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Section 162(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides a 
current deduction for the ordinary and necessary expenses of car-
rying on a trade or business. 1 However, the deduction of start-up 
and analogous costs, incurred prior to commencement of revenue-
generating operations in a new business, as an ordinary business 
expense is traditionally denied on the relatively mechanical ground 
that the taxpayer is not yet carrying on a trade or business; the 
, denial is based on the "preparatory" doctrine.2 Once capitalized, 
' I.R.C. § 162(a). 
• Section 195(c)(1) (1984) (like its predecessor § 195(b) (1980)) of the Code encompasses 
both investigatory and pre-opening costs within the generic term "start-up expenditures." 
See infra note 315. Some commentators agree with the approach adopted by the Code. See, 
e.g., Buell, Business Start Up Costs: Analyzing and Planning for Current Deductibility, 43 J. 
Tax'n 278 (1975); Erbacher, Start-Up Costs: Are They Deductible by a Corporation for Fed-
eral Income Tax Purposes?, 48 Taxes 488, 496 (1970); Roth, Trade or Business Requirement 
of Sec. 162 and the Deductibility of Preoccupancy Expenses Incurred in Rental Real Estate 
Projects, 57 Taxes 33 (1979); see also infra note 175. However, other commentators distin-
guish between (a) investigatory costs and (b) pre-opening expenses, which are often called 
start-up costs. See, e.g., Lee, Pre-Operating Expenses and Section 174: Will Snow Fall?, 27 
Tax Law. 381, 384 (1974); Seago, The Tax Treatment of Start-Up Costs, 9 Tax Adviser 410 
(1978). Proper tax treatment (current deduction versus capitalization) of the two classes of 
expenditure may differ in some instances under a deep structure analysis. See infra note 
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such start-up costs are also inequitably held to be nonamortizable 
after the business commences.8 In contrast to this traditional "def-
inition approach," a "functional approach" to the treatment of 
such costs would deny a deduction, based upon a lack of business 
status, only to non-profit-motivated and investment expenditures. 
The functional approach opens the way for consideration of the 
structural question" of the distinction between currently deducti-
443. 
Under the preparatory doctrine, a current deduction of both classes of expenditures is 
denied because the activity is not yet functioning as a going concern. See infra notes 175-187 
and accompanying text. The preparatory doctrine still finds adherents. See, e.g., Aboussie v. 
United States, 779 F.2d 424, 428 (8th Cir. 1985). Increasingly, however, decisions base denial 
of a current deduction of start-up costs on the rationale that they constitute capital expend-
itures. See, e.g., Johnsen v. Commissioner, 794 F.2d 1157, 1162 (6th Cir. 1986); Cleveland 
Elec. Illuminating Co. v. United States, 7 CJ. Ct. 220, 228 (1985). Start-up cost issues are 
frequently raised on audit. Hearings on H.R. 6883, H.R. 5616, H.R. 5729 [60-month amorti-
zation of start-up costs], H.R. 6039, H.R. 6140, H.R. 6247, H.R. 6824, and H.R. 7009 Before 
the Subcomm .. on Select Revenue Measures of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 45, 101-02 (1980) [hereinafter 1980 Hearings] (statements of Charles M. 
Walker, Chairman, Section of Taxation, A.B.A., and Samuel M. Chase, Jr., Chairman, Legis-
lative Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Real Estate Securities, Nat'l Ass'n of Realtors, 
respectively). 
• Capitalized start-up costs are usually added to one of three items. First, they are added 
to the nonamortizable basis of the business created in part by them. E.g., Francis v. Com-
missioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 704 (1977); Kennedy v. Commissioner, 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 52 
(1973); cf. Johnsen v. Commissioner, 794 F.2d 1157, 1162 (6th Cir. 1986) (start-up costs "are 
part of the cost of establishing the enterprise"). Second, they are added to a nonamortizable 
permit required to operate as a business. E.g., Richmond Television Corp. v. United States, 
345 F.2d 901 (4th Cir.), rev'd and remanded, 382 U.S. 68 (1965); Cleveland Elec. Illuminat-
ing Co. v. United States, 7 CJ. Ct. 220 (1985). Third, they are added to amortizable business 
assets used in the created business. E.g., Cagle v. Commissioner, 539 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 
1976); Shainberg v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 241 (1959); see also cases cited infra note 112. 
• A structural question involves a basic concept of the Code. See Kingson, The Deep 
Structure of Taxation: Dividend Distributions, 85 Yale L.J. 861, 861 (1976) (arguing that 
"difficulty in understanding tax law most frequently arises from failure by those who use 
basic concepts to grasp their meaning, rather than from any excessive attempt at statutory 
precision"). 
The deep structure analysis in the start-up and business expansion cost area must start 
with "Congress' fundamental policy decision to tax net income calculated annually, with 
minimal distortion. To arrive at a figure for annual net income for a given tax year, it is 
necessary to reduce gross revenues for the year by the costs of producing those revenues." 
NCNB Corp. v. United States, 651 F.2d 942, 947 (4th Cir. 1981) ("NCNB /"), vacated and 
remanded en bane, 684 F.2d 285 (4th Cir. 1982); see also Ellis Banking Corp. v. Commis-
sioner, 688 F.2d 1376, 1379 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1207 (1983); Note, Com-
missioner u. Lincoln Savings & Loan Association: "Separate and Distinct Asset" As a Con-
dition Sufficient for Capitalization, 2 Va. Tax Rev. 315 (1982). A net annual income is 
supported by the legislative history. 50 Cong. Rec. 3,849 (1913) (statement of Senator 
Williams). 
1986] Start-Up Costs 5 
ble or "ordinary" expenses and capital expenditures. The emerging 
functional answer turns on whether current deductibility will sub-
stantially distort the taxpayer's income.11 If so, the expenditure 
should be capitalized and concomitantly its cost amortized or de-
ducted ratably over the expenditure's useful life. The conflict be-
tween the definitional approach and the functional approach con-
tinues as to start-up-type costs incurred after commencement of 
revenue-generating operations. Under the "separate, saleable as-
set" definitional tack, start-up-type expenditures incurred in ex-
panding an existing business are currently deductible if they do 
not enhance or create property convertible into cash,6 whereas a 
functional approach continues to ask whether a current deduction 
will produce a substantial distortion of income as contrasted with 
capitalization and gradual amortization. 
The case-law development of the tax treatment of start-up busi-
ness expansion and analogous costs epitomizes the hazards of a 
bright-line definitional approach, particulary in the multi-jurisdic-
tional tax world.7 It may produce the correct result on the narrow 
facts to which first applied, but upon further talismanic extension 
generates functional inequities. These inequities, like a blocked 
river seeking new channels, often force other resolutons. Thus, 
some tribunals seeking to maintain the definitional precedents 
while obviating such inequities multiplied nonfunctional distinc-
tions, distorted other tax concepts, or adopted further definitional 
tests. Other tribunals more forthrightly, but in direct conflict with 
the definitional tests, applied a functional approach. All of this ne-
• See 1 B. Bittker, Federal Taxation of Income, Estates and Gifts 11 20.4.1, at 20-66 to -67 
(1981). Professor Bittker concludes that: 
As with the danger of over-inclusion, the best remedy against an under-inclusive ap-
plication of the capital expenditure concept is to focus on whether income will be 
better reflected by deducting or capitalizing the amount in question. This is obviously 
not an easy standard to apply, but it has the virtue of emphasizing the basic objective 
of the relevant statutory provisions rather than secondary guideposts. 
Id. at 20-67 (footnotes omitted); see Gunn, The Requirement that a Capital Expenditure 
Create or Enhance an Asset, 15 B.C. Indus. & Com. L. Rev. 443, 452 (1974); Lee & Murphy, 
Capital Expenditures: A Result in Search of a Rationale, 15 U. Rich. L. Rev. 473, 474-75, 
544-45 (1981); Note, Deductibility of Start-Up Expenditures Under Section 162-The 
"Clear-Reflection-of-Income" Test, 61 Cornell L. Rev. 618, 630-31, 638-39 (1976). 
• See, e.g., Briarcliff Candy Corp. v. Commissioner, 475 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1973); accord 
Colorado Springs Nat'! Bank v. United States, 505 F.2d 1185 (lOth Cir. 1974). 
7 Tax controversies may be tried in the Tax Court, federal district courts, or the Claims 
Court. See generally 4 B. Bittker, supra note 5, 11 115.1. 
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gates the prime, if not sole virtue of a definitional approach: pre-
dictable results.8 
The frequent controversies between taxpayers and the Internal 
Revenue Service under these definitional approaches, as well as 
the disparate tax treatment of identical expenditures by new and 
existing businesses, led Congress9 in 1980, as part of the then nas-
cent tax reform and simplification efforts, 10 to enact section 195,11 
which provides for elective sixty-month amortization of start-up 
costs incurred by a taxpayer in a new active business.12 Unfortu-
nately, the new Code provision utterly missed a basic goal of such 
·simplification: attainment of a reasonably certain conclusion with~ 
out expenditure of excessive research time. 13 Instead of remedying 
this failure, the 1984 amendments to section 1951" sadly com-
pounded it. Additionally, the section continues the perverse tax 
disparity of favoring existing businesses over new businesses,111 al-
• Cf. Hoopengarner v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 538, 550 (1983) (Cohen, J., dissenting), aff'd 
mem., 745 F.2d 66 (9th Cir. 1984). Judge Cohen stated that: 
To say that the contract is the income-producing asset and the expenses relating to 
that are deductible is to create chaos among those attempting to decide cases on 
principle [the preparatory doctrine) rather than on the level of imagination utilized 
by the taxpayer. In my opinion, the approach of the majority will create new 'incon-
gruities in this area of the law,' which can only constitute a renewed inducement to 
controversy and an impediment to settlement of litigation. 
ld. (footnote omitted). 
• See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 1036, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 13, reprinted in 1980 U.S. Code Cong. & 
Admin. News 7293, 7303. 
10 See, e.g., Committee on Tax Policy, Tax Section, N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, A Report on 
Complexity and the Income Tax, 27 Tax L. Rev. 325 (1972) [hereinafter N.Y. Bar Report); 
Krane, Depreciation, Investment Tax Credit, Capitalized Versus Deductible Expenditures, 
and Prepaid Expenses, in Federal Income Tax Simplification 295 (C. Gustafson ed. 1979); 
McDaniel, Simplification Symposium-Federal Income Tax Simplification: The Political 
Process, 34 Tax L. Rev. 27 (1978) and commentary cited at 27 n.l. This superficial treat-
ment of start-up costa was probably considered by the drafters of § 195. Compare Krane, at 
310-11 with S. Rep. No. 1036, supra note 9, at 10-14, reprinted in 1980 U.S. Code Cong. & 
Admin. News at 7300-04. 
11 Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-605, § 102(a), 94 Stat. 3521, 3522 
(codified as amended at I.R.C. § 195). 
11 I.R.C. § 195(b)(1) (1984); I.R.C. § 195(a) (1980). 
18 Simplification to practitioners means that a reasonably certain conclusion can be deter-
mined by diligent and expert research without excess expenditure of time and dollars. See 
N.Y. Bar Report, supra note 10, at 327. (This is not generally the case with start-up costs 
and analogous expenditures before or after § 195, as this article abundantly evidences.) 
14 Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 94(a), 98 Stat. 494, 614-15 (codified at 
I.R.C. § 195). 
10 Section 195 requires new businesses to amortize or deduct ratably over at least a 60-
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though new businesses are already at a disadvantage in both the 
capital and credit markets. 
Two mistakes made by its drafters make section 195 a deeply 
flawed provision and a substantial step backwards from simplicity. 
First, embodying a drafting technique widely advocated in calls for 
tax reform and simplification, 18 section 195 constitutes a bare-
bones generalized statute leaving to the regulations, yet to be 
promulgated, the fleshing out of the necessary details. Congress, 
however, apparently unwilling to remove its thumb from the scales, 
provided detailed guidance in the 1980 Committee Reports.17 Un-
fortunately, this "legislative history" incorporated by reference 
"present law" in an astounding number of controversial, uncertain 
areas, fatally eroding the certainty sought by the statute. Second, 
the drafters failed to consider an even more fundamental need in 
month period expenditures that an existing business can currently deduct in "operation" 
(previously, could currently deduct in "expansion"). I.R.C. § 195(b)(1) (1984); cf. I.R.C. 
§ 195(a) (1980). As a witness pointed out at the 1980 Hearings on § 195 and other "minor" 
tax bills, as to the pre-section 195 tax disparity between a new business and an existing 
business: 
An interesting point is that the same costs which are not deductible in starting up a 
new business become deductible once the business has reached going concern status. 
Then those same types of costs, not deductible or depreciable to the preoperating 
venture, become deductible under our tax laws. Thus, our tax policy currently warns 
an entrepreneur who is interested in investing and starting a new business or a new 
economic entity: You will have to finance all of these costs with after-tax dollars, but 
just as soon as you can demonstrate you have become a going concern, then we will 
let you finance the identical types of costs with pretax dollars. In our judgment, this 
is an excellent illustration of a cart-before-horse policy. 
1980 Hearings, supra note 2, at 107 (statement of Gerald W. Padwe, Associate National 
Director, Tax Services, Touche Ross & Co.). 
Sixty-month amortization is still less beneficial than an immediate deduction, notwith-
standing the rationalization that a new business may be in a loss situation and, hence, find 
deferral simpler since it corresponds "more closely to the earnings growth of a new busi-
ness." 126 Cong. Rec. 24,813 (1980) (statement of Rep. Conable, introducer of H.R. 5729); 
see NCNB Corp. v. United States, 684 F.2d 285, 295-96 (4th Cir. 1982) (en bane) ("NCNB 
//") (Murnaghan, J., dissenting), vacating and remanding, 651 F.2d 942 (4th Cir. 1981). The 
60-month amortization undoubtedly was a compromise between the aU-or-nothing (immedi-
ate deduction or capitalization without amortization) definitional rules of pre-1980 case law. 
See Krane, supra note 10, at 310-11) (suggesting just such a § 248-like compromise to the 
"intractable" start-up controversy). Section 248 was unmistakably the basis for the original 
bill. Compare H.R. 5729, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1980 Hearings, supra note 2, at 
181 with I.R.C. § 248. 
'" See N.Y. Bar Report, supra note 10, at 348-49. 
17 See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 1036, supra note 9, at 10-14, reprinted in 1980 U.S. Code Cong. & 
Admin. News at 7300-04. 
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such reform-deep structure analysis18 of ordinary and capital ex-
penditures. Consequently, the efficacy of original section 195 fate-
fully hinged upon the fallacious premise that all targeted start-up 
costs would be currently deductible if they had been incurred after 
commencement of the business, with no apparent awareness of the 
capitalization role of the clear reflection of income doctrine. The 
1984 amendments still displayed the drafters' confusion of ordi-
nary and capital expenditures. 
The demarcation, predominantly judicially fashioned, between 
ordinary and capital expenditures probably is the most difficult to 
·draw in the tax field. 19 Accordingly, in order to lay an analytical 
framework on which to examine start-up costs, Part II of this arti-
cle analyzes the minimum distortion of income rationale for capi-
talization and the acquisition cost rationale, which when misap-
plied itself produces distortion of income. This section also 
proposes a model reconciling these two approaches with respect to 
start-up costs by treating the expenditure itself as a free-standing, 
amortizable asset. Part III evaluates the case-law development of 
start-up and business expansion costs in light of this model, focus-
ing on (a) the judicial development of, and responses to, the con-
flicting definitional and functional tests, (b) the rejection of an ap-
proach substantially similar to the model, and (c) the substantial 
impact of the enactment of section 195. Part IV critically examines 
section 195, both as enacted and as amended, against the backdrop 
of this case-law development and the model, paying particular at-
tention to the statute's attributes of legislation by committee re-
port, codification of case-law conflicts, and lack of deep structure 
analysis. 
II. CAPITALIZATION AND CAPITAL RECOVERY: A DEEP STRUCTURE 
ANALYSIS 
A. The Model 
An ordinary business or investment expense is currently deducti-
•• See Kingson, supra note 4, at 861. 
11 See, e.g., Seligman v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 191, 201 (1985), affd, 796 F.2d 116 (5th 
Cir. 1986); accord Iowa-Des Moines Nat'! Bank v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 872, 878 (1977), 
affd, 592 F.2d 433 (8th Cir. 1979); Boagni v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 708, 712 (1973). See 
generally Lee & Murphy, supra note 5, at 473. 
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ble in the tax year incurred or paid. 20 A capital expenditure, in 
contrast, may be deducted from ordinary income only21 through (a) 
amortization or depreciation, usually ratably, over the useful life of 
•• Section 162(a) provides a deduction for "all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid 
or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business." I.R.C. § 162(a). 
Section 212 provides individual taxpayers a deduction for "all the ordinary and necessary 
expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year-(1) for the production or collection of 
income; (2) for the management, conservation, or maintenance of property held for the pro-
duction of income." I.R.C. § 212. The courts have assigned several major functions to the 
term "ordinary and necessary." See 1 B. Bittker, supra note 5, II 20.3.2. The two most im-
portant of these functions have been (1) to limit deductions to normal or habitual expendi-
tures (shading into "public policy") and (2) to distinguish between currently deductible and 
capital expenditures. See Raymond Bertolini Trucking Co. v. Commissioner, 736 F.2d 1120 
(6th Cir. 1984). Bertolini Trucking, however, pointed out that the Supreme Court an-
nounced that the " 'principal function of the term 'ordinary' ... is to clarify the distinction, 
often difficult, between those expenses that are currently deductible and those that are in 
the nature of capital expenditures, which, if deductible at all, must be amortized over the 
useful life of the asset.'" 736 F.2d at 1123 (quoting Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 
689-90 (1966)). 
The confusion as to the meaning of "ordinary" stems from the fact that both approaches 
are "to a certain extent correct, and are not mutually exclusive.'' 736 F.2d at 1124. An un-
usual expense is often capital "because it is a purchase of an asset requiring an unusually 
large cash outlay," and "an expenditure may be so abnormal as not to logically be connected 
to the taxpayer's particular business at all," in which case it is not necessary. Id. at 1124-25. 
These questions-"normal" or "habitual"-are but tools for getting at the prime question: 
whether the expenditure should be deducted currently or capitalized. Id. at 1125. See gener-
ally Wolfman, Professors and the "Ordinary and Necessary" Business Expense, 112 U. Pa. 
L. Rev. 1089, 1096 (1964). The term "expense" in both §§ 162 and 212 may also serve the 
same function as "ordinary.'' See Commissioner v. Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 403 U.S. 345, 
354 (1971). See generally 1 B. Bittker, supra note 5, II 20.4.1, at 20-65; Roth, supra note 2, at 
34. These provisions are backstopped by § 263, which denies any (current) deduction for, 
among other items, "[a]ny amount paid out for new buildings or for permanent improve-
ments or betterments made to increase the value of any property or estate." I.R.C. 
§ 263(a)(1) (which overrides §§ 162(a) and 212). See Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 
U.S. 1, 16-17 (1974). These provisions also appear to be the inspiration for the test adopted 
in Lincoln Savings & Loan. See infra note 233 and accompanying text. 
While § 263 has been broadly interpreted to deny any deduction for capital expenditures, 
"[i]t serves to prevent a taxpayer from utilizing currently a deduction properly attributable, 
through amortization, to later tax years when the capital asset becomes income producing." 
Idaho Power, 418 U.S. at 16. In fact, "capitalization is a basic principle of income taxation 
rather than a technical requirement imposed by specific statutory language.'' Gunn, supra 
note 5, at 450; see also 1 B. Bittker supra note 5, II 20.4.1, at 20-66. Section 446(b), with its 
requirement that the taxpayer's method of accounting clearly reflect income, also applies to 
this area. See Treas. Reg. § 1.446-l(a)(4)(ii) (expenditures made during the year must be 
properly classified between capital and expense); 1 B. Bittker, supra note 5, II 20.4.1, at 20-
65. 
•• The Code and, on occasion, the regulations have provided a mechanical current deduc-
tion for capital expenditures below an administrative benchmark. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 179; 
Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-11(d)(2)(iii). 
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the asset acquired, created, or improved by the expenditure,22 or 
(b) upon destruction or abandonment prior to the end of such life 
as a loss under section 165.28 This timing aspect of capitalization is 
•• Amortization of the "cost" of property used in a trade or business, or held for the 
production of income, traditionally has consisted of first determining the useful life of the 
intangible asset acquired, created, or enhanced by the expenditure, under Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.167(a)-3, and then allowing ratable, animal "depreciation" or amortization deductions, 
under § 167 of the Code, equal to the amount of that expenditure over such life. Such 
ratable charge generally is not directly tied, tax year-by-tax year, to the income produced . 
. See 1 B. Bittker, supra note 5, 11 23.1.1, at 23-5; Note, supra note 4, at 331. 
In the case of depreciation of tangible assets, useful life rules are similar to- (albeit more 
lenient, under Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-l(a)), but more rapid (in early years of use) than, rata-
ble methods of recovery (i.e., accelerated depreciation), although recently class-life treat-
ment has been increasingly available. See 1 B. Bittker, supra note 5, 11 23.3.4. Under the 
Accelerated Cost Recovery System ("ACRS") provided by § 168, which also is limited to 
depreciable tangible property, the recovery method is front-loaded and the recovery period 
a small fraction of actual useful life. See, e.g., 2 Department of the Treasury, Tax Reform 
for Fairness, Simplicity, and Economic Growth: The Treasury Department Report to the 
President 154-55 (1984) [hereinafter Treasury Report]. In addition, for most taxpayers all 
assets fall into one of three classes: real estate, cars and truc-ks, and other equipment. See 
I.R.C. § 168(b)(2). 
. 
Terminology in this area is "confused," with the Code using "depreciation" to refer to the 
cost of tangible and intangible property covered by § 167, while "amortization" refers to 
statutory provisions allowing ratable deductions of cost faster than permitted under § 167 
(see, e.g., I.R.C. § 169), or of costs not deductible under § 167 (see, e.g., I.R.C. § 195). Com-
mentators and cases, however, limit "depreciation" to cost recovery of tangible property and 
"amortization" to cost recovery of intangibles. E.g., 1 B. Bittker, supra note 5, 11 23.1.1, at 
23-4. 
The function of classic depreciation and amortization is "to further the integrity of peri-
odic income statements by making a meaningful allocation of the cost entailed in the use 
(excluding maintenance expense) of the asset to the periods to which it contributes." Mas-
sey Motors, Inc. v. United States, 364 U.S. 92, 104 (1960). In short, depreciation and amorti-
zation are the "indispensable corollary" of capitalization to prevent distortion of income. 
See 1 B. Bittker, supra note 5, 11 23.1.2, at 23-7. Historically, they served to spread the 
deductions of the capitalized expenditure over the tax years benefited, thereby "matching" 
income and the cost of producing the income. For discussion of the controversy over 
whether capitalization to prevent distortion of income is appropriate where neither depreci-
ation nor amortization is available (e.g., due to inability to prove a "limited useful life"), see 
infra notes 65-95 and accompanying text. For discussion of the different thrust of ACRS, see 
infra notes 30-32 and accompanying text. 
18 Section 165(a) provides a deduction for "any loss sustained during the taxable year and 
not compensated for by insurance or otherwise." I.R.C. § 165(a). In the case of individuals, 
however, such deductible losses are limited to losses incurred in a trade or business or in 
any (non-trade or -business) transaction entered into for profit. These limitations do not 
apply to losses arising from casualty or theft, however. See I.R.C. § 165(c). For losses (not 
from casualty or theft) to be ordinary, either from a capital asset or an expenditure, they 
must not arise from a sale or exchange. See I.R.C. § 165(0. As a practical matter, non-theft 
or -casualty losses must arise from the asset becoming worthless or being abandoned. See 1 
B. Bittker, supra note 5, 11 25.8.2. For special problems where nonrecourse liabilities are 
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dictated by a basic policy of the tax system to tax net income an-
nually with minimum distortion of income.2" Under an economic 
model of determining net income, a capital expenditure is not 
spent in the year it is made; rather, the expenditure is converted 
into a different type of property. 211 The cost of this property then 
reduces gross income in each tax period according to the change in 
its value between the beginning and the end of the period in ques-
tion.26 Under judicially adopted accounting concepts,27 capitaliza-
tion-when coupled with depreciation or amortization-serves to 
match (albeit usually roughly) an expenditure generating future in-
come with such income.28 
Accelerated costs recovery methods, e.g., the Accelerated Cost 
Recovery System ("ACRS") enacted as section 168 of the Code29 
(unavailable for intangible assets), are a major departure from the 
economic model . This departure at best economically matches re-
sultant income and the expenditure only in very high inflation tax 
years. 30 This distortion in accelerated cost recovery methods re-
sulted in the open abandonment of the pretense of trying to mea-
sure income31 and instead was intended to eliminate the income 
tax on capital, at least for personal property.32 Such methods fuel 
present, see Freeland v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 970 (1980); accord Middleton v. Commis-
sioner, 77 T.C. 310 (1981). 
•• See supra note 4. See generally Gunn, supra note 5 (discussed infra note 37). 
•• See Kahn, Accelerated Depreciation-Tax Expenditure or Proper Allowance for Mea-
suring Net Income?, 78 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 13 (1979). 
•• See id. at 3. 
17 Matching costs with revenues produced in a particular period is a basic financial ac-
counting concept under Generally Accepted Accounting Principles ("GAAP"). See Dubroff, 
Cahill & Norris, Tax Accounting: The Relationship of Clear Reflection of Income to Gener-
ally Accepted Accounting Principles, 47 Alb. L. Rev. 354, 358-59 (1983) [hereinafter 
Dubroff]. Judicial acceptance of this basic financial accounting concept should not involve 
the adoption, as well, of the GAAP hierarchy of expense principles. See Commissioner v. 
Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1, 16 (1974); Wolfsen Land & Cattle Co. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 
1 (1979). But see NCNB I, 651 F.2d at 948-49, vacated and remanded en bane, 684 F.2d 285 
(4th Cir. 1982). See generally infra notes 258-63 and accompanying text. 
•• Idaho Power, 418 U.S. at 16. 
•• Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 20l(a), 95 Stat. 172, 203-18 
(codified as amended at I.R.C. § 168). 
•• See Treasury Report, supra note 22, at 155-56. 
•• See Steines, Income Tax Allowances for Cost Recovery, 40 Tax L. Rev. 483, 501, 518-
19, 531-32, 536 (1985); Warren, Accelerated Capital Recovery, Debt, and Tax Arbitrage, 38 
Tax Law. 549 (1985). 
•• Steines, supra note 31, at 518, 531, 537; Warren, supra note 31, at 554 (1982-86 combi-
nation of investment tax credits, depreciable basis, and acceleration of depreciation for 
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real estate tax shelters, particularly in low inflation tax years, and 
virtually eliminate corporate-level income taxes in some capital in-
tensive industries.88 Classic depreciation of tangible property and 
current amortization of intangible property, on the other hand, 
conceptually consist of allocating a capitalized cost (usually rata-
bly) to the tax years to which it contributes to production of in-
come, i.e., its useful life. s• Capitalization coupled with amortization 
is therefore necessary to prevent the distortion (here, understate-
ment) of the taxpayer's net income that would result from deduct-
ing the entire cost currently of an expenditure "properly attributa-
·ble, through amortization, to later tax years when the capital asset 
becomes income-producing."811 
In ascertaining the period in which to deduct a cost benefiting 
several tax years, the fact that it benefits future years is not alone 
determinative. As one commentator notes 
if the IRS seriously endeavored to disallow every cost contributing 
to the profits of future periods, it would be necessary to divide al-
most every salary and advertising expense between its immediate 
impact on the customer and its contribution to the company's 
long-lived goodwill. Recognizing this fact of business life, the Su-
preme Court has said that "the presence of an ensuing benefit that 
may have some future aspect is not controlling; many expenses 
concededly deductible have prospective effect beyond the taxable 
year."88 
three· and five-year ACRS property equivalent to expensing at ten percent discount rate); 
see S. Rep. No. 494, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 123, 126, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & 
Admin. News 781, 888, 891. 
•• The new separate basket limitation on the deductibility of passive activity losses, also 
included in the new minimum tax, will serve as a surrogate to curb overuse of tax shelters. 
Under new § 469 of the Code, after Dec. 31, 1986, individuals, estates, trusts, and close and 
personal service corporations may not use net losses and credits from passive trade or busi-
ness activities to offset other income (e.g., salary, portfolio income, and active business in-
come), but may use them to offset income from passive activities. See Tax Reform Act of 
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 501(a) (to be codified at I.R.C. § 469). The new minimum tax 
imposes this limitation on all taxpayers, corporate as well as noncorporate. See id. at 
§ 701(a) (to be codified at I.R.C. § 58(b)) . 
.. See, e.g., Massey Motors, 364 U.S. at 104. 
•• Idaho Power, 418 U.S. at 16. 
ae 1 B. Bittker, supra note 5, 11 20.4.1, at 20-67 (quoting Commissioner v. Lincoln Sav. & 
Loan Ass'n, 403 U.S. 345, 354 (1971)). Precisely the same point was made (indeed, using the 
same example) subsequently in Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. v. Commissioner, 685 F.2d 
212, 217 (7th Cir. 1982) (dictum). See Briarcliff Candy Corp. v. Commissioner, 475 F.2d 775, 
785-86 (2d Cir. 1973); Southland Royalty Co. v. United States, 582 F.2d 604, 617 (Ct. Cl. 
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The critical question is whether current deduction of an expendi-
ture will result in more than minimal distortion of income. 37 If not, 
and the burden of capitalization and amortization will be heavy, 
the expenditure should be currently deducted in its entirety in the 
year made. 38 Such minimal distortion is produced by the current 
deduction of an expenditure with future benefits where the expen-
diture (1) is not substantial in relationship to the taxpayer's over-
all income for the year or its useful life is short, (2) recurs regu-
larly, or annually in roughly equivalent amounts, and the future 
benefit is short or uncertain, or (3) cannot be clearly associated 
with either current or future tax years. 39 
However, another basis for capitalizaton, derived from a differ-
ent line of authorities than those preventing a mismatch in the 
timing of costs and attributable income, seeks to prevent a mis-
match in the character of the deduction of an expenditure in-
curred in connection with the acquisition or disposition of a capital 
asset. 40 To prevent the income distortion generated by the coup-
1978). 
" The seminal commentary in the area of capital expenditures developed the thesis that 
"a determination of whether capitalization of an expenditure is necessary to clearly reflect 
income ... [should be] substituted for the usual process of determining whether the expen-
diture produces an asset,'~ and that expensing small items does not distort the taxpayer's 
income. Gunn, supra note 5, at 452; accord Lee & Murphy, supra note 5, at 541-44; see infra 
notes 53-60 and accompanying text. Gunn also raised the possibility that capitalization is 
not appropriate in this context when amortization is not available. Gunn, supra note 5, at 
492-95; cf. Note, supra note 5, at 621 n.21, 625 n.42 (proposing as an alternative factor to 
future benefit the question whether the expense is recurring, in the context of distortion of 
income; but principally arguing that reliance upon Generally Accepted Accounting Princi-
ples ("GAAP") for determining current deduction versus capitalization would avoid distor-
tion of income). Essentially, this was the approach taken in NCNB I, 651 F.2d at 961; see 
infra notes 253-58 and accompanying text. One thesis of this article is that accounting con-
cepts, e.g., treating a cost as an amortizable deferred charge, are useful in clearly reflecting 
income, but "currency" or even "capitalization" does not incorporate GAAP per se. See 
infra notes 87-95 and accompanying text. 
88 See Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P. Ry. v. United States, 424 F.2d 563 (Ct. Cl. 1970); see also 
Iowa-Des Moines Nat'! Bank v. Commissioner, 592 F.2d 433, 436 (8th Cir. 1979); Southland 
Royalty, 582 F.2d at 618. Some tribunals overstress the "burden" of capitalization/amortiza-
tion in attempting to distinguish between current and future use. E.g., Cleveland Elec. Illu-
minating Co. v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 220, 234-35 (1985); cf. NCNB I, 651 F.2d at 961 
(vacated panel opinion). These courts focus on the "burden" rather than determining the 
total period benefited (useful life). See infra notes 253-58 and accompanying text. 
•• For discussion of each of these categories in turn, see infra notes 53-66, 67-79 & 80-108 
and accompanying texts. 
•• See Woodward v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. 572 (1970). See generally Lee & Murphy, 
supra note 5, at 474-75, 484-99. 
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ling of a current ordinary deduction for the cost of acquiring or 
disposing of an asset and a pre-1987 capital gains deduction upon 
disposition of the asset against the attributable capital gain un-
reduced by the expenditures, the "origin-of-the-claim," also known 
as the acquisition cost, doctrine requires capitalization of such ex-
penditures in order to match the character of the expenditure and 
the income.41 This doctrine is compatible with the timing-mini-
. mum distortion of income doctrine only so long as the expenditure 
does not produce benefits for a shorter period than the asset to the 
basis of which it is added. If, however, the expenditure's benefits 
last for a shorter period than the useful life of the capital asset 
acquired, capitalization of the expenditure and its addition to the 
basis of the asset acquired itself produces distortion of income 
through depreciation or amortization over a longer period than 
that benefited by the expenditure, or at worst, by no amortization 
at all. 
In addition to the "origin-of-the-claim" doctrine, avoiding such 
distortion of income also requires the use of a judicially approved 
accounting concept. This concept, under the model, treats the ex-
penditure as a separate asset, a "deferred charge" in accounting 
terms,-n and its cost is then amortized over the period benefited.43 
If the period benefited is short or highly variable, so that amortiza-
tion is difficult or impossible, and the expenditure is at least 
"steady-state"" recurring, then the cost treated as a separate asset 
should be expensed in its entirety in the year made. ' 11 
Additionally, the role of the courts should be modified under the 
model. Many courts improperly permit a current deduction of 
(business expansion) costs, creating intangibles benefiting future 
41 See Sharples v. United States, 533 F.2d 550, 554 (Ct. Cl. 1976). For taxable years begin-
ning after Dec. 31, 1986, the present 60% capital gains deduction provided by § 1202(a) is 
repealed. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 301. In addition, the alternate 
corporate capital gains rate of 28% provided by § 120l(a) is conformed to the top rate for 
corporations. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 311. 
•• NCNB I, 651 F.2d at 949. 
•• See Wolfsen Land & Cattle, 72 T.C. at 13. The vacated NCNB I panel opinion in 
essence called for this approach with regard to start-up or expansion costs (which it prop-
erly believed should be treated identically), although the panel was confused regarding the 
actual tax mechanisms for amortization. See infra notes 258-68 and accompanying text. 
" See infra note 75 and accompanying text. 
•• See Iowa-Des Moines Nat'l Bank, 592 F.2d at 436; Southland Royalty, 582 F.2d at 618. 
For discusion of the "origin-of-the-claim" or acquisition cost doctrine and deferred charge 
approach, see infra notes 116-61 and accompanying text. 
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years under the definitional "separate, saleable asset" doctrine,46 
in order to prevent distortion of income where they believe amorti-
zation will not be available if the expenditure were capitalized. 
However, under the model the courts' flexibility in avoiding distor-
tion of income as to start-up and business expansion costs instead 
should lie in (a) approximating or estimating useful lives under 
Cohan u. Commissioner,•' or (b) determining that a current deduc-
tion produces minimal distortion of income.48 
Summarizing the model entails a two-step analysis: (1) look at 
whether current deduction of an expenditure will distort the tax-
payer's income (because the expenditure provides future benefits 
and is neither sufficiently insubstantial nor recurring to be nondis-
torting if currently deducted); if so, (2) estimate the period bene-
fited by the expenditure, i.e., the useful life, and amortize the ex-
penditure as a free-standing asset over that period. 
B. Currently Deductible Future Benefit Expenditures Not 
Distorting I nco me 
The allowance of a current deduction for an expense generating 
future benefit depends on several factors, including the insubstan-
tiality or short life of the expenditure49 and its regular steady-state 
recurrence.110 A further issue is raised when an expenditure cannot 
be clearly associated with either current or future tax years.111 In 
light of these considerations, courts and commentators alike have 
attempted to establish grounds for allowing a current deduction 
for such expenditures. In contexts where income is distorted, how-
ever, amortization based on "estimation" of useful life is the ap-
propriate remedy.112 
1. Insubstantiality or Short-Lived Expenditure 
Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific Railway u. United 
•• See infra notes 225-43 and accompanying text. 
47 39 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1930). 
•• See infra notes 116-61 and accompanying text. 
•• See infra notes 54-66 and accompanying text. 
•• See infra notes 67-79 and accompanying text. 
61 See infra notes 80-108 and accompanying text. 
•• See infra notes 109-115 and accompanying text. 
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States63 was the first decision to allow the current deduction of an 
expenditure benefiting future years under a distortion of income 
analysis. There the government argued that: (1) since the expendi-
tures at issue admittedly had a useful life in excess of one year, 
they had to be capitalized under the predecessor to section 26364 as 
a "betterment"; and, (2) the method of accounting provisions (the 
predecessor to section 446) 66 were subordinate to the capital ex-
penditure and depreciation provisions. 66 The Court of Claims (now 
the Federal Circuit) disagreed, reasoning that capitalization, de-
preciation, and the requirement that the taxpayer's method of ac-
counting clearly reflect income were all so "inextricably inter-
twined"67 that the ultimate question was whether the taxpayer's 
(tax) accounting method clearly reflected its income,68 and not 
whether the benefits generated by the expenditures extended be-
yond the tax year, although that was a relevant inquiry.69 The 
Court of Claims relied most heavily on the insubstantiality of the 
expenditures in relation to both the taxable income and the bal-
ance sheet of the taxpayer, concluding that the taxpayer's method 
did clearly reflect its income.6° Critical to the court's conclusion 
was the fact that the burden of capitalizing and depreciating each 
purchase with benefits extending beyond the tax year would be 
•• 424 F.2d 563 (Ct. Cl. 1970). See generally Gunn, supra note 5, at 454-57. 
•• Section 263 generally denies a current deduction for expenditures for new buildings or 
permanent improvements or betterments. I.R.C. § 263; see also supra note 20. Commenta-
tors believe that the capitalization requirement is broader than any particular section of the 
Code. See, e.g., Gunn, supra note 5, at 450; accord 1 B. Bittker, supra note 5, 11 20.4.1, at 20-
66. 
•• Section 446(a) and (b) provides that the taxpayer's income is to be computed under his 
regular method of accounting unless he fails to employ a method or the method used does 
not clearly reflect income. I.R.C. § 446(a)-(b). In either case, income will be computed under 
such method as does clearly reflect income in the opinion of the Secretary of the Treasury. 
I d . 
.. 424 F.2d at 567-68. The useful life was assumed to be ten years. ld. at 571; Gunn, supra 
note 5, at 456 n.55. 
07 424 F.2d at 569. 
•• See supra note 55. 
•• 424 F.2d at 568. In this determination of clear reflection of income, "the one year rule 
will be given adequate, though not conclusive, weight." Id. The taxpayer's method of ac-
counting for these items was required by the Interstate Commerce Commission. Id. at 565. 
Courts tend to give considerable weight to the requirements of applicable regulatory ac-
counting in determining clear reflection of income. See id.; NCNB II, 684 F.2d at 292; see 
also Dubroff, supra note 27, at 396-97. 
80 See 424 F.2d at 571-72; Gunn, supra note 5, at 456-57. 
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heavy; "at the same time, the clearer reflection of income would be 
exceedingly slight if there were any at all. "61 
The Tax Court similarly pointed to the regulation permitting a 
farmer to currently deduct the full cost of inexpensive or short-
lived tools in the year of payment despite their capital nature, as 
supporting the current deduction of the minor costs of a license by 
an attorney admitted to one state bar to practice in another state 
notwithstanding its future benefits.62 Commentators also largely 
rationalized the repair-maintenance rules (under which expendi-
tures made to keep property in ordinarily efficient condition are 
currently deductible but must also be capitalized)63 under such a 
distortion of income approach. The proper criterion for nondeduct-
ibility of a "repair" expenditure is whether it is sufficiently sub-
stantial in relation to the taxpayer's entire business so that deduc-
tion all at once will produce a distortion of income. 64 In short, 
determining net income annually with minimum distoriton of in-
come entails a balancing process under which taxable income is not 
distorted by currently deducting a cost producing future benefit so 
long as such cost is insubstantial or the future benefit is short-
lived, particularly if capitalizing and then amortizing such cost will 
be burdensome. 
The difficulty in the "insubstantiality" test lies not in its theory, 
which is recognized by certain statutory provisions,66 but rather in 
determinimg "insubstantiality" as to the particular taxpayer and 
the tax year. While the cases explicitly relying on the doctrine have 
involved a $20-$500 range, the Claims Court has viewed $15,000 as 
•• 424 F.2d at 572. For the same balancing approach as to recurring expenditures, see 
infra notes 75-78 and accompanying text. 
•• Sharon v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 515, 527 (1976), affd, 591 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1978), 
cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979); accord Diffley v. Commissioner, 48 T.C.M. (CCH) 547, 549 
(1984); Galazin v. Commissioner, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 851, 853 (1979); Treas. Reg. § 1.162-
12(a). Similarly, the regulations provide that "[a]mounts currently paid or accrued for 
books, furniture, and professional instruments and equipment, the useful life of which is 
short, may be deducted." Treas. Reg. § 1.162-6. Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific 
Railway noted the "insubstantiality" underlying the current deductibility by mine operators 
of the cost of items of plant and equipment necessary to maintain the mine's normal output. 
424 F.2d at 569; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.612-2(a). 
•• See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-4. 
•• Gunn, supra note 5, at 457-60; Lee & Murphy, supra note 5, at 541-43; see NCNB I, 651 
F.2d at 961 n.39. 
•• See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
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insubstantial (at least compared to $300,000).66 
2. Recurring Steady-State Expenditures 
Several decisions analyzed the current deduction of recurring ex-
penses benefiting several tax years as not distorting the taxpayer's 
income. In Southland Royalty Co. v. United States67 the taxpayer, 
an oil and gas company, currently deducted the cost of an oil and 
gas reserve survey used in current operations, with an uncertain 
and short useful life. The government disallowed the current de-
duction for the survey, but disavowed prior survey decisions that 
capitalized such survey costs as part of some underlying property,68 
instead arguing that the cost must be capitalized because the sur-
vey itself had a useful life lasting beyond the taxable year.69 The 
Court of Claims allowed the deductions because they were "func-
tionally part of, and indistinguishable from, expenditures for ordi-
nary management planning,"70 noting that the reserve survey was 
not used to determine whether oil drilling was feasible, prior to 
acquiring the mineral interest. If the company had obtained the 
mineral interest, the survey cost would have constituted part of the 
cost of such interest (under the acquisition cost doctrine).71 The 
court looked to "matching expenditures to the income resulting 
from a capital transaction" as a function of capitalization, but 
found amortization inappropriate because the surveys were subject 
to change at any time and were updated every few years, and 
hence, capitalization without amortization would distort the tax-
payer's income. 72 
•• Compare Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P. Ry. v. United States, 424 F.2d 563 (Ct. Cl. 1970) with 
Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 220 (1985). 
87 582 F.2d 604, 618 (Ct. Cl. 1978). Surveys of the kind at issue, while providing some 
future benefits (three to four years), were used in current operations to make income projec-
tions, develop short- and long-term budgets, arrange financing, and prepare reports to 
shareholders and regulatory authorities. 
88 ld. at 616. Misidentification of cost with nonamortizable assetS has been a longstanding 
problem. Gunn, supra note 5, at 446. 
•• 582 F.2d at 616-17. 
70 ld. at 617. 
71 For discussion of the treatment of recurring expenditures incurred in the acquisition of 
capital assets, see infra note 284 and accompanying text. 
71 The Southland Royalty court noted that: 
The useful life of the survey is very uncertain; as the trial judge found, the estimates 
in a reserve study are subject to change at any time and have to be updated every few 
years to take account of subsequent developments. In those circumstances, it is not 
1986] Start- Up Costs 19 
In essence, the current deduction of expenditures recurring in 
normal operations, even if producing future benefits, does not pro-
duce a distortion of income so long as the expenditures are not an 
acquisition cost of some underlying property with a useful life co-
terminous with such benefits. Analogously, the Seventh Circuit in 
Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. v. Commissioner73 profferred (in 
dictum)· a distortion of income analysis as supporting a series of 
decisions74 allowing authors to currently deduct their expenses 
even though incurred in the creation of long-lived assets (the books 
being written). 'fhe court stated: 
We can think of a practical reason for allowing authors to de-
duct their expenses immediately, one applicable as well to pub-
lishers though not in the circumstances of the present case. If you 
are in the business of producing a series of assets that will yield 
income over a period of years-which is the situation of most au-
thors and all publishers-identifying particular expenditures with 
particular books, a necessary step for proper capitalization because 
the useful lives of the books will not be the same, may be very 
difficult, since the expenditures of an author or publisher (more 
clearly the latter) tend to be joint among several books. Moreover, 
allocating these expenditures among the different books is not al-
ways necessary to produce the temporal matching of income and 
expenditures that the Code desiderates, because the taxable in-
come of the author or publisher who is in a steady state (that is, 
whose output is neither increasing or decreasing) will be at least 
approximately the same whether his costs are expensed or capi-
talized. Not the same on any given book-on each book expenses 
and receipts will be systematically mismatched-but the same on 
average. Under these conditions the benefits of capitalization are 
unlikely to exceed the accounting and other administrative costs 
entailed in capitalization76 
compulsory to amortize such a recurring item over a fixed time-interval. Neither is it 
appropriate to require capitalization without amortization; such a requirement would 
clearly distort Southland's income. 
582 F.2d at 618 (footnote omitted); see also Iowa-Des Moines Nat'! Bank v. Commissioner, 
592 F.2d 433, 436 (8th Cir. 1979). 
•• 685 F.2d 212 (7th Cir. 1982). 
•• Faura v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 849 (1980); accord Snyder v. United States, 674 F.2d 
1359, 1365 (lOth Cir. 1982). See generally Note, Tax Treatment of Prepublication Expenses 
of Authors and Publishers, 82 Mich. L. Rev. 537 (1983). 
•• 685 F.2d at 215 (emphasis added). This balancing of the benefits of capitalization ver-
sus administrative costs where income will not be distorted by current deduction is also a 
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However, the Seventh Circuit questioned whether there is a ten-
sion between the author expense cases and Commissioner v. Idaho 
Power Co.,76 where the Supreme Court ruled that expenses, regard-
less of character, must be capitalized if incurred in creating a capi-
tal asset. Encyclopaedia Britannica balanced this reservation with 
the observation that capitalizing an expenditure producing future 
income or benefits, if taken "seriously," would force the capitaliza-
tion of virtually every business expense, even the salary of the 
salespeople whose selling activities create goodwill, yielding income 
beyond the year in which the salary is paid or accrued. This is "a 
result courts naturally shy away from. "77 The Seventh Circuit 
viewed the administrative costs of such "conceptual rigor" as too 
great: 
The distinction between recurring and nonrecurring business ex-
penses provides a very crude but perhaps serviceable demarcation 
between those capital expenditures that can feasibly be capitalized 
and those that cannot be. Whether the distinction breaks down 
where, as in the case of the conventional publisher, the firm's en-
tire business is the producton of capital assets, so that it is literally 
true that all of its business expenses are capital in nature [under 
Idaho Power], is happily not a question we have to decide here, for 
it is clear that Encyclopaedia Britannica's payments . . . were of a 
nonnormal, nonrecurrent nature.78 
The tension between Idaho Power and the current deduction 
under a clear reflection of income analysis of recurring expendi-
tures made in connection with an acquisition of a capital asset, 
noted in Encyclopaedia Britannica, largely disappears under fur-
ther analysis. 79 
3. No Clear Association with Current or Future Tax Years 
The distortion of income, resulting from capitalization without 
subsequent amortization or an expenditure benefiting both the 
current and future tax years, calls for a determination of whether a 
critical element in the insubstantial cost exception to the rule requiring capitalization of 
costs that produce future benefits. See supra note 61. 
78 418 u.s. 1, 16 (1974). 
77 685 F.2d at 217; see supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
78 685 F.2d at 217. 
78 See infra notes 134·61 and accompanying text. 
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current deduction of such an expenditure is mandated when amor-
tization is impractical or unavailable. Courts and commentators 
have espoused the following positions: (1) Generally Accepted Ac-
counting Principles ("GAAP") are determinative as to the timing 
of deductions; (2) capitalization and amortization are subordinate 
to clear reflection of income, so that a current deduction is prefera-
ble to capitalization without amortization; (3) capitalization and 
amortization are separate questions; and, ( 4) where both current 
deduction and capitalization without amortization produce distor-
tion of income, the appropriate remedy is creative use of amortiza-
tion through "estimation" of useful life-the alternative this arti-
cle advocates.80 
a. G AAP and Tax Accounting 
The regulations regard the taxpayer's method of accounting, as 
ordinarily "clearly reflecting income" for purposes of section 
446(b)81 if it "reflects the consistent application of generally ac-
cepted accounting principles ... , provided all items of gross in-
come and expense are treated consistently from year to year."82 
GAAP consists of the conventions, rules, and procedures used in 
financial accounting to define: (1) those economic resources and 
obligations which should be recorded as assets and liabilities, (2) 
which changes in them should be recorded, and (3) how and when 
these changes should be measured. 83 
GAAP calls for "recognition" of an expenditure as an expense in 
the year paid if it cannot be associated with revenue in a later 
year, preferably on the basis of either cause and effect or, if that is 
not possible, on the basis of systematic and rational allocation. 8 " If 
80 See infra notes 109-115 and accompanying text. 
81 Under § 446(b), if the taxpayer's method of accounting does not clearly reflect income, 
the Service may recompute the taxpayer's taxable income under a method which the Com-
missioner believes does clearly reflect income. See Dubroff, supra note 27; Note, Protecting 
the Public Fisc: Fighting Accrual Abuse with Section 446 Discretion, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 378, 
387-98 (1983). 
•• Tress. Reg. § 1.446-1(a)(2) (based upon S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 300, 
reprinted in 1954 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 4621, 4939). 
•• Dubroff, supra note 27, at 366 . 
.. See, e.g., Basic Concepts and Accounting Principles Underlying Financial Statements 
of Business Enterprises, Accounting Principles Board Statement No.4, 1111147, 157-60 (1970) 
[hereinafter APB Statement No. 4]. This Statement, relied upon by the NCNB I panel in 
describing the three principles mentioned in 11 161, provides in pertinent part that: 
22 Virginia Tax Review [Vol. 6:1 
an expenditure is not so immediately recognized as an expense, it 
is carried forward on the balance sheet as an asset, acting as a de-
ferred charge to be expensed in whole or in part in future peri-
11 147 .... Expenses are determined by applying the expense recognition principles 
on the basis of relationships between acquisition costs and either the independently 
determined revenue or accounting periods . . .. From the perspective of income de-
termination, costs are divided into (1) those that have "expired" and become ex-
penses and (2) those that are related to later periods and are carried forward as assets 
in the balance sheet. 
11 157 .... [Associating cause and effect.] Some costs are recognized as expenses on 
the basis of a presumed direct association with specific revenue. 
Although direct cause and effect relationships can seldom be conclusively demon-
strated, many costs appear to be related to particular revenue and recognizing them 
as expenses accompanies recognition of the revenue. Examples of expenses that are 
recognized by associating cause and effect are sales commissions and costs of prod-
ucts sold or services provided. 
11 158. Several assumptions regarding relationships must be made to accumulate the 
costs of products sold or services provided .... "Attaching" costs ... often requires 
several allocations and reallocations of costs . . . . 
11159 .... [Systematic and rational allocation.) In the absence of a direct means of 
associating cause and effect, some costs are associated with specific accounting peri-
ods as expenses on the basis of an attempt to allocate costs in a systematic and ra-
tional manner among the periods in which benefits are provided. If an asset provides 
benefits for several periods its cost is allocated to the periods in a systematic and 
rational manner in the absence of a more direct basis for associating cause and effect. 
The cost of an asset that provides benefits for only one period is recognized as an 
expense of that period (also a systematic and rational allocation). This form of ex-
pense recognition always involves assumptions about the pattern of benefits and the 
relationship between costs and benefits because neither of these two factors can be 
conclusively demonstrated .... Examples of items that are recognized in a system-
atic and rational manner are depreciation of fixed assets, amortization of intangible 
assets, and allocation of rent and insurance. Systematic and rational allocation of 
costs may increase assets as product costs or as other asset costs rather than increase 
expenses immediately, for example, depreciation charged to inventory and costs of 
self-constructed assets. These costs are later recognized as expenses under the ex-
pense recognition principles. 
11 160 .... [Immediate recognition.] Some costs are associated with the current 
accounting period as expenses because (I) costs incurred during the period provide no 
discernible future benefits, (2) costs recorded as assets in prior periods no longer pro-
vide discernible benefits or (3) allocating costs either on the basis of association with 
revenue or among several accounting periods is considered to serve no useful purpose. 
Application of this principle of expense recognition results in charging many costs 
to expense in the period in which they are paid or liabilities to pay them accrue. 
Examples include officers' salaries, most selling costs, amounts paid to settle lawsuits, 
and costs of resources used in unsuccessful efforts. The principle of immediate recog-
nition also requires that items carried as assets in prior periods that are discovered to 
have no discernible future benefit be charged to expense . 
ld. (quoted in NCNB I, 651 F.2d at 952-53 & n.l8). 
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ods. 86 The GAAP hierarchy of expense recognition rules reflect the 
underlying accounting concept of matching expenses with revenues 
in a particular period. 86 
Although adherence to GAAP in most cases does clearly reflect 
income for tax accounting purposes, GAAP is neither determina-
tive nor even presumptively correct regarding tax issues.87 As the 
Supreme Court pointed out in Thor Power Tool Co. v. Commis-
soner,88 no such presumption is supportable in light of the vastly 
different goals of financial and tax accounting.89 GAAP financial 
accounting rules and tax accounting rules vary in a number of spe-
cific transactions regarding timing of income and of expenses or 
deductions. 90 
Moreover, while financial and tax accounting both seek to match 
costs with attributable revenue in the appropriate period, the 
mechanisms utilized differ. In tax accounting, unlike financial ac-
counting, capitalization and depreciation/amortization do not oper-
ate to match expense and income on a cause and effect basis, nor 
does depreciation take account of actual market declines in the 
•• NCNB /, 651 F.2d at 949; Gunn, supra note 5, at 445-46. 
88 Dubroff, supra note 27, at 359 n.19. 
87 One commentator notes that "financial accounting principles tend to err on the side of 
understating income, which may not be tolerable for income tax purposes." Warner, Deduct-
ibility of Business Expansion Expenses-NCNB Corp. v. U. S., Tax Mgmt. Mem. No. 81-22 
(BNA) 2, 6 (1981); see Note, Taxation: Start-up Cost Treatment Under § 195: Tax Disparity 
in Disguise, 36 Okla. L. Rev. 449, 463 (1983). See generally Dubroff, supra note 27, at 383-
88, 400-02 . 
.. 439 u.s. 522, 542-44 (1979). 
•• The Court stated that: 
The primary goal of financial accounting is to provide useful information to manage-
ment, shareholders, creditors, and others properly interested; the major responsibility 
of the accountant is to protect those parties from being misled. The primary goal of 
the income tax system, in contrast, is the equitable collection of revenue; the major 
responsibility of the Internal Revenue Service is to protect the public fisc. 
439 U.S. at 542. See generally Dubroff, supra note 27, at 377-79. 
•• Dubroff, supra note 27, lists a number of such areas in which financial and tax account-
ing vary, including the following more common examples: (I) prepaid income and expenses, 
(2) "all events" limitation on accountability of contingent expenses, and (3) inclusion of 
"contingent" income under the "claim of right" doctrine. Id. at 360-63, 385-86, 386; see also, 
Jensen, Deduction of Future Liabilities by Accrual-Basis Taxpayers: Premature Accruals, 
the All Events Test, and Economic Performance, 37 U. Fla. L. Rev. 444 (1985). Tax and 
financial accounting, in fact, differ as to the treatment of start-up costs. See Intangible As-
sets, Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 17 (1970); Case Note, Deductibility of Cost 
of Establishing Merchandising Outlets, 34 Ohio St. L.J. 906, 909-13 (1973). 
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value of the depreciable asset.91 Rather, under classic tax deprecia-
tion/amortization concepts the expenditure's "useful life"92 is "es-
timated" in the year incurred and its costs allocated to the tax 
years of that useful life under one of several allowable methods 
(e.g., straightline or ratably declining balance).93 Only over the en-
tire useful life of the expenditures is the cost matched with the 
income it generates, and the results of any particular year may not 
actually reflect income so clearly.94 In short, blind resort to GAAP 
as supplying the answers to the capital/ordinary controversy works 
as too facile a panacea,9 & since GAAP rules do not always accord 
with the tax policy (here, the minimum distortion of income). Nev-
ertheless, rather broad accounting concepts, such as "matching" 
income and expenses and a deferred charge as constituting an 
amortizable asset, are useful in effectuating such tax policy. 
b. Current Deduction if Amortization Unavailable 
The Federal Circuit correctly believes that capitalization, depre-
ciation, and clear reflection of income are "inextricably inter-
twined," with the ultimate question being the success of the tax-
payer's method of tax accounting in clearly reflecting income. 96 
Not surprisingly, therefore, the Court of Claims (predecessor to the 
Federal Circuit) held in Southland Royalty Co. v. United States 
that capitalization without amortization was inappropriate where 
the recurring expenditures produced highly variable and relatively 
short-lived benefits,97 because such capitalization would distort the 
taypayer's income. The distortion of income arising from capitaliz-
•• See 1 B. Bittker, supra note 5, 11 23.1.1, at 23-5; see also Kansas Power & Light Co. v. 
Burlington N.R.R., 740 F.2d 780 (lOth Cir. 1984). 
•• Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-2, -3. 
•• See I.R.C. § 167(b); see also supra note 22 . 
.. 1 B. Bittker, supra note 5, 11 23.1.1, at 23-6. 
•• For discussion of variances between the book and tax accounting systems, see supra 
note 90. The NCNB I panel opinion hoped that book accounting rules will resolve the start-
up expansion cost conflicts. 651 F.2d at 948 & n.ll. Commentators assumed the same. Note, 
supra note 5, at 619, 633-38. The better approach is to look at book accounting concepts to 
fashion tax accounting rules, such as the amortization of recurring costs as a free-standing 
"asset." See infra notes 134-40 and accompanying text. 
"" Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P. Ry. v. United States, 424 F.2d 563, 569 (Ct. Cl. 1970) (relying 
on the decision in Fort Howard Paper Co. v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 275, 283-84 (1967)). See 
generally Gunn, supra note 5, at 453-54. 
"' Southland Royalty Co. v. United States, 582 F.2d 604, 618 (Ct. CL 1978). 
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ing an investigatory or start-up expenditure-with future, but tem-
porally limited, benefits-incurred while expanding an existing 
business and then adding such cost to the basis of a nonamortiz-
able asset also clearly motivated the courts considering the bank 
credit card and branch progeny of Briarcliff Candy Corp. v. Com-
missioner to adopt the "separate, saleable asset" rule.98 This defi-
nitional rule calls for current. deduction of expansion costs, not-
withstanding future benefits, if no separate, transferable asset is 
created or enhanced by the expenditure. An unarticulated premise 
is that a saleable or transferable asset usually will have a determi-
nable life and, hence, be amortizable.99 
Current deduction under the separate, saleable asset test of re-
curring expenditures producing short- or variable-term benefits 
does not distort the taxpayer's income. Hence, the test often re-
sults in "rough justice."100 However, a taxpayer can make substan-
tial payments creating a nontransferable asset that benefits an ex-
tended or indefinite period. Current deduction of such 
expenditures, e.g., the substantial cost of a computer program 
designed for the taxpayer with a five-year life or acquisition costs 
of a license with an indefinite life/01 under talismanic102 applica-
tion of the transferability test will clearly distort the taxpayer's in-
come. This illustrates a common shortcoming of "talismans": pro-
moting rough justice in commonplace application, but yielding 
inequities in borderline areas. 
•• See infra notes 225-44 and accompanying text. 
•• See Warner, supra note 87, at 8. 
100 ld. See, e.g., Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank v. United States, 505 F.2d 1185, 1185 (lOth 
Cir. 1974) (recurring computer charges for customer accounting entries, advertising, and 
credit checks); accord First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 413 F. Supp. 1107, 1109 (D.S.C. 
1976) (charges for recurring consulting fees, salaries, rent, office expenses, and advertising), 
affd per curiam, 558 F.2d 721 (4th Cir. 1977). 
101 See First Sec. Bank v. Commissioner, 592 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 1979) (Duniway, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (recurring costs of advertising, etc., properly de-
ductible, but cost of computer program used for five years and costing substantial amount 
should be capitalized and amortized over that period rather than currently deducted under 
the majority's separate, saleable asset test); see also NCNB II, 684 F.2d 285 (current deduc-
tion of cost of branch banking permit with indefinite life). Contra Central Tex. Sav. & Loan 
Ass'n v. United States, 731 F.2d 1181 (5th Cir. 1984). 
101 The NCNB I panel majority viewed a definitional rule, such as the separate, saleable 
asset test and the start-up of new business/expansion of old business dichotomy, as a "talis-
man," a rule operating mechanically without considering the underlying policy. 651 F.2d at 
955. 
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Immediate deduction of such intangibles benefiting an extended 
period might, however, be justified on a different policy basis. 
Under pre-1987 ACRS, coupled with investment tax credits 
("ITC")1°3 and the effects of leverage, the function of cost recovery 
shifted from matching of income and expenses to immediate de-
duction, in practical effect protecting capital from taxation.104 
Thus, from 1981-86, the separate, saleability prerequisite effected 
rough parity between amortization of intangible and tangible prop-
erty.1011 Explicit reliance on such policy, however, might betray too 
much judiciallegislation/06 particularly in light of the 1985-86 tax 
reform process. Additionally, such a judicial grant of a tax benefit 
(current expensing of intangibles) might ignore trade-offs and bar-
gains struck in that process. 107 
Nevertheless, a current deduction of temporally limited expendi-
tures does produce less distortion of income than capitalization 
without amortization.108 However, under the model, the answer is 
to supply amortizaton through liberal approximation of useful life, 
rather than a current deduction that is more income distorting 
than amortization over the approximate period benefited. 
c. Capitalization and Amortization as Separate Questions 
Some commentators maintain, contrary to the separate, saleable 
••• See I.R.C. §§ 38, 46. 
104 See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text. 
106 Congress repealed the regular lTC for property placed in service after Dec. 31, 1985. 
Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 211(a) (to be codified at I.R.C. 49(a)). With 
this repeal, cost recovery of tangible personal property is no longer equivalent to immediate 
expensing, although the "reasonable allowance for depreciation" itself for most tangible per-
sonal property remains much the same as under pre-1987 ACRS. 
108 Statements abound that courts may not legislate in the tax area to cure omissions or 
inequities. E.g., Bidart Bros. v. United States, 262 F.2d 607, 609 (9th Cir. 1959); Estate of 
Yantes v. Commissioner, 21 T.C. 830, 833 (1954), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Ohio Nat'l Bank 
v. Commissioner, 220 F.2d 754 (6th Cir. 1955). Nevertheless, courts in fact have fashioned 
many equitable doctrines. See, e.g., Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1930); 
Alice Phelan Sullivan Corp. v. United States, 381 F.2d 399 (Ct. Cl. 1967); see also infra 
notes 170-71 and accompanying text. 
107 The 1985-86 tax reform primarily constituted a balancing of individual tax reductions 
over a specified period with corresponding increases in corporate taxes over the same period, 
coupled with some restructuring of tax burden within classes of taxpayers (both individual 
and corporate). 
108 A commentator has suggested that a current deduction should be allowed "whenever 
capitalization would distort income more than current expensing." Note, supra note 4, at 
333. If this is the only choice, the author agrees. 
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asset doctrine, that concern regarding the lack of amortization is 
not a basis for allowing a current deduction that itself will produce 
distortion of income. They maintain instead that the remedy is 
congressional allowance of amortization.109 Similarly, the govern-
ment has argued that the presence of any future benefits mandates 
capitalization, but any inability to· determine useful life is immate-
rial to capitalization. no Proper resolution of this view with the con-
flicting views as to the importance of the ability to amortize in the 
capitilization determination should lie in the analysis of why amor-
tization is inappropriate in a particular case. If amortization is un-
available because the expenditure produces highly variable and 
largely shorter-term benefits (in which case the expenditure usu-
ally recurs frequently), then a current deduction is appropriate 
under the model. m 
If amortization is unavailable because an expenditure producing 
a determinable temporal benefit is associated with the acquisition 
of an asset with a longer or indeterminable life, then the expendi-
ture itself should be treated as a free-standing asset that is then 
amortizable or currently deductible under the model. Many of the 
capitalized start-up costs denied amortization, because they are 
added to the nonamortizable basis of the business created, 112 
100 One commentator has argued that: 
If prepaid interest creates a capital asset, and if the Code precludes amortization in 
certain cases, and if the deduction is lost, the solution is not to disregard the capitali-
zation concept, but rather to fill the gap left by Congress in the statutory scheme by 
an amendment to the Code allowing amortization in this situation. 
Asimov, Principle and Prepaid Interest, 16 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 36, 61 (1968); see also Note, An 
Inquiry into the Nature of Goodwill, 53 Colum. L. Rev. 660, 719 (1953). 
11° Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank v. United States, 505 F.2d 1185, 1192 (lOth Cir. 1974). 
111 See APB Statement No. 4, supra note 84, 11 160; see also NCNB I, 651 F.2d at 962; cf. 
Encyclopaedia Britannica v. Commissioner, 685 F.2d 212, 217 (7th Cir. 1982); 1 B. Bittker, 
supra note 5, 11 20.4.1, at 20-67. 
111 The bulk of the start-up and investigatory cost decisions in contrast simply denied the 
claimed deduction as a pre-operating "capital" expense without indicating the asset, if any, 
which the capitalized cost should reflect. See, e.g., Johnsen v. Commissioner, 794 F.2d 1157, 
1162 (6th Cir. 1986) (cost of establishing the enterprise); Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. 
United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 220, 228 (1985) (rationale of classic start-up cases is capital invest-
ment in business as a whole); Bennett Paper Corp. v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 458, 469-70 
(1982), afrd per curiam, 699 F.2d 450 (8th Cir. 1983); Davis v. Commissioner, 45 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 1070 (1983); Lardy v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 217 (1980). A few decisions 
have expressly left open the question whether pre-operating expenses created (amortizable) 
assets with determinable useful lives benefiting taxable years following the start of business 
operations. E.g., Goodwin v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 424, 432 n.S (1980), arrd mem., 691 F.2d 
490 (3d Cir. 1982); Madison Gas & Elec. Co. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 521, 564 n.15 (1979), 
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should be either currently deductible or amortizable under this 
separate, amortizable asset approach. 
However, if amortization is unavailable because the expenditure 
must be added to the basis of an asset with a long-but not defi-
nitely determinable-life (because their benefits are coterminous), 
the expenditure should be capitalized if a current deduction would 
distort the taxpayer's income. 113 Distortion of income from lack of 
amortization in such circumstances should be addressed through 
remedial legislation or more liberality in "estimating" useful life, 114 
not through a current deduction that would also distort income.1u1 
C. Detailed Analysis: Acquisition Cost as Basis for 
Capitalization 
1. "Origin-of-the-Claim" 
Under the "origin-of-the-claim" doctrine, a taxpayer must capi-
talize those expenses arising from a capital transaction, for exam-
ple, the acquisition or disposition of a capital asset.116 This rule 
"rests on the belief that all expenses which stem from a capital 
transaction should rationally be 'matched' or equated with all 
gains from the same capital transaction and the expenses should 
receive identical tax treatment as the gains."117 The origin-of-the-
claim doctrine is designed to prevent the distortion of income aris-
ing from a mismatch of the (pre-1987) character of the income and 
affd, 633 F.2d 512 (7th Cir. 1980); Kennedy v. Commissioner, 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 52 (1973). A 
few others have added pre·operating or investigatory costs to the basis of a capital asset 
constructed at the same time. E.g., Odom v. Commissioner, 44 T.C.M. (CCH) 1132 (1982); 
see Cagle v. Commissioner, 539 F.2d 409, 416 (5th Cir. 1976) (semble); Francis v. Commis-
sioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 704 (1977) (semble). Where the costs were found to be preparatory 
because a necessary business permit had not yet been obtained, the courts have readily and 
wrongly added the start-up or investigatory cost to the basis of the nonamortizable permit. 
Richmond Television Corp. v. United States, 345 F.2d 901 (4th Cir.), remanded on other 
grounds, 382 U.S. 68 (1965); accord Central Tex. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 731 
F.2d 1181 (5th Cir. 1984); Cleveland Elec. Illuminating, 7 Cl. Ct. at 229. 
118 See Gunn, supra note 5, at 494 n.230. 
114 See infra notes 116-61 and accompanying text. 
110 But see Note, supra note 4, at 333; Note, Costs of Expanding an Existing Business: 
Current Deductions Versus Capital Expenditures-North Carolina Nat'l Bank Corp. v. 
United States, 18 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1127 (1982). 
118 Woodward v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. 572 (1970); Lee & Murphy, supra note 5, at 484-
99. 
117 Sharples v. United States, 533 F.2d 550, 555 (Ct. Cl. 1976). See generally, Lee & Mur-
phy, supra note 5, at 474, 484, 488-89. 
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the deduction. Such prevention is accomplished by ensuring that 
the taxpayer does not deduct against ordinary income expenses 
that arise from a capital transaction, but instead adds such costs to 
the basis of the capital asset acquired or subtracts such costs to 
reduce the proceeds of the disposition of the capital asset. 
The overlap of the origin-of-the-claim and the timing-distortion 
of income doctrine produces conflicts. On the one hand, if the capi-
talized expenditure is added to a depreciable asset, amortization 
produces an ordinary deduction of the acquisition cost so that su-
perficially the character is not matched.118 Conversely, if an expen-
diture which benefits a finite period is added under the origin-of-
the-claim principle to the basis of an asset with a substantially 
longer useful life, the slower amortization of the capitalized expen-
diture results in distortion of the taxpayer's income. Distortion is 
even greater where the capitalized limited life expenditure is added 
to the basis of a nonamortizable asset. 119 
Nevertheless, the origin-of-the-claim or acquisition cost doctrine 
is used to capitalize, and add to the basis of the asset acquired, 120 
the recurring short-lived costs incurred in connection with the ac-
quisiton of an asset used in the taxpayer's business. Such usage 
occurs although identical costs incurred after, and unrelated to,121 
118 Under pre-1987 rules, gain from the sale of depreciable property (subject to complex 
netting rules under § 1231(a)(3)-(4) and loss recapture rules under § 1231(c)), constituted 
capital gains. See I.R.C. § 1231(a)(1). Such gains were subject in turn to depreciation recap-
ture in whole or in part under §§ 1245 and 1250. See generally, Lee, Capital Gains Excep-
tion to the House's General Utilites Repeal: Further Indigestions from Overly Processed 
Corn Products, 30 Tax Notes 1375, 1378, 1384 n.51 (Mar. 31, 1986). 
110 See Note, supra note 4, at 322-23, 332. 
••• See Shainberg v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 241 (1959); see also Lee & Murphy, supra 
note 5, at 482. The Claims Court explained the decisions that relied on a capitalization basis 
for denying current deductibility of start-up costs as follows: 
Although the rationale of these decisions is not fully articulated, they appear to 
accept or assume the underlying theory that where a business requires substantial 
start-up expenditures before it can begin operations, which are not directly for the 
purchase of tangible assets and which will not ordinarily be recovered out of revenues 
for the same year, the capital investment is in the business as a whole rather than 
merely in the tangibles, and it includes the start-up costs. 
Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 220, 228 (1985). Such rationale 
logically would deny, however, a current deduction for identical expenditures incurred once 
the business commenced. See infra note 131 and accompanying text. 
111 Such a cost incurred after acquisition, but anticipated at that time, may be capitalized 
as an acquisition cost. See Mt. Morris Drive-In Theatre Co. v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 272 
(1955), afrd, 238 F.2d 85 (5th Cir. 1956). 
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the acquisition are currently deducted, usually as a maintenance 
cost. Analyzing the farm preparatory cost doctrine,122 Judge Raum 
of the Tax Court observed: 
[T]he cost of painting a building ... generally is considered a de-
ductible business expense. Yet the cost of putting the final coat of 
paint on a building in the course of construction is plainly a capital 
expenditure. Both involve painting and may be identical in physi-
cal character; however, one is incurred in ordinary maintenance 
while the other is one of the components of cost in acquiring a 
complete capital asset.118 
Similarly, the Tax Court treated cleaning expenses (paid to the 
contractor) incurred in preparing a shopping center for its grand 
opening as capitalizable acquisition costs, 124 stating subsequently 
that the same treatment resulted even if the taxpayer developed 
the center through its own efforts.1211 Additionally, the Tax Court 
required capitalization of recurring classic "start-up" costs, not 
under the theory that they constituted preparatory costs, but 
rather under the "general rule . . . that an expenditure in connec-
tion with the acquisition of a capital asset is a capital investment 
and hence not deductible as an ordinary and necessary expense of 
carrying on business."128 The Claims Court in Cleveland Electric 
Illuminating Co. v. United States read these and similar cases as 
n• For descriptions of the farm preparatory cost doctrine, see Maple v. Commissioner, 
440 F.2d 1055, 1056·57 (9th Cir. 1971); Department of the Treasury, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 
Tax Reform Studies and Proposals 153 (Comm. Print 1969) (issued jointly by the House 
Comm. on Ways & Means and Senate Comm. on Finance). See generally sources cited in 
Lee, A Blend of Old Wines in a New Wineskin: Section 183 and Beyond, 29 Tax L. Rev. 347, 
465 n.498 (1974). 
111 Estate of Wilbur v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 322, 327 n.6 (1964), acq., 1965-2 C.B. 7. 
••• Shainberg, 33 T.C. at 251. 
••• See Perlmutter v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 382, 403-05 (1965), afrd, 373 F.2d 45 (lOth 
Cir. 1967). In Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., the Supreme Court stated most strongly 
the requirement of tax parity between costs of self-constructed and purchased assets. 418 
U.S. 1, 14 (1974). The Sixth Circuit recently reasoned "that pre-opening expenses must be 
treated as capital in order to maintain parity with a taxpayer whose cost of purchasing an 
existing business is clearly capital." Johnsen v. Commissioner, 794 F.2d 1157, 1161 (6th Cir. 
1986). 
11° Francis v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 704 (1977). Similarly, investigatory costs 
(feasibility study for office/showroom) have been capitalized under the rule that "an expen-
diture in acquisition of a capital asset is a capital expenditure." Cagle v. Commissioner, 539 
F.2d 409, 416 (5th Cir. 1976). The court in Cagle found that costs also had a value beyond 
the tax year in which incurred; "[t]his alone is a persuasive argument for labeling the pay-
ments as a capital expenditure." ld. at 416 n.8. 
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apparently assuming 
the underlying theory that where a business requires substantial 
start-up expenditures before it can begin operations, which are not 
directly for the purchase of tangible assets and which will not ordi-
narily be recovered out of revenues for the same year, the capital 
investment is in the business as a whole rather than merely in the 
tangibles, and it includes the start-up costs. 127 
The error in this "business as a whole" approach lies not in the 
capitalizaton theory itself, but rather in confusion as to the "asset" 
to which the recurring cost should be added;128 that "asset" was 
usually the business as a whole,129 which is nonamortizable. Such 
capitalization of recurring, finite-term benefit costs without amor-
tization produces the same distortion of income that generates the 
talismanic separate, saleable asset current deduction approach. 180 
Moreover, an acquisition cost theory under the "business as a 
whole" concept seemingly would require capitalization, and addi-
tion to the basis of the business as a whole, of substantially similar 
costs incurred in the expansion of an existing business.131 The un-
derlying rationale is that the start-up and expansion costs increase 
the earning capacity and hence produce future benefits. 132 Yet the 
Claims Court in Cleveland Electric Illuminating inconsistently re-
117 7 Cl. Ct. 220, 228 (1985); see also Johnsen, 794 F.2d at 1162 (expenses incurred during 
start-up or pre-opening period were capital in nature because part of establishing the 
enterprise). 
••• Gunn, supra note 5, at 446 (cost itself should be viewed aa amortizable asset). 
••• See supra note 112. 
130 See infra notes 230-35 and accompanying text. 
131 Both sale and acquisition of a going business are "viewed aa a sale of each individual 
asset rather than of a single capital asset." S. Rep. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 251 (1986). 
Contrary to this "separate basket" concept, some courts have treated start-up costs aa a cost 
of the business as a whole and not of specific tangible assets. See cases cited supra note.112; 
cf. Aboussie v. United States, 779 F.2d 424, 428 (8th Cir. 1985). This can be explained in 
capitalization terms only on the basis of creating future earning capacity. See infra note 132 
and accompanying text. If so, the increased earning capacity logically should be capitalized 
where incurred in expanding, operating, or starting a new business. Even if start-up costs 
were properly viewed as acquisition costs of the tangible assets of a new business, they 
would constitute acquisition costs of similar assets acquired in expanding or operating an 
existing business. See supra note 112. This baa always been the fatal weakness in the capital-
ization theory for denying a current deduction for start-up costs so long aa similar expansion 
costs are currently deductible. Cf. Lee, supra note 2, at 390 n.53-
... See, e.g., Mid-State Products Co. v. Commissioner, 21 T.C. 696, 714 (1954); Miner v. 
Commissioner, 21 T.C.M. (CCH) 1173, 1177 (1962); see also Lee, supra note 2, at 390 n.53; 
Lee, supra note 122, at 461-63, 466. 
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quired capitalization of substantial training costs for employees 
who were to work at a nuclear power generating plant as part of 
the acquisition cost of the taxpayer's interest in the plant, while 
permitting a current deduction for significantly less substantial 
training costs for employees who were to work at a new conven-
tional fossil fuel generating plant similar to four plants already in 
use. las 
2. Free-Standing Amortizable Asset 
The distortion of income which results from adding a recurring 
cost to a longer-lived or nonamortizable asset, under the rationale 
that it constitutes an acquisition cost of the business as a whole, 
can be avoided by relying on the basic financial accounting concept 
of treating the expense itself as an amortizable asset.184 Assets, for 
financial accounting or balance sheet purposes, include both the 
economic resources of the enterprise and certain deferred charges 
that are not resources. If an expenditure may not be expensed in 
its entirety in the year paid, the cash assets of the enterprise are 
reduced and the portion of the expenditl,lre that cannot be cur-
rently expensed is treated as a separate, noncash asset on the bal-
ance sheet.186 Thus, the NCNB I court noted that: 
In order more accurately to reflect income, both in the present pe-
riod and in future accounting periods, the carried-forward "assets" 
of an enterprise include, without regard to whether they are tangi-
ble or intangible, certain expenditures for benefits whose cost has 
already been incurred but the outlay for which is nevertheless most 
properly matched against some future period's revenues which the 
benefits will help produce. 188 
In short, in financial accouting the expenditure itself may be 
treated as a separate asset to be expensed, or in tax terms "depre-
ciated" or "amortized," in future tax periods.187 In the start-up and 
••• 7 Cl. Ct. at 235-36. The Claims Court obviously was attempting to preserVe § 195. See 
infra notes 305-19 and accompanying text. 
114 See Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 220, 229 (1985); cf. 
Madison Gas & Elec. Co. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 521, 566 (1979), affd, 633 F.2d 512 (7th 
Cir. 1980). 
110 NCNB I, 651 F.2d at 949 (vacated panel opinion) . 
••• ld. 
117 Gunn, supra note 5, at 445 (citing De Capriles, Modem Financial Accounting, pt. 1, 37 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1001, 1020-21 (1962)). 
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business expansion areas, such amortization of recurring costs as a 
free-standing asset, without regard to whether incurred in starting 
up a new business or expanding an exisiting business, provides a, 
"golden mean" avoiding the ali-or-nothing extremes of the talis1 
manic separate, saleable asset (current deduction) or preparatory 
(capitalization without amortization) approaches.138 , 
The Tax Court in Wolfsen Land & Cattle Co. v. Commis-
sioner189 treated a recurring expenditure with a limited life as such 
a separate, amortizable, intangible asset to avoid the distortion of 
income that would have followed from associating the expenditure 
with the nonamortizable asset it enhanced. Wolfsen Land & Cattle 
considered the deductibility of substantial expenditures, which the 
taxpayer incurred every ten years, for draglining an earthenwork 
irrigation system with an indefinite life. These substantial ex-
penses resulted from the taxpayer's allowing the system to deterio-
rate until it became almost dysfunctional, rather than annually re-
pairing and maintaining it. The court noted: 
Thus, we are faced with something of a conundrum, how do we 
treat a maintenance-type expense substantial in amount, which 
only restores its subject to its original operating condition, yet need 
be repeated only on the average of every 10 years and is performed 
on a subject of indefinite life. 
To permit a current deduction of such a large expenditure with a 
beneficial effect lasting on the average of 10 years would surely dis-
tort that years's [sic] income. Yet to deny even an amortization 
deduction for an expenditure with a specific demonstrable benefi-
cial life on the ground that its deductibility is contaminated by its 
relationship to an asset of indefinite life, i.e., the land, would simi-
larly require an uneven reporting of income. 
Since a basic premise of the income tax laws is to relate expenses 
to the income which they helped earn, a reasonable solution to our 
conundrum is to hold that the expenses in issue should be written 
off over their useful life. In short we would subscribe independent 
status to those expenditures on the basis that they create a free-
standing intangible asset with an amortizable 10-year life.140 
138 See NCNB II, 684 F.2d 285, 294, 295 (4th Cir. 1982) (Murnaghan, J., dissenting). 
,.. 72 T.C. 1 (1979). 
140 Id. at 13 (footnote omitted). Gunn, supra note 5, at 446, perspicaciously suggested just 
this approach. The NCNB I panel came close to this approach. See infra notes 250-52 and 
accompanying text. 
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The treatment of certain recurring expenses as a separate asset, 
even ·though such expenses are incurred in the acquisition of a 
nonamortizable asset, is not inconsistent with Idaho Power.w The 
Supreme Court in Idaho Power required (1) capitalization of the 
"depreciation" allocable to equipment the taxpayer used to con-
struct capital improvements and (2) addition of the capitalized 
amounts to the basis of such improvements. The Court sought to 
prevent the distortion of income that would result from currently 
deducting "depreciation" costs properly allocable to assets that in 
the future would produce income themselves. a 2 The Court also 
sought to maintain tax parity between a taxpayer that did its own 
construction work and a taxpayer that purchased the work from an 
independent contractor, which in turn charged its construction 
equipment depreciation to the taxpayer as an element of the total 
cost of the services. as However, allocation of a temporally limited 
expenditure to the basis of a substantially longer-lived asset, or an 
asset with no determinable life, produces distortion of income. If a 
recurring expenditure-such as employee training in a workforce 
with high turnover-is added to the nonamortizable basis of a new 
or expanded business, a distortion of income is produced;144 this is 
not the situation in Idaho Power. Distortion will also exist when an 
expenditure with a shorter-term benefit is incurred in connection 
with the acquisition of an asset with a longer term; Idaho Power is 
also distinguishable from this scenario. In Idaho Power the ex-
penditures in question benefited the depreciable assets, created 
with the machinery, over their entire useful life, in effect creating a 
construction cost of the assets. 
The deferred charge or separate asset approach is consistent 
with basic tax concepts such as the "separate basket" approach to 
transfers of a going business and to "component" depreciation. 
Under the firmly established "separate basket" rule/''~ the sale or 
,., The Seventh Circuit intimated a conflict between distortion of income analysis and 
Idaho Power. Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. v. Commissioner, 685 F.2d 212, 215, 217 (7th 
Cir. 1982) (discussing Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1 (1974)); see also supra 
note 76 and accompanying text. 
141 418 U.S. at 14 . 
... ld. 
,.. See Madison Gas & Elec., 633 F.2d at 517. 
,.. Williams v. McGowan, 152 F.2d 570, 572 (2d Cir. 1945). Judge Learned Hand con-
cluded that "upon the sale of a going business it is to be comminuted into its fragments, and 
these are to be separately matched against the definition [of 'capital assets' in the predeces-
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acquisition of a business is not treated as the transfer of a single 
asset; rather, the business is fragmented into its components, with 
each asset given separate treatment on both the sale and pwchase 
side.146 Accordingly, even under an acquisition cost approach, 
start-up as well as internal and external business expansion costs 
should be separated into their components for "tax parity" pur-
poses, with those items providing benefits for a shorter period than 
the useful life of the business (which usually is indefinite) being 
treated as separate assets to be expensed or amortized according to 
clear reflection of income principles. For instance, if a taxpayer 
purchases an ongoing business that possesses short-lived recurring 
assets (usually already expensed by the seller),147 e.g., tools, sup-
plies, or recurring marketing surveys, then the purchaser-under 
the "basket of assets" fragmentation approach, involving transfers 
of a going business-will be allowed to deduct currently the exter-
nal cost of such items in the year of purchase. Technically, per-
haps, the deduction may be considered depreciation or amortiza-
tion of the cost in its entirety in the acquisition year because its 
determinable life is one year and as such can be amortized fully 
within one year under section 167.148 Accordingly, treatment of in-
ternal costs for short-lived recurring expansion or start-up expend-
itures as a separate asset, to be expensed or amortized under clear 
reflection of income principles, does not conflict with Idaho Power. 
The same treatment of a recurring cost as a separate, free-stand-
ing asset should apply where a depreciable asset, e.g., a shopping 
center or apartment project, is acquired or constructed and the (re-
curring) cost benefits a shorter period than the purchased or con-
structed asset. Under "component" depreciation an asset com-
posed of separately replaceable components may be fragmented in 
computing depreciation, even though the components are interde-
pendent parts of an integral whole. Thus, "[i]nstead of assigning a 
sor to § 1221(1)]." ld. 
"" See Faber, Allocation of Purchase Price on Acquisitions; Recapture; Going Concern 
Value, 39 lnst. on Fed. Tax'n 6-1 (1981); Ganier, Treatment of Goodwill: Allocating a Lump 
Sum Purchase Price Among Mixed Assets of a Going Business, 7 J. Corp. Tax'n 111 (1980); 
Leighton, Tax and Accounting Problems on the Purchase of a Basket of Assets, 28 Inst. on 
Fed. Tax'n 75 (1970); supra note 131. 
"
1 Under the "tax benefit" doctrine, the seller would recognize income (probably) equal 
to the prior deduction. See Hillsboro Nat'! Bank v. Commissioner, 460 U.S. 370 (1983). 
"" See infra note 219 and accompanying text. 
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single useful life to a building, for example, the taxpayer can allo-
cate its cost among such components as the shell, roof, plumbing 
and wiring, heating plant, air-conditioners, and elevators and de-
preciate each of these elements over its own usefullife."149 Hence, 
a market survey of a rapidly changing environment, providing a 
shorter benefit than a depreciable (e.g., an office showroom)1110 or 
nondepreciable (e.g., a branch operating under an indefinite life 
permit) 1111 asset with which the survey is associated can be treated 
as a separate, amortizable, capitalized cost, as an asset, or as a cur-
rently expensed short- or variable-term benefit, if sufficiently re-
curring. If this is so, should not the "last coat of paint" be treated 
as a separate asset, probably currently deductible? One clear con-
gressional trend in cost recovery for tangibles, however, is elimina-
tion of the line drawing entailed in component depreciation; the 
Code prohibits its use where ACRS applies.1112 
While some "straws in the wind" support this approach, and 
hence, the model, 1113 the bulk of the start-up cost and related deci-
••• 1 B. Bittker, supra note 5, 1l 23.3.3, at 23-41. 
, .. But see Cagle v. Commissioner, 539 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1976) (added survey cost to 
basis of showroom). 
••• But see Central Tex. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 731 F.2d 1181 (5th Cir. 1984) 
(added survey cost to basis of permits). 
••• See I.R.C. § 168(0(1) (disallowing component depreciation of buildings); see also H.R. 
Conf. Rep. No. 215, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 208-9, reprinted in 1981 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad-
min. News 285, 299. For the definition of component depreciation, see supra text accompa-
nying note 149. 
••• E.g., Ellis Banking Corp. v. Commissioner, 688 F.2d 1376 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 
463 U.S. 1207 (1983). The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that even if the taxpayer's investiga-
tion of a target corporation's books (primarily to determine the merger stock exchange ratio) 
produced general market information of continuing usefulness, "that future benefit of the 
study might require capitalization and amortization over the period during which the study 
was expected to have utility." Id. at 1381-82 n.ll. The court apparently visualized an inde-
pendent benefit from use of the survey, rather than a survey used solely for acquisition, but 
with a benefit shorter than that of the asset acquired. In contrast, professional fees incurred 
in an acquisition, the benefit of which does not diminish over the period the asset is held, 
clearly should be added to the cost of the asset acquired. Cf. Gunn, supra note 5, at 494 
n.230. The author is indebted to Bittker, Tax Shelters, Nonrecourse Debt, and the Crane 
Case, 33 Tax L. Rev. 277 (1978), for the "straws in the wind" metaphor. 
This analysis suggests that Estate of Wilbur (last coat of paint) and Shainberg (grand 
opening cleaning expenses) were incorrectly decided. For discussion of these cases, see supra 
notes 123-24 and accompanying text. Under the model, Schultz v. Commissioner was proba-
bly decided incorrectly as well. 50 T.C. 688, 694-95 (1968), affd per curiam, 420 F.2d 490 
(3d Cir. 1970). In Schultz, the taxpayer purchased quantities of bulk raw whiskey as an 
investment and prepaid four years' storage charges, insurance premiums, and estimated 
state ad valorem taxes at the time of purchase. Such expenses are usually currently deducti-
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sions using an acquisition cost rationale find some asset, generally 
nonamortizable, with which to "associate" even a recurring expen-
diture. 1114 Indeed, this error is made by the Supreme Court in Rich-
mond Television Corp. v. Commissioner. 166 The Fourth Circuit 
had held that the employee staff training costs, incurred prior to a 
television station's obtaining its broadcasting license, were not cur-
rently deductible as pre-opening expenses incurred between the 
decision to establish a business and its actually beginning to func-
tion as a going concern.166 Alternatively, the court had held that 
the staff training costs were not currently deductible because they 
resulted in the acquisition of a capital asset, the value of which to 
the taxpayer would continue for many years, even though from 
time to time individual staff members would leave.167 
The taxpayer, in response to the capitalization question, argued 
that the staff training costs should be added to the basis of the 
broadcasting permit and amortized over its useful life.168 The 
hie. See I.R.C. § 212. In this case the prepaid expenses, if deductible, should have been 
capitalized as a deferred charge and amortized over four years. The Tax Court found that 
the expenditures did not contribute an added value to the whiskey or extend its useful life. 
50 T.C. at 695-96, 698. (The court's approach is analogous to the Lincoln Savings & Loan 
test. See infra notes 233-34 and accompanying text.) Nevertheless, the Schultz court found 
that the costs were acquisition costs of four-year-old bourbon (which through the passage of 
time and chemical changes is more valuable than raw whiskey), the product the taxpayer 
sought to acquire. 50 T.C. at 696, 699. The Third Circuit affirmed Schultz on the grounds 
that the Tax Court's determination that these normally deductible expenses "were incurred 
as an integral part of a capital transaction" was not clearly erroneous. 420 F.2d at 491. 
, .. See cases cited supra note 112 . 
... 382 u.s. 68, 68 (1965). 
, .. Richmond Television Corp. v. United States, 345 F.2d 901, 907 (4th Cir.), vacated and 
remanded per curiam on other grounds, 382 U.S. 68 (1965). Judge Sobelof fashioned this 
argument sua sponte, since the government relied only on a capitalization/distortion of in-
come position. Brief for Appellant at 12-14, Richmond Television (4th Cir.) (No. 64-9531) 
(copy on file); see Lee, supra note 122, at 458. Judge Sobelof may have felt compelled to 
answer the taxpayer's "challenge": 
Every business paying U. S. ~es has incurred start-up expenses, many of them 
repeatedly, every time they try to develop a new product or expand. Did Ford capital-
ize the quarter of a billion spent on the Edsel? Did Dupont capitalize the develop-
ment of nylon? We challenge the Government to produce a case or a ruling which 
denies the deduction of start-up costs. 
Reply Brief for Appellee at 13 (copy on file). 
107 345 F.2d at 907-08; see supra note 156. The Fourth Circuit subsequently overruled this 
leg of Richmond Television. See NCNB II, 684 F.2d at 289. , 
100 The government noted that: 
Taxpayer, by an amendment to its complaint, alleged in the alternative that the 
advantage secured by its capital outlay had a useful life co-extensive with the term of 
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Fourth Circuit avoided this argument by pointing out that since 
the taxpayer was not yet in business during the tax year, the tax-
payer also was not entitled to any amortization deduction. 1119 The 
Supreme Court remanded for a finding of the permit's useful 
life. 160 The Fourth Circuit on remand held it was indefinite, in line 
with established precedents.161 No one thought of treating the em-
ployee training cost itself as the asset and then determining its 
useful life based on turnover and frequency of retraining. 
D. Detailed Analysis: Cohan Approximation of Useful Life 
The clear reflection of income through amortization of a sepa-
rate or free-standing intangible asset or deferred charge frequently 
will require either the taxpayer or courts to estimate the useful life 
of the deferred charge. The pertinent Treasury Regulations re-
quire, as a precondition for depreciation or amortization of an in-
tangible asset, that its useful life "be estimated with reasonable 
accuracy,"162 and disallow any deduction claimed "merely because 
in the unsupported opinion of the taxpayer, the intangible asset 
has a limited usefullife."163 No similar restrictions or admonitions 
appear in the regulations dealing with depreciation of tangible 
assets. 164 
If a taxpayer can show. that the benefits produced by the expen-
diture are temporally limited, although he may not be able to esti-
mate that life with reasonable accuracy, logically he proves entitle-
ment to a deduction equal to some percentage of the cost of the 
expenditure. Generally, useful life cannot be estimated with rea-
sonable accuracy; therefore, the taxpayer cannot prove exactly 
what percentage of the cost should be ratably deducted (e.g., ten 
percent if the useful life were in fact ten years or three percent if 
the FCC construction permit and first regular license and accordingly claimed the 
right to depreciate these expenditures over a period of 58 months. 
Brief for Appellant at 8; see Richmond Television, 345 F.2d at 908. The taxpayer should 
have argued that the training cost itself was the amortizable asset. 
100 345 F.2d at 909. 
180 382 U.S. at 68. 
101 Richmond Television Corp. v. United States, 354 F.2d 410, 413 (4th Cir. 1965); see, 
e.g., Commissioner v. Indiana Broadcasting Corp., 350 F.2d 580 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 
382 U.S. 1027 (1966); Nachman v. Commissioner, 191 F.2d 934 (5th Cir. 1951). 
101 Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3. 
18
" Id. 
1 
.. See Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-2. See generally 1 B. Bittker, supra note 5, ~ 23.2.6. 
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the useful life were in fact thirty-three years). This situation calls 
for approximation of the useful life of the deferred charge under 
the doctrine of Cohan v. Commissioner. 1611 Under Cohan, if the 
taxpayer proves to the court that deductible expenditures are in-
curred in some amount, the court must "make as close an approxi-
mation as it can, bearing heavily if it chooses upon the taxpayer 
whose inexactitude is of his own making."166 Thus, where the tax-
payer proved that an intangible asset (an easement) was indeed a 
wasting asset, the Eighth Circuit held that some amortization de-
duction is mandated under Cohan. 167 The court read a similar, but 
harsher, requirement as to the limited life of an amortizable intan-
gible, imposed by a prior regulation, 166 as not requiring 
proof of the exact number of years the easements will continue. We 
believe that all that is required is definite proof that the asset is 
one definitely undergoing exhaustion. The evidence clearly estab-
lishes that the rights-of-way will be useful for taxpayer's purposes 
for only a limited period . . . . The uncertainty relates to the 
length of the period. 169 
Although only rarely so acknowledged, the Cohan rule is an eq-
uitable one under which a court, unable to be precise in its find-
ings, dispenses "practical justice" as best it can.170 Similarly, useful 
180 39 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1930). 
188 ld. at 544. 
187 Northern Natural Gas Co. v. O'Malley, 277 F.2d 128, 135, 138 (8th Cir. 1960). 
188 The regulations promulgated under § 23(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 pro-
vided that: 
Intangibles, the use of which in the trade or business or in the production of income 
is indefinitely limited in duration, may be the subject of a depreciation allowance. 
Examples are patents and copyrights, licenses, and franchises. Intangibles, the use of 
which in the business or trade or in the production of income is not so limited, will 
not usually be a proper subject of such an allowance. If, however an intangible asset 
acquired through capital outlay is known from experience to be of value in the busi-
ness or in the production of income for only a limited period, the length of which can 
be estimated from experience with reasonable certainty, such intangible asset may be 
the subject of a depreciation allowance. 
Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.23(1)-3 (predecessor of Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3). 
180 277 F.2d at 135. 
170 See Dowell v. United States, 522 F.2d 708, 711 (5th Cir. 1975) (dictum); John L. Ashe, 
Inc. v. Commissioner, 214 F.2d 13, 16 (5th Cir. 1954); Robinson v. Commissioner, 10 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 571 (1951). Several courts have required a reasonable basis for judicial estimation 
under Cohan. See cases cited infra note 173. In general, however, courts have not permitted 
an "equitable" allocation not based on credible evidence. E.g., Union Stock Farms v. Com-
missioner, 265 F.2d 712, 723-24 (9th Cir. 1959); see Gross v. Commissioner, 48 T.C.M. 
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life for depreciation under one view need not be established with 
certainty. Only a "reasonable approximation" or even a "rough es-
timate" is required. 171 Application of distortion of income analysis 
to the issue of current deduction versus capitalization and amorti-
zation supports the liberal use of Cohan. If an expenditure does 
benefit a number of tax years and the taxpayer proves that the 
value of the expenditure becomes exhausted or will only benefit a 
limited number of tax periods, but cannot reasonably estimate the 
useful life, three judicial options are presented. First, under the 
"rough justice" of the separate, saleable asset test,172 a current de-
·duction is allowed if the benefits of the expenditure are not salea-
ble, which generally will be the case if amortization is not availa-
ble. However, current deduction of an expenditure benefiting a 
number of tax years distorts income. Second, capitalization is al-
lowed, but amortization is denied due to inability reasonably to 
estimate useful life. However, this equally distorts income if the 
expenditure is capitalized as a cost of the business as a whole. 
Third, the useful life of the expenditure itself is approximated, 
along the lines of Cohan, even if a reasonable basis for the approxi-
mation is not available. Only this third option offers "practical jus-
tice," consistent with the distortion of income rationale. 
The model for separating current and capital expenditures on 
the basis of distortion of income requires the third option. Equita-
ble Cohan approximations of the useful life of intangibles avoids 
the ali-or-nothing conflict between current expensing and capital-
izing without amortizing expenditures that produce benefits for a 
(CCH) 77 (1984). 
A major difficulty in determining the approach followed by a particular opinion-equity 
or reasonable basis-is that judges are unlikely to admit that they are making Cohan ap-
proximations without any ascertainable basis. For instance, one dissenting opinion charged 
the majority with making a Cohan approximation without any ascertainable basis, or even a 
citation to Cohan, and hence clothing the court with the "power of an equity court" that it 
did not possess. Ward v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 332, 345-46 (1953) (Withey, J., dissenting). 
171 Burnet v. Niagara Falls Brewing Co., 282 U.S. 648, 654-55 (1931); cf. United States v. 
Ludey, 274 U.S. 295, 302 (1927) (considering depletion). Useful life has been determined by 
Cohan approximations implicitly or explicitly. See, e.g., Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. v. 
United States, 481 F.2d 1240, 1253-54 (5th Cir. 1973) (approximation of useful life without 
citing Cohan); Richard S. Miller & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 537 F.2d 446, 455-56 (Ct. Cl. 
1976) (same); Wisconsin Psychiatric Serv., Ltd. v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 839, 852-53 (1981) 
(Cohan approximation of useful life); Joyce v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 13, 15-16 (1955) 
(Cohan approximation of reasonable allowance for depreciation). 
171 See Warner, supra note 87, at 8. 
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substantial period that cannot be determined with accuracy. A 
"rough guess" as to useful life produces less distortion of income 
than the "rough justice" of a current deduction. This approach is 
readily applicable to wasting assets such as market distribution 
and sources surveys and employee training. Nonwasting assets 
such as indefinite-life permits require a different conceptual ap-
proach to depreciation: abandoning the economic concept that de-
preciation measures the decline in value of an asset over its useful 
life. Courts, focusing instead on the necessity of allocating mean-
ingfully the cost entailed in the use of an asset to tax years to 
which it contributes to income in order to avoid distortion of in-
come, should pick some arbitrary period as the reasonable useful 
life of an indefinite-life asset, say twenty or even eighteen years, 
and provide a "reasonable allowance" for depreciation. 
This liberal view of Cohan and, hence, this part of the model, is 
not without opposition in the case law. Several decisions have re-
quired the taxpayer to prove a reasonable basis for a Cohan ap-
proximation, particularly where the taxpayer's sole evidence as to 
amount was his testimony.173 Moreover, depreciation has been de-
nied due to a failure in establishing an asset's useful life even 
though the asset would physically deteriorate or someday be re-
tired from service.174 In short, a conflict exists between those au-
thorities fashioning some deduction where allowing no deduction 
will produce a distortion of income and those authorities requiring 
a reasonable basis for estimation. 
III. START-UP AND BusiNEss ExPANSION CosTs CAsE LAw: CHAos 
OVER SYNTHESIS 
A. Thesis: Definitional Preparatory Doctrine 
The traditional preparatory doctrine, also known as the classic 
start-up doctrine, denies a current section 162 deduction to recur-
ring, otherwise deductible, expenditures when incurred before or 
171 See, e.g., Plisco v. United States, 306 F.2d 784, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1962); A. Finkl & Sons v. 
Commissioner, 38 T.C. 886, 904 n.15 (1962); Masters v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 1093, 1099-
1100 (1956). 
174 See, e.g., Burlington Northern, Inc. v. United States, 676 F.2d 566, 582 (Ct. Cl. 1982) 
(Kashiwa, J., dissenting) (describing the majority's finding that the assets involved were 
durable but would nonetheless become obsolescent); c{. Coleman v. Commission£:r, 540 F.2d 
427, 431-32 (9th Cir. 1976). 
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after the business is decided upon but before the taxpayer's trade 
or business begins to function as a going concern. The traditional 
approach denies a deduction on the definitional grounds that the 
taxpayer is not yet carrying on a trade or business/711 or under per-
110 Westervelt v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 1248, 1254 (1947) (investigatory costs such as trav-
eling expenses "were preparatory to entering the cattle business"); accord Liberty Nat'! 
Bank & Trust v. United States, 69-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 11 9147 (S.D. Ga. 1968); Dean v. 
Commissioner, 56 T.C. 895, 902 (1971); Abegg v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 145, 153-54 (1968), 
affd, 429 F.2d 1209 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied sub nom. Cresta Corp., S.A. v. Commis-
.sioner, 400 U.S. 1008 (1971); Polachek v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 858, 863 (1954); Ward v. 
Commissioner, 20 T.C. 332, 343-44 (1953), affd on other grounds, 224 F.2d 547 (9th Cir. 
1955); Evans v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 1192 (1974); Ewart v. Commissioner, 25 
T.C.M. (CCH) 96 (1966). The Tax Court, in extending the "pre-operational costs" doctrine 
to start-up costs (e.g., pre-opening training costs in a nuclear energy electric power plant 
that, due to high employee turnover and engineering and safety changes after business com-
menced, trained new employees and retrained existing employees with equivalent scope and 
content as an ongoing function), capitalized these costs simply because they were pre-opera-
tional. Madison Gas & Elec. Co. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 521, 567 (1979) (amortization not 
considered since not timely raised), affd per curiam, 633 F.2d 512 (7th Cir. 1980). 
For the historical development of the investigatory cost doctrine, see Fleischer, Tax 
Treatment of Expenses Incurred in Investigation for a Business or Capital Investment, 14 
Tax L. Rev. 567 (1959); Wilberding, An Individual's Business Investigation Expenses: An 
Argument Supporting Deductibility, 26 Tax Law. 219 (1973). For the development of the 
start-up cost doctrine, see Lee, supra note 2, at 391-96; Lee, supra note 122, at 464-65; Roth, 
supra note 2; Seago, supra note 2. The Tax Court, following the rigid conceptualism of its 
preparatory doctrine, permitted a father to deduct his coaching services, rendered to further 
his son's development as a professional baseball player, upon the son's entering the busi-
ness. The court found the son to be contractually obligated to pay for such services only if 
he attained professional status. Hundley v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 339, 347 (1967). 
Most early investigatory cost decisions were based on the rationale that the taxpayer was 
not yet engaged in a trade or business. See Lee, supra note 2, at 393. Additionally,§ 212 was 
originally intended to allow th<' deduction of expenses incurred for production or collection 
of income, not those incurred in a trade or business. See Lang, Scope of Deductions Under 
Section 212, 7 Rev. Tax'n Individuals 291 (1983); see also Treasury Reg. § 1.212-1(b) (not 
requiring the "production or collection of income" to be received in the same tax year as the 
deduction). Moreover, on its surface § 212 would appear to have been an available avenue 
for currently deducting start-up costs (prior to 1984 amendments to § 195). Such use was 
recommended early on by Fleischer, at 580-84. Shortly after deciding the first modern inves-
tigatory expense decisions (under the predecessor to § 162), however, the Tax Court in a 
landmark decision denied any deduction under the predecessors to both § 162 and § 212 for 
investigatory expenses incurred prior to the taxpayer's entering into a trade or business. 
Frank v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 511 (1953). The court based its opinion on the rationale 
that the predecessor § 212 presupposed an existing endeavor with which the taxpayer was 
connected, stating that "[t]here is a basic distinction between allowing deductions for the 
expense of producing or collecting income, in which one has an existent interest or right, 
and expenses incurred in an attempt to obtain income by the creation of some new inter-
est." I d. at 514. 
More recently the Tax Court has applied § 212 to start-up costs (ground rent during year 
one for a leasehold interest where construction and rental of building on such interest oc-
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haps the same test worded differently, the taxpayer is not yet 
holding himself out to others as engaged in the selling of goods or 
services. 176 Amortization of such capitalized expenditures is not 
usually available because the expenditures generally are added to 
the nonamortizable basis of the business entered into by the 
taxpayer. 177 
Application of the definitional preparatory approach, in its mod-
ern manifestation, to investigatory expenses took place in the 
1940s, 178 in cases involving expenses that were incurred prior to a 
commitment to enter the venture. This approach resulted in their 
disallowance on the ground that they were preparatory to the tax-
payer's entering the business in question.179 In 1965 the leading 
preparatory decision, Richmond Television Corp. v. United 
curred during year two), finding the requisite year-one "existent interest" in the ground 
lease. Hoopengarner v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 538, 541 (1983), affd mem., 745 F.2d 66 (9th 
Cir. 1984). Contra Johnsen v. Commissioner, 794 F.2d 1157 (6th Cir. 1986); Aboussie v. 
United States, 779 F.2d 424, 428-29 n.6 (8th Cir. 1985). This end-run around the start-up 
cost doctrine was ably and justifiably criticized in Note, Hoopengarner v. Commissioner 
Revisited: Does the Tax Reform Act of 1984 Solve the Pre-Opening Expense Problem?, 4 
Va. Tax Rev. 141 (1984). For the rationale behind Congress' reversal of Hoopengarner in 
the 1984 amendments to § 195, see infra notes 439-41 and accompanying text. 
178 See, e.g., Richmond Television Corp. v. United States, 345 F.2d 901, 905 (4th Cir.), 
vacated and remanded per curiam on other grounds, 382 U.S. 68 (1965); Downs v. Commis-
sioner, 49 T.C. 533, 540 (1968) (also relied on preparatory doctrine); Kennedy v. Commis-
sioner, 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 52 (1973). 
177 See supra note 112. 
170 E.g., Westervelt v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 1248, 1254 (1947). The preparatory doctrine 
arose as early as 1929. See Harrisburg Hosp., Inc. v. Commissioner, 15 B.T.A. 1014, 1018 
(1929); see also Lee, supra note 122, at 455. The Board of Tax Appeals (predecessor to the 
Tax Court) first ignored the Second Circuit's opinion in 379 Madison Ave., Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 60 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1932), continuing to rely on its own precedents. See, e.g., New 
Quincy Mining Co. v. Commissioner, 36 B.T.A. 376, 383-84 (1937). In the alternative, the 
Tax Court facilely distinguised 379 Madison Ave. as involving different facts. E.g., Todd v. 
Commissioner, 77 T.C. 246, 250 n.4 (1981), affd per curiam, 682 F.2d 207 (9th Cir. 1982); 
Ewart v. Commissioner, 25 T.C.M. (CCH) 96, 98 (1966). Ultimately, the Tax Court acknowl-
edged more forthrightly that there were two "diametrically opposed" positions in the start-
up cost area, with Tax Court precedents falling on one side and 379 Madison Ave. and 
Blitzer falling on the other. See Hoopengarner, 80 T.C. 543 & n.9; see also Haskins v. Com-
missioner, 45 T.C.M. (CCH) 359, 362 (1982). 
170 See cases cited supra note 175. These caaes adopted the position that investigating a 
potential new business did not constitute carrying on a trade or business but disproportion-
ately involved businesses that never got off the ground and mixed business/personal motives 
that could have better been resolved on the patent lack of profit motive. See generally I B. 
Bittker, supra note 5, 11 20.4.4, at 20-77 to -78 and cases cited at 20-78 n.47; Lee, supra note 
122, at 447-51; Wilberding, supra note 175, at 228; Note, Investigation Costs: An Analysis 
and a Proposal, 41 Temple L.Q. 81, 88, 98 (1967). 
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States, 180 extended the doctrine to "pre-opening" or start-up ex-
penses incurred between the decision to establish a business, con-
cluding the investigatory stage, and the actual beginning of busi-
ness operations as a going concern.181 In Richmond Television, the 
Fourth Circuit disallowed a current deduction for the cost of train-
ing and paying salaries to the taxpayer's broadcasting staff in-
curred during a two-year period prior to the taxpayer's obtaining 
its broadcasting license, reasoning that a taxpayer was still not car-
rying on a trade or business under section 162 "until such time as 
the business has begun to function as a going concern and per-
Jormed those activities for which it was organized. " 182 In the late 
1970s, the Tax Court began to apply repeatedly and mechani-
180 345 F.2d 901 (4th Cir.), vacated and remanded per curiam on other grounds, 382 U.S. 
68 (1965). 
181 ld. at 905. Commentators have widely criticized Richmond Television, with its alter-
nate holdings of (1) no deduction because the taxpayer was not currently carrying on a trade 
or business, or (2) the disputed costs were capital because they provided future benefits. 
These commentators have usually focused on the Fourth Circuit's application of the prepar-
atory doctrine to recurring expenditures after the business "commenced." E.g., Buell, supra 
note 2, at 280-81 (stating that the trade or business requirement should not be used to deny 
current deduction of costs connected with acquisition of a capital asset or prior to genera-
tion of income to which they gave rise, because the "Commissioner has other tools, including 
Sections 263 and 446, to prevent the current deduction of capital expenditures and the ma-
terial distortion of income"); Erbacher, supra note 2, at 497-99 (also reasoning that if initial 
costs are capitalized they should be amortized over a fairly short period of time); Roth, 
supra note 2, at 48; Solomon, Tax Treatment of Pre-Opening Expenses, 46 Taxes 521, 525-
28 (1968). 
For a description of the arguments made by the parties and evidence that the Fourth 
Circuit sua sponte fashioned the preparatory start-up costs doctrine, see Lee, supra note 
122, at 457-59; supra note 156. The author long thought that Richmond Television's gravest 
error lay in its adoption of the preparatory doctine. See Lee, supra note 122, at 460. The 
author now realizes that an equal if not greater error was its application of the "future 
benefits" rule to capitalize probably recurring, short-term benefits, such as costs consisting 
of employee training, travel, etc., and then adding such costs to the nonamortizable federal 
agency license. These costs should have been treated as costs of separate assets under Wolf-
sen Land & Cattle's separate free-standing asset approach and either currently deducted or 
amortized whenever the business commenced. See supra notes 139-40 and accompanying 
text. This determination of current deduction or amortization should depend upon the 
amount of such costs in relationship to the annually recurring employee training (and possi-
bly retraining) costs, as well as the rates of employee turnover. Even when presented with 
sufficient data, however, the Tax Court has applied the preparatory doctrine mechanically 
to recurring, but pre-operational, employee training costs incurred in a new business. 
Madison Gas & Elec. Co. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 521, 566 (1979) (the capitalization and 
amortization issue not timely raised by taxpayer), affd, 633 F.2d 512 (7th Cir. 1980); see 
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8,423,005 (Feb. 8, 1984). 
181 345 F.2d at 907. 
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cally183 the Richmond Television nondeductibility of pre-opening 
expenses rule to such start-up costs as nuclear power generating 
plant employee training expenses before the issuance of an Atomic 
Energy Commission operating permit184 and mortgage broker fees 
incurred before completion of construction or leasing of units to 
tenants. 186 Initially, various circuit courts uniformly affirmed these 
decisions on the basis of a mechanical application of the Tax 
Court's reasoning.186 More recently, the circuit courts espousing 
the pre-opening doctrine have begun to offer more extensive rea-
soning. However, conflict continues over whether pre-opening ex-
penses are nondeductible because they are capital or because the 
taxpayer is not yet carrying on a trade or business.187 
These decisions by-and-large denied amortization either because 
the taxpayer did not timely raise the issue of amortizing the ex-
penditures188 or because the court added the start-up costs to the 
basis of a nonamortizable asset189 or the business as a whole.190 
The combination of denying both a current deduction and an 
amortization deduction produced distortion of income as to recur-
ring, short-term benefits. In order to avoid such distortion yet 
maintain the mechanical pre-opening doctrine, courts began to 
carve out a number of definitional exceptions, 191 the most impor-
183 Bradley, Deductibility of a Partnership's Investigation and Start-Up Expenses, 2 J. 
Partnership Tax'n 233, 243 (1985). 
184 Madison Gas & Elec., 72 T.C. at 566. 
180 Goodwin v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 424 (1980), aff'd mem., 691 F.2d 490 (3d Cir. 1982). 
188 See Goodwin, 691 F.2d at 490 (affirming without opinion); Madison Gas & Elec., 633 
F.2d at 517 (holding that "expenses were nondeductible, pre-operational start-up costs," 
apparently viewing the issue as "whether the costs were necessary and ordinary current 
expenses or capital investments in future economic benefits"); see also Todd v. Commis-
sioner, 682 F.2d 207 (9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam). 
187 Compare Aboussie v. United States, 779 F.2d 424, 428, 428-29 n.6 (8th Cir. 1985) 
(finding that the taxpayer was not carrying on trade or business, but the pre-operating ex-
pense incurred also did not represent the cost of acquiring the taxpayer's sole operating 
asset) with Johnsen v. Commissioner, 794 F.2d 1157, 1162 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding that pre-
operating expenses constituted a capital expenditure since they were part of the cost of 
establishing the enterprise). 
188 See Madison Gas & Elec., 72 T.C. at 564 n.15; Aboussie, 779 F.2d at 428 n.5. 
180 E.g., Richmond Television Corp. v. United States, 354 F.2d 410, 412 (4th Cir. 1965) 
(on remand, start up costs added to the basis of an indefinite-lived permit). 
100 Johnsen, 794 F.2d at 1162. 
101 See, e.g., Hoopengarner v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 538 (1983), aff'd mem., 745 F.2d 66 
(9th Cir. 1984). Under Hoopengarner, the application of§ 212 to start-up costs constitutes a 
further definitional exception, adopted to avoid the § 162 start-up quagmire. See also supra 
note 175 and accompanying text; infra notes 222-24 and accompanying text. 
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tant of which is the "separate, saleable asset" precondition to 
capitalization. 192 
Finally, late in the development of the start-up cost doctrine, in 
Blitzer v. United States193 the Court of Claims challenged the doc-
trine's definitional functioning as putting a "going concern" gloss 
on section 162(a).194 The court rejected, albeit in dictum, 1911 the 
government's "thesis that the start of a trade or business in the 
sense of carrying on revenue-producing operations is an inflexible 
temporal prerequisite for the application of I.R.C. § 162(a)."196 In-
stead, the Court of Claims would have turned current deductibility 
on general capitalization theories, i.e., whether the expenditures 
were intended to provide benefits extending beyond the tax year in 
question or were in the nature of start-up costs.197 Thus, Blitzer 
••• See infra notes 225-43 and accompanying text. 
118 684 F.2d 874 (Ct. Cl. 1982). See generally Jones & Fowler, Pre-Operating Expenses: 
Sec. 195 Does Not Resolve Conflicting Judicial Views, 14 Tax Adviser 471, 473-74 (1983); 
Warner, supra note 87, at 3-4. 
, .. See 684 F.2d at 879-81. 
••• The court's discussion of whether the partnership was carrying on a trade or business 
in the tax year in question constituted dictum in that the expenditures at issue were actu-
ally capital expenditures (e.g., payments for services in connection with the acquisition and 
construction of capital assets, services in connection with obtaining a 42-year loan, and a 
front-end fee for services rendered throughout the life of the partnership). 684 F.2d at 893-
94. The Blitzer court stated that the taxpayer might well have been able to prove that some 
portion of fees paid to the administrative general partner were "of a non-capital nature, for 
performing overhead, recordkeeping and normal housekeeping duties" during the tax year 
in question, but the taxpayer waived any right to a remand since the amount involved was 
too small. 684 F.2d at 895. 
,.., 684 F.2d at 880 (footnote omitted). In Blitzer the government relied upon Richmond 
Television Corp. v. United States, 354 F.2d 410 (4th Cir. 1965) (on remand), and on the Tax 
Court decisions in Madison Gas & Elec. Co. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 521 (1979), afrd, 633 
F.2d 512 (7th Cir. 1980), Francis v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 704 (1977), and Good-
win v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 424 (1980). See Blitzer, 684 F.2d at 880. The court distin-
guished Richmond Television and Madison Gas & Electric from the case before it on the 
basis that they involved costs treated as capital expenses under the application of tests 
which were apart from the "carrying on a trade or business" requirement, i.e., staff costs 
that provided future benefits. Id. Additionally, the Blitzer court dismissed Francis and 
Goodwin as being "without critical analysis." ld.; see also, Bradley, supra note 183. For 
further discussion of Richmond Television, see supra notes 180-82 and accompanying text; 
of Madison Gas & Electric, Francis, and Goodwin, see supra note 112 and accompanying 
text. 
,.., The court in Blitzer stated: 
Defendant [the government] has supplied no good reason why normal recurring ex-
penses to maintain any business enterprise, and which are not in the nature of start-
up costs nor intended to provide benefits extending beyond the year in question, 
should not be deductible as ordinary expenses of such business irrespective of 
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left open the possibility of capitalizing start-up costs on some 
ground other than the preparatory doctrine. 198 It would, neverthe-
less, allow new corporations and new partnerships a current deduc-
tion for recurring expenditures producing short-term benefits.199 
Such expenditures fall within the classic definition of pre-operat-
ing or pre-opening expenses;200 however, investigatory costs would 
not be included. The Court of Claims previously had held that in-
vestigatory costs as to the acquisition of an investment, even 
though recurring, had to be capitalized and added to the basis of 
the assets. 201 
Blitzer, in a step long advocated by commentators,202 function-
ally limited "trade or business" in section 162(a) to requiring only 
regular, continuous conduct distinguishing the activity from non-
deductible "personal" or "family" expenses.203 Ample support ex-
ists in the "hobby loss" area for this interpretation of "trade or 
business."204 However, something more than continuity is needed 
to distinguish investment activities fro~ business activities. "The 
'regular, extensive and continuous' test is not in itself the correct 
test for determining whether a taxpayer is engaged in the trade or 
whether or not the business has yet completed construction or acquisition of its in-
come-producing asset. 
684 F.2d at 880. 
118 The Claims Court subsequently approved an "amassing of assets'.' capitalization ra-
tionale as undergirding the start-up cost doctrine. See Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. 
United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 220, 228 (1985). But see supra notes 120 & 131 and accompanying 
texts (criticizing the Claims Court's approach). 
"'" 684 F.2d at 880 (dictum). Such deductions could be allowed "for amortization of or-
ganization and loan costs, for payment of telephone and other utility bills, rent, stationery, 
and salaries and wages of corporate officers, secretaries and even for those who sweep the 
floor ... [although] the business enterprise is not yet in a position to earn income." Id.; 
accord Brotherman v. United States, 6 Cl. Ct. 407 (1984). 
••• See infra note 315. Other decisions have treated similar costs as nondeductible prepar-
atory costs. E.g., Goodwin v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 424, 434 (1980), affd mem., 691 F.2d 
490 (3d Cir. 1982); Francis v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M .. (CCH) 704 (1977). The Court of 
Claims viewed these decisions as mechanical. Blitzer, 684 F.2d at 880; accord Bradley, supra 
note 183. 
••• See Weinstein v. United States, 420 F.2d 700 (Ct. Cl. 1970). Recurring acquisition 
costs of capital assets also must be capitalized. See Union Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. United 
States, 570 F.2d 382, 390-91 (1st Cir. 1978). 
••• E.g., Buell, supra note 2, at 280; Roth, supra note 2, at 48; see Erbacher, supra note 2, 
at 491, 493, 495. 
••• 684 F.2d at 879-80; accord Brotherman v. United States, 6 Cl. Ct. 407 (1984). 
104 1 B. Bittker, supra note 5, 11 22.5.1 to .2, at 22-44 to -49; Lee, supra note 122, at 390-97. 
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business of managing his own investments. "2011 At the same time, 
there is no need to use the term "trade or business" to separate 
currently deductible expenses from capital expenditures; this sepa-
ration is the primary function of the "ordinary" requirement under 
both sections 162 and 212.206 
Rejecting revenue-producing operations as an "inflexible tempo-
ral prerequisite" for the application of section 162(a),207 the court 
in Blitzer held that a taxpayer had begun business, for purposes of 
this provision, as soon as the taxpayer "had actually begun, . . . a 
regular, continuous course of conduct,"206 in this instance "to en-
gage in, and carry on, its 'trade or business' of developing, con-
structing, owning and operating an apartment project with a bona 
fide expectation of profit. "209 The taxpayer's activities reached 
trade or business status under this definition on ·the date on which 
it "had acquired the land, had arranged for the financing of the 
project, had executed its building loan agreement and given a note 
therefor, had received substantial funds, and had prepared plans 
for actual construction of its apartments (which began shortly 
thereafter [and was completed in the following tax year])."210 
While couched in traditional commencement of a trade or business 
format and perhaps supported by regulations under section 248,211 
••• Moller v. United States, 721 F.2d 810, 814 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
•oe See Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 689-90 (1966); Raymond Bertolini Trucking 
Co. v. Commissioner, 736 F.2d 1120, 1123 (6th Cir. 1984). 
••• Blitzer, 684 F.2d at 880. 
••• Id. For a discussion of the "continuity" doctrine, see Lee, supra note 122, at 449-51. 
108 684 F.2d at 880-81; Warner, supra note 87, at 3. See generally Lee, supra note 2, at 387 
(trade or business requirement conotes profit motive and continuity). For a discussion of the 
"profit" prerequisite, see Lee, supra note 122, at 380-90. 
110 684 F.2d at 880. 
111 See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.248-1(a)(3), 1.1372-4(b)(5)(ii)(b). The regulations peg "deemed 
commencement of a business" (or "active conduct" in the latter instance) to whether the 
activities of the (corporate) taxpayer advance to the extent necessary to identify the nature 
of its business operations, e.g., the acquisition of necessary "operating assets." The Tax 
Court explicitly rejected this model in the context of preparatory expenses. See infra note 
428. 
With increasing sophistication, or at least experience, the drafters of the regulations 
under § 709 added, in 1983, a definition of "operating assets" providing that such assets are 
"assets that are in a state of readiness to be placed in service within a reasonable period 
following their acquisition." Treas. Reg. § 1.709-2(c). This definition was implicitly based on 
the model of § 248. See S. Rep. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 1, 94, reprinted in 1976 
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3439, 3530. It provides for 60-month amortization of part-
nership organization fees "beginning with the month in which the partnership begins busi-
ness." See I.R.C. § 709(b)(l). Not surprisingly, a decision following the start-up cost doctrine 
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this approach, also long called for by commentators, 212 pinpoints 
commencement of business activities substantially prior to the first 
carrying on of revenue-producing operations. The government and 
the Tax Court preferred the later starting point as the commence-
ment of a business for start-up costs purposes. 213 
Blitzer and other cases attacking the "holding oneself out as 
providing goods or services" definition of trade or business sta-
tus214 undermine the noncapital aspects of the preparatory doc-
trine, thus opening the way for a functional analysis of the deduct-
ibility of start-up and business expansion costs, as well. The 
practical effect of Blitzer probably lay, however, more in its deter-
mination of when a business commences, than in its effect on the 
definitional underpinnings of the traditional start-up cost doctrine. 
For instance, under Blitzer, at least as soon as the typical real es-
tate tax shelter venture acquired land and executed a construction 
loan agreement, it could currently deduct classic recurring start-up 
costs prior to completion or even commencement of construc-
tion. 2111 Investigatory costs, therefore, would not be currently de-
ductible under the Blitzer approach because (1) they would still 
fail the "ordinary" expense requirement previously viewed by the 
Court of Claims as a capitalizable acquisition cost,218 and (2) gen-
approved these regulations. Aboussie v. United States, 779 F.2d 424, 430 (8th Cir. 1985). 
111 See, e.g., Galvin, Investigation and Start-Up Costs: Consequences and Considerations 
for New Business, 56 Taxes 413, 418 (1978); Roth, supra note 2, at 39-40 . 
.,. See infra notes 415 & 420. Notwithstanding its usual hard-line tack as to when a busi-
ness commences, the Tax Court on occasion has pinpointed commencement not on the first 
purchase or sale (in a commodities trading business) but on when "planning for the business 
was completed." Louismet v. Commissioner, 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 1496 (1982). For examples of 
typical Tax Court opinions, see cases cited infra note 415. 
••• The author elsewhere has criticized the use of the "holding one's self out as providing 
goods or services" definition of "trade or business" as support for the classic start-up cost 
doctrine. See Lee, supra note 122, at 452-54; Lee, supra note 2, at 398-400. The issue of 
whether meeting the "goods or services" standard is a prerequisite for "trade or business" 
status is presently before the Supreme Court. See Commissioner v. Groetzinger, 721 F.2d 
269 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 1456 (1986). See generally, Boyle, What is a 
Trade or Business?, 39 Tax Law. 737 (1986); Note, Trade or BusineSs Issue: Can a Gambling 
Loss Properly Be Considered a Business Loss?, 19 Suffolk U.L. Rev. 907 (1985); Comment, 
Defining "Trade or Business" Under the Internal Revenue Code: A Survey of Relevant 
Cases, 11 Fla. St. U.L. Rev. 949 (1984). 
111 See Staff of Joint Comm. on Tax'n, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., General Explanation of the 
Revenue Provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1984, at 296 (Comm. Print 1985) [hereinafter 
General Explanation). 
11
" See Weinstein v. United States, 420 F.2d 700 (Ct. Cl. 1970). 
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erally they would be incurred prior to the Blitzer identification of 
the business starting point for trade or business status. 
Under a deep structure analysis, Blitzer's rejection of the "func-
tioning as a going concern" gloss on section 162 is correct. Follow-
ing this analysis, the "carrying on a trade or business" requirement 
should be limited to distinguishing between section 162 activities 
and non-profit-motivated activities or investments.217 A trade or 
business should be viewed as commencing as soon as the activity 
can be determined to be profit-motivated and not merely an in-
vestment, i.e., usually when the business character of the activity 
can be identified. An expenditure incurred prior to such point, e.g., 
investigatory costs incurred prior to a firm decision to enter the 
activity, should be set up under the model as a separate asset and 
currently deducted in the tax year in which the business com-
mences, but only if the expenditure produces sufficiently short-
term, variable-term, or insubstantial benefits. Otherwise, the pe-
riod benefited by such a capitalized cost should be estimated, even 
if in a rough guess, and the expenditure then amortized over that 
useful life. Under the model, most, if not all, pre-opening expenses 
would be currently deductible in the year incurred unless other-
wise prohibited under the distortion of income doctrine. However, 
as a practical matter probably only investigatory costs would be set 
up as a separate asset and then expensed or amortized once the 
business commences, because only they would be likely to be 
nonrecurring. 218 
Even if the taxpayer's trade or business were determined not to 
commence until the business begins to function as a going concern, 
substantial distortion of income could be avoided by treating lim-
ited-life investigatory and pre-opening costs as creating free-stand-
ing assets, amortizable in full in the first tax year of operation. 219 
117 Blitzer, 684 F.2d at 879; see Buell, supra note 2, at 280. 
••• See Note, supra note 87, at 453. 
••• The Tax Court has obliquely indicated its receptiveness to such an approach. Goodwin 
v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 424, 433-34 n.9 (1980), afrd mem., 691 F.2d 490 (3d Cir. 1982). 
The Goodwin Court indicated approval of the result, but not the reasoning, in United States 
v. Manor Care, Inc., 490 F. Supp. 355 (D. Md. 1980). The Manor Care court allowed a 
current deduction in the tax year the business began to function as a going concern for 
expenditures paid earlier in the same year, but prior to the taxpayer's both obtaining a 
license to operate and operating the business. Id. at 362. In Goodwin, the Tax Court dis-
agreed with the reasoning in Manor Care that the expenditures were deductible under 
§ 162, on the ground they "were clearly pre-operating in nature." 75 T.C. at 433-34 n.8. 
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In the case of the investigatory expenses and rare pre-opening ex-
penses that benefit an extended period, amortization would begin 
when the business commences and would be available through the 
benefited period. In the case of pre-opening expenses which are 
sufficiently recurring so that if they are incurred after the business 
commences they will be currently deductible, a reasonable allow-
ance under this approach for amortization in the year the business 
commences of such expenditures would be equal to the entire 
amount of the expense. 
The suggested approach would bring symmetry and less distor-
tion of income to the start-up and business expansion costs area. 
Unfortunately, its conflict with contrary definitional precedents 
and the necessity of case-by-case determination of useful life or 
distortion of income would pose substantial problems in tax ad-
minstration. Moreover, at least since the 1984 amendments in re-
sponse to Blitzer,220 courts arguably are not free to develop case-
law solutions as to start-up costs under provisions other than sec-
tion 195.221 
B. Antithesis: Definitional Separate, Saleable Asset Doctrine 
The distortion of income caused by capitalization without amor-
tization under the classic preparatory doctrine generated a host of 
definitional refinements to the doctrine. Examples of such refine-
ments are: the preparatory doctrine does not apply to recurring-
type expenditures incurred in the same tax year that the business 
later commences,222 and conceptually unsound attribution of busi-
ness status223 and deductions224 across corporate lines. The major 
Instead, the Goodwin court indicated the identical result of a current deduction could be 
reached by capitalizing the expenditures and then providing-once the business be-
gan-amortization deductions over the period benefited. Id. Further, the Tax Court rea-
soned, implicitly, that the period benefited by such recurring pre-operating costs was a year 
or less; therefore, the "reasonable allowance" in the year the business commenced for depre-
ciation of such capitalized pre-operating costs was the entire cost. See Schuster, Pre-Open-
ing Costs-Recent Legislative and Judicial Attention, Tax. Mgmt. Mem. No. 81-8 (BNA) 3, 
5-6 (1981). 
110 See infra note 446 and accompanying text . 
.., See infra note 441 and accompanying text. 
111 United States v. Manor Care, Inc., 490 F. Supp. 355 (D. Md. 1980). See generally 
Schuster, supra note 219. 
••• Duffy v. United States, 690 F.2d 889 (Ct. Cl. 1982). Notwithstanding the Supreme 
Court's pronouncement in Whipple v. Commissioner, 373 U.S. 193 (1963) (relying on a long 
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development in response to the inequities of the preparatory doc-
trine is the "separate, saleable asset" doctrine, fashioned to allow 
current deduction of start-up-like expenditures with present and 
future benefits incurred in expanding an existing business. 
Briarcliff Candy Corp. v. Commissioner22 rs and most of its bank 
credit card case progeny, establishing the "separate, saleable prop-
erty right" bright-line test for current deductibility of certain busi-
ness expansion costs,228 contained common elements. The expenses 
line of its earlier decisions that a shareholder was not engaged in the business of the corpo-
ration in which he owned stock), in Duffy the Court of Claims, in the context of whether 
sales of property by a shareholder to his controlled corporation were made in the ordinary 
course of the shareholder's business, imputed the corporation's trade or business activities 
to the shareholder under an agency theory. 690 F.2d at 895-96; see also Tibbals v. United 
States, 362 F.2d 266, 272 (Ct. Cl. 1966). 
••• Baltimore Aircoil Co. v. United States, 333 F. Supp. 705 (D. Md. 1971) (although par-
ent and subsidiary were separate entities, they filed consolidated returns and the subsidiary 
was merely a branch or division of parent); see also Playboy Clubs Int'l, Inc., v. United 
States, 76-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 11 9560 (N.D. Ill. 1976), aff'd in part, vacated in part, and 
remanded in part, in unpublished order, (7th Cir. May 16, 1977). The Tax Court refused to 
take this approach, at least where the parent and subsidiary were not in the same business. 
Bennett Paper Corp. v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 458, 464-65 (1982), aff'd per curiam, 699 F.2d 
450 (8th Cir. 1983); accord Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8,423,005 (Feb. 8, 1984) . 
... 475 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1973); Case Note, supra note 90 . 
... Briarcliff Candy, and its progeny, have been described as involving new ways of, not 
new geographic branches for, operating an existing business. See Central Tex. Sav. & Loan 
Ass'n v. United States, 731 F.2d 1181, 1185 (5th Cir. 1984). In fact, however, Briarcliff 
Candy promoted sales through new retail, franchise outlets in drug stores in areas of geo-
graphic expansion (the suburbs). 
In Briarcliff Candy, recurring (and generally increasing) expenditures were involved, 
which was also true in the first bank credit card decision. See Colorado Springs Nat'! Bank 
v. United States, 505 F.2d 1185 (lOth Cir. 1974). In First Sec. Bank v. Commissioner, 592 
F.2d 1050 (9th Cir. 1979) (permitting a current deduction under the separate, saleable asset 
test for the cost of a computer program having a five-year useful period), however, the 
Ninth Circuit majority was unable to distinguish the computer costs in Colorado Springs 
National Bank. See id. at 1053 (Duniway, J., dissenting). This inability stemmed from mis-
focusing on the separate, saleable asset test. In Colorado Springs National Bank, the de-
ductible computer costs consisted almost entirely of data entry charges, clearly recurring 
costs probably with short-term benefits, and hence were currently deductible without dis-
tortion of income. See 505 F.2d at 1187-88. In contrast, in First Security Bank the computer 
costs largely consisted of the cost of a computer program, used for five years, which under a 
distortion of income analysis should have been capitalized and amortized, probably over 
that period. 592 F.2d at 1053 n.1 (Duniway, J., dissenting in part). 
Indeed, the best-reasoned bank credit card opinion did not even consider the lack of 
transferability, the focal point of Colorado Springs National Bank and Briarcliff Candy. 
See Iowa-Des Moines Nat'! Bank v. Commissioner, 592 F.2d 433 (8th Cir. 1979). The court 
in Iowa-Des Moines National Bank rested on the facts that: (I) the acquired credit informa-
tion was short-lived and subject to sudden change; (2) the information obtained could only 
have been used to issue credit cards and did not create goodwill; and (3) equivalent credit 
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were recurring (and in Briarcliff Candy increased annually in 
amount over a long period),227 and thus were similar to many pre-
opening expenses. Moreover, " [ t] he distinction between recurring 
and nonrecurring business expenses provides a very crude but per-
haps serviceable demarcation between those capital expenditures 
that can be feasibly capitalized and those that cannot be."228 These 
cases universally viewed the expansion costs as new ways of carry-
ing on an existing business, rather than starting a new business in 
a new location. 229 
The most important common factor, however, was the view that 
a current deduction of a recurring expense with some future bene-
fits was preferable to its capitalization without amortiza-
tion-"rough justice. "230 The Second Circuit in Briarcliff Candy 
merely charged the government "to furnish clear standards and 
guidelines as to what intangible assets are deductible under § 162 
and what are not. "231 The leading bank credit card decision, Colo-
rado Springs National Bank u. United States, however, sharpened 
the thrust: 
The start-up expenditures here challenged did not create a prop-
erty interest. They produced nothing corporeal or salable. They 
are recurring. At the most they introduced a more efficient method 
of conducting an old business. The government suggests no way in 
which they could be amortized. The government's theoretical ap-
screening, clearly an ordinary and necessary part of banking, could have been internally 
performed and currently deducted. Id. at 436. Therefore, in an interesting twist on Idaho 
Power's tax parity mandate, the court in Iowa-Des Moines National Bank held that pur-
chased credit screening was currently deductible. Id. The model works the same way; thus, 
in practical effect a distortion of income analysis (although not expressly so articulated) 
would not change the result in most of the bank credit card cases, but would produce capi-
talization and amortization in First Security Bank. 
107 Over an eight-year period (1963-70) the franchise division's expenses annually ranged 
from $580,702 to $808,965. 475 F.2d at 780. 
••• Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. v. Commisioner, 685 F.2d 212, 217 (7th Cir. 1982); see 
supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text. 
••• Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank, 505 F.2d at 1190. The court held that "[t]he credit card 
system enables a bank to carry on an old business in a new way. A new method is distin-
guishable from a new business." Id.; accord First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 558 F.2d 721 
(4th Cir. 1977) (per curiam); First Sec. Bank v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 644, 649 (1975), affd, 
592 F.2d 1050 (9th Cir. 1979); see Briarcliff Candy, 475 F.2d at 781, 787. 
••• See Warner, supra note 87, at 8; Note, supra note 4, at 332-33. 
131 475 F.2d at 783. The recurring costs in question consisted of compensation paid to 
added salepersons, extensive advertising, and costs of soliciting drug stores and others to act 
as sales agents. See id. 
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proach ignores the practicalities of the situation, and permits a 
distortion of taxpayer's financial situation. If an expenditure, con-
cededly of temporal value, may be neither expensed nor amortized, 
the adoption of technological advances is discouraged.232 
Briarcliff Candy and its progeny read the Supreme Court in 
Commissioner v. Lincoln Savings & Loan Association as having 
shifted the emphasis radically: ensuing future benefit was thought 
no longer controlling. Rather, the court in Briarcliff Candy held 
that the inquiry should be whether the expenditure created or en-
hanced essentially a separate and distinct asset.233 "Asset" was de-
••• 505 F.2d at 1192 (emphasis added). 
131 475 F. 2d at 786. In Commissioner v. Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 403 U.S. 345 (1971), 
the taxpayer currently deducted compulsory payments to the Federal Savings and Loan 
Insurance Corporation's ("FSLIC") Secondary Reserve, in which Lincoln Savings & Loan 
had a transferable pro rata share that could also be refunded or applied to FSLIC's conced· 
edly deductible primary reserve. The Commissioner argued that because the Secondary Re-
serve provided future benefits it should be capitalized. Id. at 354. In response, the Court 
stated that 
the presence of an ensuing benefit that may have some future aspect is not control-
ling; many expenses concededly deductible have prospective effect beyond the taxa-
ble year. 
What is important and controlling, we feel is that the ... payment serves to create 
or enhance for Lincoln what is essentially a separate and distinct additional asset and 
that, as an inevitable consequence, the payment is capital in nature and not an ex-
pense, let alone an ordinary expense, deductible under § 162(a) in the absence of 
other factors not established here. 
Id. This passage illustrates well one of the dangers of dictum. Although the passage showed 
that the Court in Lincoln Savings & Loan focused on the presence of a separate asset, 
several decisions and commentators have read it as merely indicating that the presence of a 
separate asset is a "condition sufficient" for capitalization. See, e.g., Florida Publishing Co. 
v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 269, 272, (1975), arrd in unpublished opinion, (5th Cir. April 26, 
1977); see also NCNB Corp v. United States, 651 F.2d 942, 957-58 (4th Cir. 1981), vacated 
en bane, 684 F.2d 285 (4th Cir. 1982); Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. United States, 7 
Cl. Ct. 220, 225 (1985); 1 B. Bittker, supra note 5, 11 20.4.4, at 20-80 n.54; Gunn, supra note 
5, at 444; Lee & Murphy, supra note 5, at 476; Warner, supra note 87, at 5, 8 (stating that a 
separate property interest rule was hard to justify); Note, supra note 5, at 622; Note, supra 
note 4, at 332 (stating that the separate asset standard was not sound tax policy, and there-
fore should be interpreted merely as a condition sufficent for capitalization). Implicit sup-
port for this reading can be found in the Court's subsequent capital expenditure cases, 
which adopted other capitalization tests. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 
U.S. 1 (1973); United States v. Mississippi Chern. Corp., 405 U.S. 298 (1972); see also Note, 
s•Jpra note 4, at 320 & n.56. 
Other cases and many student commentators have read Lincoln Savings & Loan as re-
quiring creation or enhancement of a separate transferable asset as a condition precedent 
for capitalization. See cases and sources cited infra note 234. The author would reconcile 
Lincoln Savings & Loan with the clear reflection of income doctrine by treating the de-
ferred charge, required where current deduction of the cost would produce a distortion of 
1986] Start-Up Costs 55 
fined in its business sense as "items of ownership of a permanent 
or fixed nature which are convertible into cash. "234 Briarcliff 
Candy's unarticulated premise may have been that such "assets" 
(apart from increase in value of the business) usually would be de-
preciable or amortizable; hence, no distortion of income would re-
sult from capitalization.280 While Briarcliff Candy, with its pro-
nouncements on the one-year rule, called into question the 
production of future benefits rationale for capitalizing pre-opening 
expenses, 236 its progeny tended to explain the preparatory doctrine 
in relation to the "carrying on a trade or business" leg of Rich-
income, as a separate, free-standing, and usually amortizable asset, thus satisfying the Lin-
coln Savings & Loan test. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text; cf. Central Texas 
Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. United·States, 731 F.2d 1181, 1185 (5th Cir. 1984). 
••• Briarcliff Candy, 475 F.2d at 786. Briarcliff Candy and its bank credit card progeny 
read Lincoln Savings & Loan as requiring a separate, saleable asset and the standard set 
forth in NCNB II, 684 F.2d at 289, as preconditions for capitalization. See supra note 227. 
Specifically, Briarcliff Candy and its progeny held that the "ensuing benefit" language in 
Lincoln Savings & Loan overruled the one-year standard for distinguishing between capital 
and current costs. Most student commentators have erroneously favored the separate, salea-
ble property rule. E.g., Note, supra note 87, at 463, 465; Note, supra note 115, at 1138, 1142; 
Note, Deductibility of Bank Branching Expenditures: Central Texas Savings & Loan Asso-
ciation v. United States, A Weak Rebuttal to NCNB Corp. v. United States, 19 U. Rich-
mond L. Rev. 147 (1984). But see Note, supra note 4, at 330, 332. Unfortunately, congres-
sional staff also seem to have read Lincoln Savings & Loan as establishing such a separate 
and distinct asset precondition to capitalization. See S. Rep. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 
141 (1986); Staff of Joint Comm. on Tax'n, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., Tax Reform Accounting 
Issues 50 (Sept. 13, 1985). 
••• As one commentator noted 
the property interest test drawn from Lincoln Savings & Loan is difficult to justify in 
theory. However, it may serve as a means of imposing rough justice by requiring capi-
talization only with respect to those assets and benefits-tangible assets and intangi-
ble property interests-most likely to have ascertainable useful lives that will support 
amortization deductions. 
Warner, supra note 87, at 3. Colorado Springs National Bank appears to have been greatly 
influenced by such considerations. See supra note 228 and accompanying text. On the other 
hand, the Second Circuit historically has displayed a predeliction for importing property Jaw 
concepts into this and related areas of taxation. See Commissioner v. Ferrer, 304 F.2d 125 
(2d Cir. 1962); Van Iderstine Co. v. Commissioner, 261 F.2d 211, 213 (2d Cir. 1958) (a capi-
tal expenditure must result in the acquisition of "capital," i.e., an addition to the taxpayer's 
taxable wealth). 
••• If the future benefits/capitalization basis for the preparatory doctrine is removed, and 
the definitional preparatory basis is undercut by Blitzer, then recurring pre-opening costs 
should be currently deductible. See Erbacher, supra note 2, at 495; Lee, supra note 2, at 30 
n.53; Note, supra note 5, at 624 n.34; see also supra notes 193-214 and accompanying text. 
The business expansion decisions, however, were not so forthright. See infra notes 292-300 
and accompanying text. 
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mond Television. 237 
The "separate, saleable asset" precondition for capitalization is 
overinclusive, permitting a current deduction for (1) substantial 
expenditures benefiting an extended period of time although creat-
ing no transferable asset, e.g., a computer program expected to last 
five years,238 and (2) acquisition costs of a license with an indefi-
nite life. 239 A current deduction in such instances produces more 
distortion of income than capitalization as a free-standing asset 
amortizable over the benefited period. In addition to its functional 
weaknesses, the separate, saleable asset test is conceptually weak, 
based upon a limited, and oft-critized,240 reading of Lincoln Sav-
ings & Loan. As the Claims Court pointed out in Cleveland Elec-
tric Illuminating Co. v. United States,241 the "separate and dis-
tinct asset" referent in Lincoln Savings & Loan only meant that in 
the particular case before the Court the taxpayer's acquisition of 
such an asset was decisive. "It does not state ... that if the sepa-
rate and distinct asset test is not met the payment is a necessary 
and ordinary expense. "242 A host of examples may be found where 
capital treatment is required although no such separate and dis-
tinct asset is created or enhanced. 243 
In summary, the first application of the separate, saleable asset 
doctrine worked well (steady-state recurring expenditures).244 
117 See, e.g., Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank, 505 F.2d at 1190; see also First Nat'! Bank v. 
United States, 41 F. Supp. 1107, 1111 (D.S.C. 1976), aff'd per curiam, 558 F.2d 721 (4th Cir. 
1977); First Sec. Bank v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 644, 649 (1975), aff'd, 592 F.2d 1050 (9th 
Cir. 1979). See generally Note, supra note 115, at 1134 & n.57. Central Texas Savings & 
Loan (which applied the origin-of-the-claim doctrine to expansion costs) agreed that "if a 
taxpayer were to start a new business, the pre-operational or start-up expenses would not be 
deductible under section 162(a)." 731 F.2d at 1183. 
All three definitional doctrines (preparatory doctrine, separate, saleable asset, and acqui-
sition cost), however, fail the acid clear reflection of income test. Distinguishing (and hence, 
approving in dictum) the preparatory doctrine was undoubtedly motivated by "the desire to 
permit the taxpayer to deduct its expenses without directly challenging the well-entrenched 
rule prohibiting the deduction of pre-operating costs." Note, supra note 5, at 627; see infra 
notes 310-18 and accompanying text. 
•aa First Sec. Bank, 592 F.2d at 1053 (Duniway, J., dissenting). 
110 NCNB Corp. v. United States, 684 F.2d 285 (4th Cir. 1982) (en bane). Contra Central 
Tex. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 731 F.2d 1181 (5th Cir. 1984). 
••• Gunn, supra note 5, at 452; Note, supra note 4, at 330. 
••• 7 Cl. Ct. 220 (1985). 
141 Id. at 225. 
141 Id.; Gunn, supra note 5, at 446, 447 n.20; Lee & Murphy, supra note 5, at 544-46. 
••• See supra note 227 and accompanying text. 
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When mechanically extended, however, as is the nature of a 
bright-line test, the doctrine itself produced distortion of income 
and, in time, countervailing authorities. 
C. Failed Synthesis: Amortization of Free-Standing Deferred 
Charge 
The majority panel decision in NCNB I (vacated on en bane re-
view), paralleling an approach called for by some commentators2'«~ 
and the inspiration for the model, attempted to chart a middle 
ground or "golden mean"246 between the Richmond Television 
"one-year rule"247 and the Briarcliff Candy "separate, saleable in-
terest" rule. The panel favored untying the "Gordian knot" of 
these two talismanic rules by: (1) capitalizing business expansion 
costs (and start-up costs as well) to the extent that their current 
deduction would distort the taxpayer's income because future 
years would be benefited (while recognizing exceptions for certain 
nondistorting, currently deductible costs that would benefit future 
years);248 but then, (2) treating the expansion costs as separate, 
... Erbacher, supra note 2, at 500; Seago, supra note 2, at 421; Note, supra note 5, at 619, 
633; Case Note, supra note 90, at 916-17. These commentators, however, meant different 
things by "clear reflection of income," usually adopting either the incorporation of financial 
accounting rules or judicial policy. See supra notes 81-95 and accompanying text; infra notes 
254-67 and accompanying text. 
ua NCNB II, 684 F.2d at 294-95 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting). In his vacated majority 
opinion in NCNB I, Judge Murnaghan saw his device of amortization as avoiding "the 
Catch-22 from which the Tenth Circuit believed that it had to rescue Colorado Springs 
National Bank." 651 F.2d at 959. For a discussion of the technical difficulties of the NCNB 
I panel majority's view of amortization, see infra notes 254-67 and accompanying text. 
147 The court in Richmond Television alternatively denied a current deduction for the 
contested start-up costs (principally pre-opening broadcasting staff training) on the ground 
that the costs benefited future tax years and, hence, were capital. See supra notes 156-57 
and accompanying text. The court stated: "Our system of income taxation attempts to 
match income and expenses so as to tax only net income. A taxpayer may, therefore, not 
deduct as a current business expense the full cost of acquiring an asset, tangible or intangi-
ble, which benefits the taxpayer for more than one year." 345 F.2d at 907. Where an expen-
diture benefits future years, automatic capitalization can lead to distortion of income. See 
supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text . 
... The NCNB I majority read the reference to currently deductible future benefit ex-
penditures in Lincoln Savings & Loan as speaking to "situations involving considerations of 
pragmatism and uncertainty in which, with the blessing of the Commissioner, taxpayers 
may deduct currently certain expenditures, notwithstanding the presence of probable future 
benefit." NCNB I, 651 F.2d at 961. The panel pointed to the allowance of current deduc-
tions (1) for repair and educational expenditures benefiting a taxpayer during subsequent 
tax years and (2) for expenditures that, as a practical matter, could not be associated with 
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free-standing assets and allowing amortization in both the current 
and future tax years in proportion to the extent the costs were 
used in such years. 249 
1. NCNB I Panel: Amortization of Deferred Charge 
The panel's treatment of the cost itself as a free-standing, amor-
tizable, separate asset, rather than looking for a saleable asset pro-
duced or purchased by the expenditure, constituted one of the 
opinion's two most significant holdings: 
In order more accurately to reflect income, :both in the present pe-
riod and in the future accounting periods, tpe carried-forward "as-
sets" of an enterprise include, without regard to whether they are 
tangible or intangible, certain expenditures for benefits whose cost 
has already been incurred but the outlay for which is nevertheless 
most properly matched against some future period's revenues 
which the benefits will help produce. This matching is without re-
gard to whether the benefits are tangible or intangible and also 
without regard to their realizability, through sale or otherwise. The 
critical factor is the accounting period in which the associated rev-
enues are to be recognized, not the nature of the benefits which 
help produce those revenues. Whether the deferred charge has 
some separate identifiable worth is irrelevant to the accounting 
process as it is applied. zao 
either current or future tax years. Id. at 961-62. The panel also categorized other minor 
current deductible expenditures, which conceptually were capital, as " 'more-trouble-than-
it's-worth exceptions,' " e.g., expenditures with a useful life of no more than a year that in 
fact overlapped two tax years. Id. at 953 & n.21; see Note, supra note 4, at 332-33. For 
discussion of the proper future benefit exceptions to capitalization under the model, see 
supra notes 53-78 and accompanying text. 
••• NCNB I, 651 F.2d at 962-63. For discussion of the flaw in this view of amortization, 
see infra notes 253-61 and accompanying text. 
••• 651 F.2d at 949. For a hypothetical (strikingly prophetic of the Wolfsen Land & Cattle 
approach) involving recurring landscaping costs, see Gunn, supra note 5, at 446 & n.19. 
Professor Gunn advocated that the "cost" be treated as the amortizable asset itself, rather 
than what was purchased with the cost. ld. 
The taxpayer in Central Texas Savings & Loan argued in the alternative that the market 
survey and permit application "expenditures should have been amortized over the life of the 
'work product,' presumably the period of time prior to approval of the permit during which 
the studies and applications were used." Central Tex. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 
731 F.2d 1181, 1181 (5th Cir. 1984). The Fifth Circuit artlessly held that § 195 was not yet 
applicable to the year in question, so that the court did not have to decide whether the 
contested (survey and permit) costs could meet the § 195 proviso that amortizable start-up 
costs "would be deductible if they were paid in connection with expansion of an existing 
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This approach, which the panel would have applied to both busi-
ness expansion and start-up costs, 2111 was fundamentally sound and 
is close to the model suggested. 2112 
However, through overreliance on Generally Accepted Account-
ing Principles ("GAAP"),2113 the panel opinion in NCNB I was un-
clear on tax technicalities, and its distortion of income analysis 
perhaps failed to account adequately for recurring investigatory 
costs. The NCNB I panel majority thus fell into two major techni-
cal errors in its approach to amortization of the capitalized market 
survey and branch permit application costs at issue in the case. 
The first error was that amortization was determined year-by-year 
on the basis of actual use of the intangible created by the con-
tested expenditures in current operations in that year rather than 
by estimating useful life. The second error was that amortization 
of the capitalized acquisition costs of nonwasting assets, such as 
branch permits, was permitted. 
These technical errors resulted from the panel's opinion that the 
determination of annual net income for a given tax year was an 
accounting question, calling for the matching, in the appropriate 
period, of the gross revenues for the year and the cost of producing 
business." Id. at 1186. The Fifth Circuit, as a further non sequitur, concluded that "[i]n the 
future, however, Section 195(a) should encourage formation of new businesses without the 
attendant controversy and litigation to determine the proper tax classification of the start-
up expenditures." Id. at 1186. The judicial pattern of deliberating the backstopping of§ 195 
while espousing a capitalization theory that logically would emasculate the provision has 
become commonplace. See Johnsen v. Commissioner, 794 F.2d 1157 (6th Cir. 1986); Cleve-
land Elec. Illuminating Co. v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 220 (1985). See generally infra notes 
309-17 and accompanying text. 
101 651 F.2d at 956-57; accord Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank v. United States, 505 F.2d 
1185, 1187 (lOth Cir. 1974). 
••• The model also would set up many, if not most, expenditures benefiting future years 
as a deferred charge, but would amortize the "asset" over a useful life determined by ap-
proximation. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text. Moreover, if the period bene-
fited were short, say up to three years, the model would allow a current deduction. See 
supra note 45 and accompanying text. Thus, under the model the market survey costs might 
be currently deductible, while the permit costs would be amortizable. 
••• 651 F.2d 954, 961-63. Some commentators have advocated identification of financial 
accounting with clear reflection of income in the start-up cost area. See, e.g, Lee, supra note 
5; Case Note, supra note 90. A thesis of this article, however, is that only broad financial 
accounting concepts, e.g., amortization of start-up costs as a deferred charge, and not finan-
cial accounting principles themselves, should govern. See supra notes 81-95 and accompany-
ing text. See generally, Comment, Tax Treatment of the Costs of Internally Developed In-
tangible Assets, 57 S. Cal. L. Rev. 767, 787 (1984). 
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those revenues. 26" Therefore, the Fourth Circuit panel looked to 
the GAAP "hierarchy" of expense recognition principles for the 
proper "matching"266 rules: (1) association of expense with revenue 
"on the basis of cause and effect"; (2) if not possible, systematic 
and rational allocation; and, (3) if neither possible, recognition of 
costs as expenses in the period incurred or in which a loss is sus-
tained. 266 Based on these rules the panel majority believed that 
when there are discernible future benefits from an expenditure, 
there very often will be a cause and effect relation between the 
expenditure and revenues to be received during future peri-
ods. . . . Even when there is no direct means of associating the 
expenditure and later revenues as cause and effect, there will al-
most always be a way systematically and rationally to allocate the 
cost among the periods in which benefits are provided.2117 
Consequently, relying upon a melange of clear reflection of in-
come, GAAP, and Cohan approximation,268 the panel remanded 
the case to the district court to determine the extent to which 
("even if no better than a rough guess")269 the internal and exter-
nal business expansion costs (market surveys and permit costs) 
were used in the production of current revenue during the years 
before the trial court. The panel also held that the remaining 
amount of the costs were similarly to be allocated in subsequent 
tax years between use in production of future income and use, if 
any, in the production of current revenue.260 The panel viewed 
such allocation (or amortization) according to use in the tax year 
as constituting a "systematic and rational allocation" of the cost, 
e.g., of the market survey, among the accounting periods during 
which it was economically valuable to the taxpayer. Such alloca-
tion was appropriate even if it was not possible to associate, ac-
cording to cause and effect, the use of such a survey and some sub-
204 651 F.2d at 948, 952, 961-962. 
••• Id. at 952 . 
... ld. For the text of these principles, see supra note 84. 
257 651 F.2d at 961. 
... Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540, 543-44 (2d Cir. 1930). For a discusson of Cohan 
approximations and their proper use in depreciation/amortization questions, see supra notes 
166-74 and accompanying text. 
••• 651 F.2d at 962. 
••• ld. at 963. 
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sequent revenues. 261 
Seeking "rough justice," the NCNB I panel carried the financial 
accounting principle of matching expenditures with associated rev-
enues too far. It failed to appreciate that tax accounting, unlike 
financial accounting, does not match costs and revenues on a 
cause-and-effect basis year-by-year. Rather, under tax accounting 
principles the period to be benefited, i.e., the useful life, generally 
is estimated in the year the expenditure is made and its cost is 
then deducted over that period, ratably in the case of in-
tangibles.262 Thus, under tax amortization "rough justice" is ob-
tained by estimating useful life through a "rough guess."263 
The NCNB I panel, taking matching of costs and revenue for 
financial accounting to its logical extreme, called for amortization 
of the direct and indirect permit application costs in the same 
manner as the survey costs.264 The branch banking permit, how-
ever, had an indefinite life2611 and hence, under traditional doctrine, 
could not be amortized.266 In addition, traditionally, useful life 
could not be estimated under Cohan, since the permit was not 
wasting, i.e., had an indefinite life.267 Betrayed by its desire to 
clearly reflect income and the purported ease of systematically and 
rationally allocating costs among the tax years of use, the NCNB I 
panel failed to address both the acquisition cost doctrine (treat-
ment of the application costs as a separate asset would be of no 
avail) 268 and the inability to estimate with reasonable accuracy the 
••• Id. at 962. These, of course, are the standaros of GAAP allocation. See supra note 84. 
In effect the panel applied a "transactional approach," matching expenses and revenue 
(through use rather than income generated) on year-by-year basis. Such a transactional or 
"open" approach is contrary in this context to the annual accounting principle under which 
the transaction is closed in year one, i.e., determine the useful life and then prorate the cost 
over that period. See Warner, supra note 87, at 6. Interestingly, the Fourth Circuit took an 
open-transaction approach (for lease-option transactions) once before and then reversed it-
self en bane, adopting a closed transaction approach. See Kitchin v. Commissioner, 340 F.2d 
895 (4th Cir.), vacated en bane, 353 F.2d 13 (4th Cir. 1965). 
••• Several narrow exceptions to ratable amortization of intangibles are permitted. See 1 
B. Bittker, supra note 5, 11 23.5.6, at 23-70 to -72; see also supra notes 34-35 and accompany-
ing text. 
••• See supra notes 170-71 and accompanying text . 
... 651 F.2d at 963. 
••• See 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1982). 
••• See Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3. 
••• See supra note 167 and accompanying text. 
••• The capitalized cost would still have an indefinite life. 
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useful life of the branch banking permits. As one commentator 
noted: 
Where a cost, such as that of a license, does not provide benefits 
that decrease with time, Lincoln Savings & Loan clearly bars a 
deduction, even though the result may be more or less (depending 
on the actual duration of the business) unfortunate as a matter of 
taxation of only net income.1188 
2. NCNB I Panel: Capitalization and Distortion of Income 
The second significant holding of the NCNB I majority was its 
deep structure analysis of the basis for capitalization. The presence 
of "future benefits" did not automatically require capitalization; 
rather, wherever current deduction of expenditures providing fu-
ture benefits would substantially distort the taxpayer's income, 
capitalization and amortization were in order. Thus the panel's ap-
proach (whether the current deduction of expenditures benefiting 
current and future years would distort the taxpayer's income) was 
sound/no a long-needed application of basics. The non-income-dis-
torting exceptions, however, were drawn too narrowly due to over-
reliance on the financial accounting rules implementing the match-
ing of revenues and costs in the appropriate period. 271 Many of the 
non-income-distorting exceptions noted by the NCNB I panel ma-
jority fell within the de minimis exception described by commenta-
tors, e.g., minor expenditures for books of a professional or tools of 
a craftsman.272 However, the NCNB I panel majority's understand-
ing278 of the current tax treatment of certain advanced or practical 
education costs, currently deductible by a taxpayer employed in 
the same field but automatically capitalizable (without amortiza-
tion) by a taxpayer not yet so employed, was contrary to a clear 
reflection of income analysis and rested largely on a talismanic ex-
isting/new business dichotomy, strikingly similar to the defini-
tional preparatory and separate, saleable asset tests. 27• 
"" Gunn, supra note 5, at 494 n.230. 
170 See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
171 See 651 F.2d at 948 & n.ll. For discussion of the proper relationship of GAAP and tax 
accounting, see supra notes 81-95 and accompanying text. 
171 See supra note 62 and accompanying text; see also supra note 248. 
171 See 651 F.2d at 961. 
174 See Lee, Command Performance: The Tax Treatment of Employer Mandated Ex-
penses, 7 U. Rich. L. Rev. 1, 33-36 (1972). Employee job-seeking costs also can be fit into an 
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More significantly, the NCNB I panel overlooked perhaps the 
major conceptual exception to the clear reflection of income princi-
ple permitting the current deduction of an expenditure benefiting 
future, as well as current, tax years: regularly recurring expendi-
tures. If a taxpayer annually makes similar expenditures in rela-
tively uniform amounts benefiting both present and future years, 
the taxpayer's income in any given year is not distorted by deduct-
ing the entire amount of the expenditure made in that year, so 
long as expenditures made in other years benefiting that year are 
not also amortized in that year.2711 Similarly, distortion usually will 
not arise when currently deducting, in their entirety, regularly in-
creasing or steady-state expenditures.278 Such a rationale supports 
the current deduction of advertising expenditures and goes a long 
way towards justifying the results, albeit not the rationale, of many 
of the business expansion cases in this area. 
As a practical matter, the choice between amortization and cur-
rent deduction of recurring expenditures, without distortion of in-
come, should turn more on whether the benefits created are so 
short-term and whether useful life is so difficult to estimate that 
amortization is more trouble than it is worth and unlikely to pro-
duce a clearer reflection of income than expensing.277 This may be 
the case with the market surveys in NCNB, which the NCNB I 
panel sought to capitalize and then amortize. 
In summary, the NCNB I panel majority correctly looked to one 
of the deep structure principles of capitalization versus current ex-
pense, i.e., the clear reflection of income, in determining the proper 
treatment of the business expansion co_sts. It correctly viewed the 
use of the financial accounting concept of a deferred charge as the 
resolution of the prior ali-or-nothing rules. However, it erroneously 
treated the internal and external permit costs as a separate, amor-
tizable asset apart from the branch banking privilege acquired with 
old-business/new-business mold. See Halperin, Business Deduction for Personal Living Ex-
penses: A Uniform Approach to an Unsolved Problem, 122 U. Pa. L. Rev. 859, 905-08 
(1974). To the extent § 195 works at all, it should apply to new job-advancement educa-
tional and job-seeking expenses of employees, since such status constitutes a trade or busi-
ness. See Lee, supra note 2, at 396; see infra note 468 and accompanying text. 
"'" See supra notes 67-75 and accompanying text. 
118 See id. 
177 See Iowa-Des Moines Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 592 F.2d 433, 436 (8th Cir. 1979); 
Southland Royalty Co. v. United States, 582 F.2d 604, 618 (Ct. Cl. 1978). 
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such permits. Such permit costs should be amortizable only if the 
branch itself has a determinable life or if the absence of a wasting 
asset is expressly acknowledged as not being a barrier to a Cohan 
"rough guess" approach to achieving a clearer reflection of income. 
Moreover, the NCNB I panel's method of amortizing the survey 
costs presents difficulties: allocation year-by-year according to cur-
rent revenue and future revenue use, determining or estimating 
useful life, and difficulties of Cohan approximation. 
The model approach of current deduction of a recurring expen-
diture appears preferable to capitalization and amortization be-
cause the model would not distort income where the expenditure 
produces future benefits but has a short and very uncertain useful 
life. However, the model, also based on avoiding distortion of in-
come, is a far cry from the "separate, saleable asset" test of the 
NCNB II en bane majority and would not, like it, allow current 
deduction of the permit costs. 
3. NCNB II En Bane: Adoption of Separate, Saleable Asset 
Doctrine 
On rehearing en bane, the majority in NCNB II vacated the 
panel decision below and extended the Briarcliff Candy "separate, 
saleable asset" reading of Lincoln Savings & Loan to investigatory 
(market survey) costs and permit costs incurred in establishing 
branch operations in new locations. The court stated that: 
The money spent or obligated for metro studies, feasibility studies, 
and applications to the Comptroller of the Currency, it seems to 
us, adds nothing to the value of a bank's assets which can be so 
definitely ascertained that it must be capitalized. Certainly no 
"separate and distinct additional asset" is created. While the bene-
fit of all these classes of expenses may or may not endure for more 
than one year, that is but one factor to be considered. The branch 
has no existence separate and apart from the parent bank; as a 
branch bank, it is not readily saleable and has no market value 
other than the real estate which it occupies and the tangible equip-
ment therein.178 
The NCNB II en bane majority, however, failed to address the 
clear reflection of income and amortization aspects of the panel 
••• 684 F.2d at 293. 
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opinion. Instead, it set up a "strawman," erroneously treating the 
panel opinion as merely a "future benefits" decision resting on the 
one-year rule articulated in Richmond Television, which the ma-
jority then knocked down by reading Lincoln Savings & Loan as 
overturning the parts of Richmond Television "establishing a one-
year standard for distinguishing between capital and current 
costs."279 Just as in Briarcliff Candy and its progeny, upon which 
it relied heavily, the NCNB II majority emphasized the recurring 
nature of the contested expenses, both as to the frequency of the 
taxpayer's evaluations of its market position and as to the regular-
ity of actions based upon such evaluations, i.e., opening and closing 
branches.280 However, the opinion failed to discuss the frequency 
of restudy of the same market or the rapidity of change in the en-
vironment; rather, the majority focused on the constant use of such 
studies in the bank's decision-making process. Significantly, over 
eighty percent of the contested expenditures were for internal 
costs (salaries, supplies, and depreciation) regularly incurred in 
preparing market studies (together with outside consultants) and 
preparation of applications to open branch offices,281 but neither 
270 ld. at 289 & n.4. 
••• ld. at 294; see NCNB I, 651 F.2d at 963, 970 (Widener, J., dissenting) (author of en 
bane opinion). 
18
' 684 F.2d at 286 n.l. The en bane majority's focus unfortunately appears solely to have 
been on the recurring use of the market surveys, for which it made a good case for current 
deduction along the lines of Iowa-Des Moines Nat'l Bank, 592 F.2d at 436, and Southland 
Royalty, 582 F.2d at 618 (discussed supra at notes 67-72 and accompanying text). In his 
NCNB I dissent, Judge Widener consistently ignored the direct and indirect permit costs: 
We deal only with intangibles which in proper perspective are used as a part of the 
decision making process of the bank. The taxpayer is in the regular day to day busi-
ness of branch banking. This is nothing new. It must compete or die. To this end, it 
employs consultants to prepare Metro Studies, and itself prepares feasibility and 
other more precise studies of prospective locations to open or close branch banks. 
The money spent on the Metro Studies and the money spent on the salaries, etc., 
involved in the decision making process of the bank, as well as carrying out that 
process until the physical facility is obtained, is nothing more nor less than the ex-
penses any merchant or manufacturer must bear if it is to stay in day to day competi-
tion with its competitors. The principal future benefit that such intangibles can be 
said to produce is that the bank has become wiser after spending the money, and this 
by its acquisition of additional knowledge. The additional knowledge is then used in 
its decision making process. Whatever benefit the bank has gained from these studies 
is not salable, and this is acknowledged by the government, and it has no intrinsic 
ascertainable value. 
651 F.2d at 970 (Widener, J., dissenting). 
The NCNB I panel majority also focused primarily on amortization of the survey costs, 
66 Virginia Tax Review [Vol. 6:1 
the NCNB I nor the NCNB II opinion broke down costs between 
direct and indirect market survey costs and direct and indirect 
permit application costs. 
The NCNB II opinion focused on the recurring use of the in-
tangibles created by the expenditures in the decision-making pro-
cess of the bank holding company, namely, "all of these expenses 
were connected with NCNB's developing and operating a statewide 
network of branch banking facilities."282 The majority's separate, 
saleable asset test may have reached the correct result (current de-
duction) as to the recurring market survey costs, but talismanic 
application produced the wrong result as to the direct and indirect 
permit costs because their value would continue undiminished as 
long as the branch continued. 283 The mere fact that the permit 
costs were recurring did not render them currently deductible. The 
costs were not recurring in the sense of creating short-term bene-
fits or replacement of similar prior assets; rather, they were recur-
ring because the taxpayer acquired additional permits. However, 
recurring acquisitions of long-lived or nonwasting assets are not 
currently deductible. Otherwise, a taxpayer who constantly ex-
pands by building or buying new plants could currently deduct the 
cost of each plant. 2" The answer to nonamortizable permit costs 
lies in· remedial legislation or equitable approximation of useful 
life.2sl! 
Part of the result reached by the Fourth Circuit en bane in 
NCNB II (deduction of the market survey fees) may be justifiable 
if the survey costs were sufficiently recurring so that a current de-
apparently intending that the same principles would apply to the permit costs. 651 F.2d at 
963. Conversely, the Fifth Circuit focused solely on the permit costs to the exclusion of 
market survey costs. Central Tex. Sav. & Loan v. United States, 731 F.2d 1181, 1184 (5th 
Cir. 1984). These decisions appear to have been straining for universal rules rather than 
resolutions of the particular facts-a failing shared by commentators, as well. See, e.g., 
sources cited supra note 234. 
••• 684 F.2d at 290. See generally, Note, supra note 4, at 327 n.138. 
••• As Professor Gunn has pointed out: 
Briarcliff does not support the deductibility of the cost of licenses. Where a cost, 
such as that of a license, does not provide benefits that decrease with time, Lincoln 
Savings & Loan clearly bars a deduction, even though that result may be more or less 
(depending on the actual duration of the business) unfortunate as a matter of taxa-
tion of only net income. 
Gunn, supra note 5, at 494 n.230. 
184 See Warner, supra note 87, at 5. 
••• See supra notes 131-38 and accompanying text. 
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duction would not distort the taxpayer's income. Justification may 
also be based on the ground that amortization was not feasible due 
to inability to separate present and future benefits. Nevertheless, 
allowing current deduction of permit fees with an indefinite life 
would distort the taxpayer's income. 
4. Acquisition Cost Doctrine Response to NCNB II En Bane 
In direct response to the Fourth Circuit's talismanic application 
of the separate, saleable asset test to business expansion costs, two 
other circuits subsequently applied the acquisition cost doctrine to 
bank expansion costs. First, in Ellis Banking Corp. v. United 
States288 the Eleventh Circuit easily applied the doctrine to classic 
acquisition costs (costs of determining through independent audit 
the purchase price of target's stock acquired in geographic expan-
sion through acquisition).287 Second, in Central Texas Savings & 
Loan Association v. United States288 the Fifth Circuit broadly ap-
plied the acquisition cost doctrine to expenses seemingly indistin-
guishable from those incurred in NCNB. 289 The Fifth Circuit 
viewed the state permits required for each bank branch as satisfy-
ing the separate and distinct asset test of Lincoln Savings & 
Loan.290 
Tested against a distortion of income analysis, the result in Cen-
tral Texas Savings & Loan was partly right and partly wrong. The 
"" 688 F.2d 1376 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1207 (1983). 
••• ld. at 1380-81. The major function of examining the target's books was to determine 
the appropriateness of the exchange ratio, or acquisition price-the quintessential acquisi-
tion cost under the origin-of-the-claim doctrine. The Eleventh Circuit apparently would 
permit capitalization and amortization as a separate asset of the costs of market surveys 
used in connection with a capital acquisition if the survey continued to be used in ongoing 
operations. 688 F.2d at 1381-82 n.ll (citing the vacated NCNB I decision). The author also 
would treat as a separate amortizable asset survey costs used solely in an acquisition if the 
value of the survey is temporally limited and less than the life of the asset acquired, such as 
a branch license. See supra notes 131-38 and accompanying text. Interestingly, the Eleventh 
Circuit expressly acknowledged the conflict between its decision and the NCNB II majority. 
688 F.2d at 1380 n.7. 
••• 731 F.2d 1181 (5th Cir. 1984). 
••• Id. at 1185. While not expressly acknowledging the conflict, the Central Texas Savings 
& Loan court distinguished Briarcliff Candy and its credit card progeny (upon which the 
NCNB II majority relied heavily). 731 F.2d at 1184-85. Moreover, the Fifth Circuit dis-
agreed with the proposition that the compulsory accounting rule of bank regulators (also 
relied upon in NCNB II) determined the tax consequences of the expenditures. Id. at 1185. 
110 Id. at 1185. 
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permit application costs were properly capitalized and added to 
the cost of the nonamortizable permit or branch, but the survey 
costs should then have been treated as a separate asset and cur-
rently deducted or amortized. Instead, the Fifth Circuit: (1) talis-
manically applied the acquisition cost doctrine derived from Rich-
mond Television and its progeny to the (presumably recurring) 
limited-life market survey costs; (2) mechanically associated them 
with an indeterminable-life asset (the permits); and thereby, (3) 
precluded amortization.291 Thus, under this view recurring, short-
term benefit expenditures incurred in expansion to a new location 
could neither be currently deducted nor amortized, thereby dis-
torting the taxpayer's income-the same distortion that provoked 
the separate, saleable asset test. 
In Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. v. United States292 the 
Claims Court completed the circle, reaffirming the start-up cost 
doctrine of Richmond Television. The court reaffirmed the doc-
trine this time on its future benefits leg, the preparatory leg not 
being available due to the binding precedent of Blitzer v. United 
States.293 Cleveland Electric Illuminating read Richmond Televi-. 
sion and its Tax Court progeny as accepting or assuming the "not 
fully articulated" rationale that 
where a business requires substantial start-up expenditures before 
it can begin operations, which are not directly for the purchase of 
tangible assets and which will not ordinarily be recovered out of . 
revenues for the same year, the capital investment is in the busi-
ness as a whole rather than merely in the intangibles, and it in-
cludes the start-up costs.294 
The Claims Court accepted this rationale and thus rested on a 
pure future benefits theory. Precisely this aspect of Richmond Tel-
111 The Fifth Circuit was led astray by the future benefits aspects of both the survey and 
permit costs. "While the period of the benefits may not be controlling in all cases, it none-
theless remains a prominent, if not predominant, characteristic of a capital item." 731 F.2d 
at 1183 (citing Judge Murnaghan's dissent in NCNB II). 
••• 7 Cl. Ct. 220 (1985). The Claims Court here followed the future benefits leg of Rich-
mond Television; thus, start-up expenditures that will not ordinarily be recovered out of 
revenues for the year constitute a capital investment in the business as a whole. ld. at 228-
29; accord Johnsen v. Commissioner, 794 F.2d 1157, 1162 (6th Cir. 1986). 
••• 684 F.2d 874 (Ct. Cl. 1982). In Blitzer, the Court of Claims held that Richmond Tele-
vision expenditures constituted "capital expenditures under tax law standards even apart 
from the 'trade or business' phrase in I.R.C. § 162." ld. at 880. 
... 7 Cl. Ct. at 228. 
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evision was overturned by the NCNB II en bane majority.2911 Not 
surprisingly, the Claims Court, like the Fifth Circuit before it in 
Central Texas Savings & Loan,296 also specifically rejected the 
Fourth Circuit's separate, saleable asset test on the basis of the 
clear reflection of income principle. The Claims Court noted that 
"capital treatment of expenditures connected with the acquisition 
of an asset having an extended life is an important facet of match-
ing revenues and expenditures in determining net income. "297 
Yet the approach adopted by the Fifth Circuit and the Claims 
Court itself produces distortion of income when recurring expendi-
tures, e.g., market surveys or staff training, are added to a 
nonamortizable asset, e.g., an indefinite-life operating permit. 
Moreover, the courts' rejection of the separate, saleable asset test 
creates a conceptual quandary-how to justify the current deduc-
tion of start-up-type costs. An example of this problem is allowing 
current deduction of staff training costs for a new branch in ex-
panding the same business, while requiring capitalization of start-
up costs for staff training for a new branch in a different or new 
business. Cleveland Electric Illuminating attempted to do so on 
the basis that the new business (nuclear power generating plant) 
start-up costs for new employee training were substantial, provided 
future benefits, and constituted a one-time expenditure. The court 
distinguished this "new" business from a "same" business expan-
sion because the same business (fossil fuel power generating plant) 
expansion costs for new employee training were not so substantial, 
replacement employees would receive similar training, and the em-
ployee turnover rate was projected as ten percent per year. In ad-
dition, the court found that no new operating permit was required 
for the new plant in the same business, an immediate benefit was 
present, and any division of the cost according to immediate and 
future years was thought impractical.298 
Other litigation discloses that in fact start-up employee training 
in a nuclear power plant is not a one-time expenditure, because the 
employee turnover rate is quite high and extensive retraining is 
••• 684 F.2d at 289 . 
... 731 F.2d at 1184-85 . 
• .., Cleveland Elec. Illuminating, 7 Cl. Ct. at 224 (stating the Claim Court's reading of the 
Eleventh Circuit's holding in Ellis Banking). 
••• ld. at 234-35. 
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required on an ongoing basis.299 Thus, all the Claims Court's pur-
ported differentiating factors, except "substantiality" and the re-
quirement of an operating permit, would appear to apply equally 
to the nuclear and coal-fired generating plants. Additionally, the 
court's rationale in Cleveland Electric Illuminating for the "in-
vestment in the business as a whole" approach did not distinguish 
the costs of the two plants. In the context of both start-up and 
expansion costs the value created or acquired in excess of the cost 
of the tangible assets is (increased) earnings power.300 The Claims 
Court should have set up the new business employee training costs 
·(or perhaps only the excess over the amount of recurring costs) as 
a free-standing asset amortizable over a period based upon pro-
jected employee turnover and retraining rates. The fossil fuel gen-
erating plant training costs similarly should have been set up as a 
separate asset amortizable, probably, over ten years. 
The basic question, therefore, is why did the Claims Court in 
Cleveland Electric Illuminating and the Fifth Circuit in Central 
Texas Savings & Loan ignore the NCNB I panel's "golden mean" 
of amortization of substantial recurring expansion costs as a free-
standing asset? A number of possible answers suggest themselves. 
The NCNB I panel's approach was not articulated fully and was 
confused by overreliance on GAAP as to the mechanics of amorti-
zation. Precedents301 and commentary,302 however, suggested the 
proper analysis. Additionally, the taxpayers' counsels apparently 
adopted an ali-or-nothing (current deduction or capitalization) liti-
gating stance or artlessly presented any amortization arguments.303 
Nevertheless, the panel's discussion in NCNB I was there to be 
read. The decisive factor for not using the "golden mean" of amor-
••• Madison Gas & Elec. Co. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 521, 543-44 (1979) (turnover was 
high due to an extremely competitive job market and to physical and psychological 
problems developing from stress; therefore, new operators had to be trained and current 
ones retrained continuously), afrd, 633 F.2d 512 (7th Cir. 1980). 
••• See supra note 233. 
••• See supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text . 
... See Erbacher, supra note 2, at 500 (start-up costs should be currently deductible and, 
if not, amortized over a short period); Gunn, supra note 5, at 446 (capitalized costs should 
be amortized as a free-standing asset); Seago, supra note 2, at 416 (recurring steady-state 
start-up costs should be currently deductible). 
••• See, e.g., Central Tex. Sau. & Loan, 731 F.2d at 1185-86 (court discussed taxpayer's 
amortization claim only in the context of then-not-yet applicable § 195); Cleveland Elec. 
Illuminating, 7 Cl. Ct. at 223-24 (taxpayer relied on separate and distinct asset as precondi-
tion to capitalization). 
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tization approach in subsequent cases undoubtedly was the enact-
ment of section 195 after counsel argued NCNB I but before issu-
ance of the panel's decision. 304 
D. Fatal Intersection of Section 195 and Case-Law 
Development 
Had some of the post-1980 case-law developments (Blitzer and 
NCNB I) occurred earlier, section 195 would not be needed for 
start-up, as contrasted with investigatory, costs. A functional ap-
proach to the "carrying on of a trade or business" proviso of sec-
tion 162(a), coupled with both (1) capitalization as a free-standing 
amortizable, "asset" of substantial not regularly recurring costs 
and (2) current deduction of less substantial or regularly recurring 
unequal amounts would have resolved the start-up cost contro-
versy. Ironically, however, with the enactment of section 195 some 
of these same developments (NCNB I and Central Texas Savings 
& Loan) logically would render a large part of section 195 a nullity. 
Section 195, as enacted in 1980, provided an elective sixty-
month amortization, commencing with the beginning of the tax-
payer's trade or business, of the start-up costs of an active trade or 
business, if identical expenses would have been currently deducti-
ble in the event paid or incurred in connection with the expansion 
of an existing trade or business in the same field. soG This provision 
rested on the following explicit assumptions, contained in the 
Committee Reports, as to the then-existing case law: (1) start-up 
and investigatory costs incurred prior to the commencement of 
business were not currently deductible (under the preparatory doc-
trine) because they were not incurred in carrying on a trade or bus-
iness;306 (2) often such start-up or pre-opening costs could not be 
amortized because no ascertainable useful life could be estab-
lished;307 and, (3) similar costs incurred in expanding an existing 
... The panel decided NCNB I on June 18, 1981; arguments in the case took place on 
Dec. 3, 1979. See 651 F.2d at 942. Section 195 was originally enacted on Dec. 28, 1980. 
Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-605, § 102, 94 Stat. 3521, 3522 (codified 
at I.R.C. § 195 (1980)). 
••• I.R.C. § 195(b)(2) (1980). For the corresponding current provision, see I.R.C. 
§ 195(c)(1)(B) (1984). · 
808 H.R. Rep. No. 1278, 96th Cong., 2d Seas. 9 (1980); S. Rep. No. 1036, supra note 9, at 
10, reprinted in 1980 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 7300. 
••• H.R. Rep. No. 1278, supra note 306, at 10. The 1980 Committee Reports stated that 
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business were currently deductible308 under the separate, saleable 
asset test. 309 Thus, capitalization of substantial, but not frequently 
recurring business expansion costs, under the NCNB I panel and 
the Central Texas Savings & Loan decisions, logically would 
render the sixty-month amortization pursuant to the original sec-
tion 195 unavailable for comparable costs incurred before a new 
business began. Under the NCNB I approach, but not Central 
Texas Savings & Loan, "case-law" amortization would be availa-
ble. This combination of the need to preserve the statutory refer-
ence point (deductible in expansion) and the legislative history's 
definitional view of the (then) case law infected subsequent case-
law development. 
This double impact of section 195 is probably the principal cause 
of the Fourth Circuit's en bane decision to vacate the NCNB I 
opinion. In NCNB II the court held that: 
Congress is . . . under the impression that expenditures for market 
studies and feasibility studies, as at issue here, are fully deductible 
if incurred by an existing business undergoing expansion. An inter-
pretation by us to the contrary would render § 195 meaningless for 
it would obliterate the reference point in the statute-"the expan-
sion of an existing trade or business."310 
The Claims Court in Cleveland Electric Illuminating similarly 
tried to maintain section 195, remaining true to Congress' view of 
the prior law,311 while at the same time rejecting the talismanic 
separate, saleable asset test312 and the preparatory doctrine. 313 
The next question is whether courts are compelled to follow the 
"they [certain start-up costs) relate to a business with an indeterminate life." Id.; S. Rep. 
No. 1036, supra note 9, at 11, reprinted in 1980 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 7301. 
••• H.R. Rep. No. 1278, supra note 306, at 11. The 1980 Committee Reports provided that 
"[i)n the case of an existing business, eligible start-up expenditures do not include deducti-
ble ordinary and necessary business expenses paid or incurred in connection with an expan-
sion of the business. As under present law, these expenses will continue to be currently 
deductible." Id.; S. Rep. No. 1036, supra note 9, at 12, reprinted in 1980 U.S. Code Cong. & 
Admin. News at 7302. 
... See supra notes 226-35 and accompanying text. 
310 684 F.2d at 291 (quoting I.R.C. § 195(b)(2) (1980). 
"' 7 Cl. Ct. 220, 228 (1985); accord Johnsen v. United States, 794 F.2d 1157, 1163 (6th 
Cir. 1986). . 
"" 7 Cl. Ct. 224-25 . 
.,. The Court of Claims (predecessor to the Federal Circuit, which reviews Claims Court 
decisions) previously rejected the preparatory doctrine in Blitzer. See supra notes 196-204 
and accompanying text. 
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section 195 drafters' view of the deductibility of start-up and busi-
ness expansion costs. The Claims Court accurately observed in 
Cleveland Electric Illuminating that under traditional rules of 
statutory construction "while the views of a later Congress are not 
controlling as to the meaning and application of preexisting law, 
they are entitled to consideration as a secondary authoritative ex-
pression of expert opinion as to such law. "314 In fact, the expert 
opinion of Congress, i.e., its statement of prior case law in the 1980 
legislative history, has turned out to be erroneous. Congressional 
opinion, apparently based upon commentary that described the 
preparatory or pre-operating doctrine as applying to start-up 
costs3111 and the contradictory separate, saleable asset test as apply-
... 7 Cl. Ct. at 228; accord Johnsen, 794 F.2d at 1163. 
••• Neither the original nor amended statute adopted the definitions of "start-up" and 
"investigatory" costs included in the 1980 Committee Reports. Compare I.R.C. § 195(b) 
(1980) and I.R.C. § 195(c)(1) (1984) with H.R. Rep. No. 1278, supra note 306, at 9-11 and S. 
Rep. No. 1036, supra note 9, at 10-12, reprinted in 1980 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 
7300-02. The Committee Reports paraphrased the definitions of these costs suggested in 
Lee, supra note 2, at 384-85. Thus, according to the Reports: 
Investigatory expenses are costs of seeking and reviewing prospective businesses 
prior to reaching a decision to acquire or enter any business . . .. 
Startup or preopening expenses are costs which are incurred subsequent to a deci-
sion to acquire or establish a particular business and prior to its actual operation. 
Generally, the term "startup costs" refers to expenses which would be deductible cur-
rently if they were incurred after the commencement of the particular business opera-
tion to which they relate . . . . 
Startup costs may include expenses relating to advertising, employee training, lin-
ing-up distributors, suppliers, or potential customers, and professional services in set-
ting up books and records . . . . 
Under the provision, eligible expenses consist of investigatory costs incurred in re-
viewing a prospective business prior to reaching a final decision to acquire or to enter 
that business. These costs include expenses incurred for the analysis or survey of 
potential markets, products, labor supply, transportation facilities, etc. Eligible ex-
penses also include startup costs which are incurred subsequent to a decision to es-
tablish a particular business and prior to the time when the business begins. For 
example, startup costs include advertising, salaries and wages paid to employees who 
are being trained and their instructors, travel and other expenses incurred in lining 
up prospective distributors, suppliers or customers, and salaries or fees paid or in-
curred for executives, consultants, and for similar professional services. 
H.R. Rep. No. 1278, supra note 306, at 9-11; S. Rep. No. 1036, supra note 9, at 10-12, re-
printed in 1980 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 7300-02. These definitions are similar to ' 
those recommended in the author's earlier article: 
Business investigation expenses consist of costs incurred in investigation of a prospec-
tive business prior to reaching a firm decision whether to acquire it. These expendi-
0 
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ing to similar costs in business expansion,316 did not consider a 
deep structure distortion of income basis for capitalization and 
amortization. 317 With both talismanic doctrines conceptually dis-
credited,318 Congress' "view" of the law similarly erodes concep-
tually. Thus, the results reached by the Claims Court in Cleveland 
Electric Illuminating and by the Fourth Circuit in NCNB II were 
not mandated by the legislative history of section 195. 
Under distortion of income principles, only recurring or insub-
stantial business expansion costs would be currently deductible; 
less frequently recurring (say, more than every three years) or 
'more substantial expenditures should be capitalized and then am-
ortized as a free-standing deferred charge. Therefore, typical busi-
ness expansion investigatory expenditures probably do not produce 
benefits which diminish over the life of the business and, hence, 
would not be treated as separate, amortizable assets. Most market 
survey costs do produce benefits which diminish, but last longer 
than a year and, hence, generally should be set up as separate, 
amortizable assets unless repeated every two to three years. Adver-
tising, salaries paid to employees overseeing the expansion, etc., 
should be currently deductible since they recur and produce short-
term benefits. Employee training as to the expanded facilities 
should be either capitalized and amortized or currently deducted, 
depending on the degree of regular retraining and employee turn-
over. The treatment of costs for obtaining distributors, customers, 
tures are commonly distinguished from pre-operating expenses (also called start-up 
or pre-opening costs), which are paid during the time between the decision to estab-
lish or acquire a new business and the beginning of actual business operations. The 
term usually refers to expenses which would be currently deductible if they had been 
incurred after business operations had begun in full flower. Typical examples of pre-
operating expenses are costs of advertising and promotion, training of employees, lin-
ing up suppliers and potential customers or distributors, and legal and accounting 
services in setting up books and records. Expenditures for R & D, although capital, 
are pre-operating and not investigatory expenditures. Distinctions analogous to inves-
tigatory, pre-operating, and operating expenses also exist in the areas of farming and 
mining. 
Lee, supra note 2, at 384-85 (footnotes omitted). 
"" See Lee, supra note 2, at 391-95 (preparatory doctrine), 390 n.53, 411-13 (separate and 
distinct asset doctrine). 
117 The author's previous article mentioned the distortion of income. See Lee, supra note 
2, at 412, 415. Nevertheless, setting up the start-up costs as a separate amortizable asset in 
order to prevent distortion of income was not considered. 
118 See supra notes 175-243 and accompanying text. 
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and supplies in expansion should similarly depend on the degree to 
which they are recurring and the turnover rate of such contracts. 
Since substantial and less frequently incurred expenditures 
would not be currently deductible under a distortion of income 
analysis, whether expended in operation or expansion of an ex-
isting business, conceptual consistency would rule out section 195 
amortization of similar substantial, but not frequently recurring, 
expenditures in a new business. (Such non-covered start-up costs 
in many instances should, however, be amortizable under section 
167, at least once the business commenced.)819 Under this ap-
proach, longer-term, substantial expenditures would not be cov-
ered by section 195, while recurring lesser expenditures, which can 
be currently deductible without distortion of income, would be 
covered by the provision and thus, absurdly, only amortizable over 
sixty months. 
The ideal legislative solution to the business expansion and re-
maining start-up controversies would be expansion of section 195 
to encompass business expansion costs and creation of a three-tier 
system of deduction. First, recurring (in the sense of replacement, 
not expansion) costs in creating a new business or expanding an 
existing business that produce short- or highly variable-term bene-
fits should be currently deductible. Second, expenditures so in-
curred producing longer- but not indefinite-lived benefits should 
be amortized over sixty months. Third, expenditures producing in-
definite-lived intangibles, e.g., permit costs, should be amortized 
over a longer period, e.g., eighteen to twenty years. 
If such an ideal legislative solution is not soon achieved, courts 
will face three major options in dealing with business expansion 
costs and start-up costs. The first option is for courts to "bow to 
the will of Congress"320 in codifying past judicial error and to pre-
serve section 195, denying current deduction of start-up costs 
310 See supra note 219 and accompanying text. 
••• Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 460 U.S. 370, 380 n.10 (1983) (holding that 
courts must follow § 111, the codification of the judicially created tax benefit doctrine.) 
Instead of correcting past judicial errors, the courts are yielding increasingly to the congres-
sional codification or enactment of new provisions based upon such errors. The same holds 
true regarding the judicial attitude toward administrative positions. An example of this 
trend can be seen in the Supreme Court's recent revisit to the Crane doctrine. See Commis-
sioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 317 (1983) (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
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(under the preparatory or some similar doctrine)321 while permit-
ting a current deduction of all business expansion costs (to the ex-
tent they do not create a separate, saleable asset).322 The second 
option is to apply the "same business" standard broadly and at the 
same time utilize the distortion of income concept (capitalization 
and then amortization of substantial, long-term benefit expendi-
tures) as to such business expansion costs, thus narrowing the cate-
gory of start-up costs subject to section 195 while expanding the 
start-up costs subject to capitalization and amortization outside 
the statute. The final judicial option is to apply a distortion of in-
come analysis to business expansion costs (regardless of whether 
"same business" is construed narrowly), but apply section 195 
broadly to all start-up costs other than those creating or enhancing 
a separate, saleable asset. 
The two options preserving section 195 (the first and third ap-
proaches) will possess the most surface appeaJ323 due to the poten-
tial ultimate lessening of controversy under the statutory regime 
and to the quagmire of existing conflicting start-up and business 
expansion precedents. These options, however, require eschewing a 
distortion of income analysis, or at the least will produce concep-
tual inconsistency. Even such conceptual defects may not consti-
tute the most serious problem with section 195.32" Indeed, once the 
full panoply of glitches in section 195, and particularly in the Com-
mittee Reports certain to be the model for future regulations, is 
appreciated, the option of eviscerating section 195 through strict 
adherence to distortion of income principles takes on an added 
appeal.a211 
au See supra notes 175-87 and accompanying text. 
••• See supra notes 225-35 and accompanying text . 
... In Cleveland Elec. Illuminating, the Claims Court allowed a current deduction of em-
ployee training costs of the "same" business branch (fossil fueled electric generating plant), 
but required capitalization of virtually the same expenditures associated with the "new" 
business branch (nuclear fueled electric generating plant). Clearly the preservation of § 195 
was a motivating factor. 7 Cl. Ct. at 229. 
••• See infra notes 326-56 and accompanying text . 
... Such strict adherence includes, e.g., capitalization and then amortization of substan-
tial, long-term benefit business expansion and operation costs in an existing business, as 
well as similar treatment by the courts of comparable new business start-up costs (excluded 
from § 195 because not currently deductible in operation by an existing business). 
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IV. SECTION 195: PLUS ((A CHANGE, PLUS LA MtME CHOSE: THE 
OTHER FAILED SYNTHESIS 
A. Introduction: "Those who cannot remember the past are 
condemned to fulfill it. "326 
As the calls for federal tax simplification gained momentum in 
the late 1970s, reform proponents studied start-up costs, among 
many other areas.327 To effectuate the goals of clarity and compre-
hensibility of the statutory requirements, ease of taxpayer compli-
ance, and ease of administration, reformers suggested that the "en-
tire area could be simplified and the controversy greatly reduced 
by adopting a compromise akin to that adopted for corporate 
organizational expenses. There, the law prescribes a 60-month 
fixed amortization."328 By eliminating the ali-or-nothing conse-
quences created by adopting either the separate, saleable asset or 
the preparatory rule doctrines, "the necessity for carrying the con-
troversy to conclusion is greatly reduced and one would expect in 
the long run that most of the controversies would be easily 
settled. "329 
In 1979 Representative Barber Conable introduced a "simple," 
bare-bones bill, H.R. 5729,330 which would have granted taxpayers 
an election to amortize, over at least a sixty-month period com-
mencing with the month the trade or business starts functioning as 
a going concern, "ordinary and necessary" start-up expenditures. 
Under the bill, such expenditures must have been incurred inci-
dent to the investigation, formation, and creation of a trade or bus-
iness entered into, but prior to its functioning as a going concern. 
Eligible expenditures must also have been "chargeable to capital 
account," i.e., presumably not creating an asset with a useful life of 
its own other than the business itself,331 and been of a character 
••• 1 G. Santayana, Life of Reason ch. xii (1905-06), reprinted in Oxford Dictionary of 
Quotations 414 (3d ed. 1979). 
317 See Krane, supra note 10, at 310; see also McDaniel, supra note 10; N.Y. Bar Report, 
supra note 10. 
••• Krane, supra note 10, at 310 (referring to what is now § 248(a)); see I.R.C. § 248(a). 
••• Krane, supra note 10, at 311 n.25. 
••• H.R. 5729, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 Cong. Rec. 29,857 (1979), reprinted in 1980 Hear-
ings, supra note 2, at 181. 
331 The Brief Summary of H.R. 5729 explained that: 
The amortization election would apply only to [1) ordinary and necessary start-up 
costs [2) which do not create an asset which has a useful life of its own and [3) which 
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which, if the business had a determinable life, would be amortiza-
ble over that life. This proposal closely paralleled section 248, 
which provides for sixty-month amortization of organizational ex-
penditures. 332 Congress held hearings on this and other reform bills 
in 1980.333 
The Department of the Treasury supported H.R. 5729 because it 
would reduce "the disparity in tax treatment between ordinary and 
necessary preopening expenses and similar expenses incurred by 
an existing business."334 Treasury's main concern, however, was to 
"induce taxpayers with existing businesses to elect to amortize the 
start-up costs of a marginally related business, thereby reducing 
the number of controversies in this area."335 Treasury wanted the 
provision to require an unconditional election to amortize start-up 
expenditures no later than the time for filing the return, including 
extensions, for the year the expenses were paid or incurred. 
At the Hearings on H.R. 5729 ("1980 Hearings"), witnesses 
urged three principal points. First, the drafters should not adopt 
as the commencement point for the sixty-month amortization pe-
riod the Richmond Television test of functioning as a going con-
cern, but instead should use the starting point employed in various 
regulations interpreting other Code provisions (including section 
248). These provisions deem a business to commence as soon as its 
activities advance to the extent necessary to establish the nature of 
the business.336 Second, taxpayers incurring start-up or "expan-
sion" costs in an existing business prior to the effective date of the 
are of a character which would allow the taxpayer to amortize them if they were 
expended incident to the investigation, formation, and creation of a trade or business 
having a determinable useful life. 
Brief Summary-H.R. 5729, reprinted in 1980 Hearings, supra note 2, 181, 182. The original 
proposed statutory definition (contained in § 193(b) as proposed by H.R. 5729) paralleled 
[1) and [3) above, with "chargeable to capital account" corresponding to requirement [2). 
See H.R. 5729, reprinted in 1980 Hearings, supra note 2, at 181 (proposed § 193(b)). 
••• I.R.C. § 248(a). 
••• 1980 Hearings, supra note 2. 
••• Id. at 14 (statement of Daniell. Halperin, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury 
for Tax Legislation). 
••• Id. 
••• Id. at 46, 102, 113, 114 (statements of Charles M. Walker, Chairman, Section of Taxa-
tion, A.B.A.; Samuel M. Chase, Jr., Chairman, Legislative Ad Hoc Subcommittee of Real 
Estate Securities, Nat'! Ass'n of Realtors; Paul Clevenger, Vice President, Taxes, UAL, Inc.; 
supplemental statement of Gerald W. Padwe, Associate National Director, Tax Services, 
Touche Ross & Co., respectively). 
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proposed legislation should not be precluded from using the bank 
credit card business expansion cost precedents337 to obtain a cur-
rent deduction under section 162. Third, the proposed statute 
should be available "to an existing business investigating a new 
product or service line, or preparing to open a new branch."338 One 
prophetic, but ignored, voice called for postponing consideration of 
H.R. 5729 until the Court of Claims decided Blitzer, because it 
might "clarify the definition of a beginning of business,"339 thereby 
rendering section 195 unneeded as to start-up costs. 
Congress held no further hearings, and the drafters of the provi-
sion enacted as section 195 responded to all of the above points 
(save Blitzer) by minor changes in the still bare-bones statute, ac-
companied, however, by extensive additions to the explanatory 
Committee Reports. 340 Additionally, the final statute required that 
the trade or business be "active"341 in order to preclude amortiza-
tion of start-up costs of investments.342 To prevent amortization of 
capital expenditures, the drafters in 1980 substituted for the "ordi-
nary and necessary" requirement of the draft bill the language in 
section 195 as enacted providing that amortizable start-up costs 
must be (currently) deductible in the year paid if incurred instead 
in expanding an existing business. 343 
Thus section 195, as enacted in 1980, provided an "election in" 
under which a taxpayer could elect to treat start-up expenditures 
as deferred expenses amortizable ratably over a sixty-month or 
longer period commencing with the month in which the business 
began. 344 Eligible start-up expenditures included any amount paid 
887 Id. at 110 (statement of Gerald W. Padwe). In general, the industry witnesses feared 
that the Service would argue that, since proposed § 193 would permit amortization of cer-
tain types of expenditures prospectively, such expenditures should not be deductible or 
amortizable prior to the effective date of the proposed new statute. 
••• Id. at 115 (supplemental statement of Gerald W. Padwe). 
••• Id. at 106 (statement of Samuel M. Chase, Jr.). 
••• H.R. Rep. No. 1278, supra note 306, at 9-13; S. Rep. No. 1036, supra note 9, at 10-14, 
reprinted in 1980 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 7300-04. 
341 I.R.C. § 195(a) (1980); I.R.C. § 195(b)(1) (1984). See generally Shapiro & Shaw, Start-
Up Expenditures-Section 195: Clarification or More Confusion?, 34 Major Tax Plan. 11-1 
(1982). 
••• H.R. Rep. No. 1278, supra note 306, at 11; S. Rep. No. 1036, supra note 9, at 12, 
reprinted in 1980 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 7302. 
••• I.R.C. § 195(b)(2) (1980); see H.R. Rep. No. 1278, supra note 306, at 11; S. Rep. No. 
1036, supra note 9, at 12, reprinted .in 1980 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 7302. 
••• I.R.C. § 195(a) (1980); I.R.C. § 195(b) (1984). 
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or incurred in connection with (1) investigating the creation or ac-
quisition of an active trade or business or (2) creating an active 
trade or business, which in either case would be currently deducti-
ble if paid or incurred in connection with the expansion of an ex-
isting trade or business in the same field. 3411 Predictably, the sec-
tion 195 election had to be made by the due date (including 
extensions) of the return for the year in which the business 
began.346 
The Tax Reform Act of 1984 (the "Act")347 amended section 195 
to make it exclusive as to targeted start-up costs; "start-up cost" 
deductions under sections 162 or 212 were precluded,348 and eligi-
ble start-up costs were expanded to cover Hoopengarner "pre-bus-
iness" activities. 349 The Act also changed the 1980 statutory re-
quirements for amortization under section 195 from a comparison 
with expenses currently deductible in "expansion" of an active 
trade or business to a comparison with expenses deductible in the 
year of payment if the start-up costs had been paid in connection 
with the operation of an active business.3110 Even in 1984, however, 
the drafters continued to ignore the deep structure conflict be-
tween the premise articulated in the 1984 legislative history to the 
section 195 changes (that start-up expenditures "generally result in 
the creation of an asset which has a useful life that extends sub-
stantially beyond the year in which incurred,"3111 presumably the 
business itself)3112 and the statutory requirement that the expendi-
... I.R.C. § 195(b) (1980). The bare-bones statute left to the Committee Reports the task 
of defining start-up and investigatory costs. See supra note 315. 
••• I.R.C. § 195(c)(1) (1980); I.R.C. § 195(d)(1) (1984). 
347 Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 94(a), 98 Stat. 494, 614-15 (codified at I.R.C. § 195). 
••• I.R.C. § 195(a) (1984); Senate Comm. on Finance, Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Ex-
planation of Provisions Approved by the Committee on March 21, 1984, 1 S. Print No. 169, 
98th Cong., 2d Sess. 283 (1984), reprinted as 71 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) No. 16 . 
... S. Print No. 169, supra note 348, at 283 (stating the Finance Committee's intent that § 
195 reach expenses of the sort involved in Hoopengarner v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 538 
(1983)); see supra note 175. 
••• Compare I.R.C. § 195(b)(2) (1980) with I.R.C. § 195(c)(1)(B) (1984). See infra notes 
391-96 and accompanying text. 
301 S. Print No. 169, supra note 348, at 282. Increasingly, the courts also have begun to 
adopt such future benefits capitalization as the basis for the start-up cost doctrine. See 
Johnsen v. Commissioner, 794 F.2d 1157, 1162 (6th Cir. 1986); Cleveland Elec. Illuminating 
Co. v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 220, 228 (1985). But see Aboussie v. Unted States, 779 F.2d 
424, 428 (8th Cir. 1985). 
••• See supra note 112. 
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ture be (entirely) deductible in the year paid in an existing busi-
ness under general expense-capitalization rules.3113 For an expendi-
ture to be deducted entirely in the year paid, either in expansion 
or operation, it must not distort the taxpayer's income. Yet the 
current deduction of an expenditure with a useful life extending 
substantially beyond the year in which paid will distort the tax-
payer's income (unless it is de minimis or steady-state recur-
ring),3a. whether expended in operation or expansion. 
The legislative history shows that Congress believed that section 
195 would "encourage formation of new businesses and decrease 
controversy and litigation arising under . . . [prior] law with re-
spect to the proper income tax classification of startup expendi-
tures."31111 Attempts at simplicity through the adoption of legisla-
tion by Committee Reports flawed by both the adoption of case-
law reference points, where there is a splintering of authorities, 
and the utter failure of the drafters to consider the deep structure 
of capital expenditures, set the stage for complete confusion and 
uncertainty as to the current rules-clearly a "disgrace"3116 given 
the goal of simplification. Additionally, this tacked-on legislation 
does not work in many instances, especially if the more recent bus-
iness expansion cases and deep structure concepts are taken seri-
ously. The 1984 remedial legislation still missed the mark. 
••• I.R.C. § 195(c)(1)(B) (1984); I.R.C. § 195(b)(2) (1980) . 
... See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text. 
••• H.R. Rep. No. 1278, supra note 306, at 9; S. Rep. No. 1036, supra note 9, at 11, re-
printed in 1980 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 7301; see 1980 Hearings, supra note 2, 
at 14 (statement of Daniel I. Halperin, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax 
Legislation). Halperin suggested that: 
In the unclear cases, of which there are many, taxpayers should elect to amortize; if 
they fail to elect and the Internal Revenue Service successfully maintains that the 
costs must be capitalized, the election would not be available and the costs would not 
be recoverable through amortization. Electing to amortize these expenses over five 
years would appear for most taxpayers to be a more prudent decision. 
ld. (footnote omitted); see Krane, supra note 10, at 311 n. 25. 
••• Cf. NCNB II, 684 F.2d at 296 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting) Judge Murnaghan con-
cluded: "The benefit heaped upon them [taxpayers, preeminently banks, by the separate, 
saleable asset rule] further contributes to the deserved description of our income tax system 
as a disgrace." ld. 
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B. Efficacy of Section 195: The "Shot in the Foot"-The 
Deductible Expansion/Operation Costs Reference Point 
1. Introduction 
H.R. 5729, closely paralleling the section 248(b) definition of 
"organizational expenditures,"3117 defined start-up costs as any ex-
penditure that is 
(1) an ordinary and necessary expense incident to the investiga-
tion, formation, and creation of the trade or business; 
(2) chargeable to capital account; and 
(3) of a character which, if expended incident to the investiga-
tion, formation, and creation of the trade or business having a de-
terminable life, would be amortizable over such life.m 
Due to the absence of any deep structure analysis, the irreconcil-
able conflict between the "ordinary" requirement and the capital 
expenditure aspects apparently was not perceived. Seemingly, 
"chargeable to capital account" only referred to expenses which 
would qualify but for the fact they are incurred prior to going con-
cern status. 3119 However, the third requirement for amortization, 
i.e., that the business has a determinable life, clearly rested on the 
assumption that start-up expenditures are capitalizable as an ac-
quisition cost, which would absolutely preclude "ordinary" sta-
tus. 360 This conceptual schizophrenia has continued through every 
subsequent version of the provision: the "shot in the foot." 
Section 195, as enacted in 1980, defined start-up expenditures as 
any amount 
(1) paid or incurred in connection with-
(A) investigating the creation or acquisition of an active trade 
or business, or 
307 Section 248(b) defines 60-month amortizable "organizational expenditures" as "any 
expenditure which-(1) is incident to the creation of the corporation; (2) is chargeable to 
capital account; and (3) is of a character which, if expended incident to the creation of a 
corporation having a limited life, would be amortizable over such life." l.R.C. § 248(b). 
••• H.R. 5729, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), reprinted in 1980 Hearings, supra note 2, at 
181. 
••• See 1980 Hearings, supra note 2, at 109 (statement of Gerald W. Padwe, Associate 
National Director, Tax Services, Touche Ross & Co.). According to Padwe: "Expenses which 
would qualify but for the fact they are incurred prior to going concern status, become-in 
tax terms-'chargeable to capital account' and not currently deductible; or, in accounting 
terms, a deferred charge in the nature of an intangible asset." I d. 
••• See supra note 19. 
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(B) creating an active trade or business, and 
(2) which, if paid or incurred in connection with the expansion of 
an existing trade or business (in the same field as the trade or busi-
ness referred to in paragraph (1)), would be allowable as a deduc-
tion for the taxable year in which paid or incurred.861 
Congress left to the unpromulgated regulations the role of defining 
eligible start-up expenditures. However, the 1980 Committee Re-
ports provided extensive definitions and illustrations of investiga-
tory and start-up costs. Thus, investigatory costs were said to con-
sist of the cost of seeking and reviewing a prospective business 
prior to reaching a final decision to acquire or enter that busi-
ness. 362 The Reports illustrated investigatory costs as "expenses in-
curred for the analysis or survey of potential markets, products, 
labor supply, transportation facilities, etc."363 The requirement 
that the taxpayer actually enter into the active business was in-
tended to prevent abuses,364 such as in the reported cases where 
taxpayers deducted travel costs for a prospective business that 
manifested a strong personal component. 3611 While such an ap-
proach was easier to administer, a substantiation requirement 
would have been more precise and equitable. 
The drafters of the 1980 Committee Reports defined the second 
category of targeted costs-start-up or pre-opening expenses-as 
costs incurred subsequent to a decision to establish a particular 
business, but prior to the time when the business began, and which 
would have been deductible currently if they were incurred after 
commencement of the particular business operation to which they 
relate.366 These Reports also illustrated start-up costs with "adver-
••• I.R.C. § 195(b)(2) (1981). The drafters explained that the second paragraph was in-
tended to bar amortization of syndication costs, the acquisition cost of the business, and the 
cost of investing in depreciable property. H.R. Rep. No. 1278, supra note 306, at 11; S. Rep. 
No. 1036, supra note 9, at 12, reprinted in 1980 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 7302. 
[The texts of the House and Senate 1980 Committee Reports regarding the intent of § 195 
are virtually identical. For the sole significant difference between the two, see infra notes 
510-11 and accompanying text. Hereinafter, only the Senate Finance Committee Report will 
be cited. In addition, since the 1980 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin News reprint includes the 
orginal Senate Report's pagination, parallel citations will be omitted.] 
... S. Rep. No. 1036, supra note 9, at 10, 11. 
••• ld. at 11 . 
... See infra notes 410-12 and accompanying text. 
... See supra note 179 and accompanying text. 
••• S. Rep. No. 1036, supra note 9, at 11; see supra note 315. 
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tising, salaries and wages paid to employees who are being trained 
and their instructors, travel and other expenses incurred in lining 
up prospective distributors, suppliers or customers, and salaries or 
fees paid or incurred for executives, consultants, and for similar 
professional services. "367 
The drafters of the Reports pointed out that costs may be in-
curred during the start-up stage which would be nondeductible 
and nonamortizable even if incurred subsequent to commencement 
of busine~s operations, either because the expenses were of a 
purely capital nature or related to a business with an indetermin-
able life. 368 The "ordinary and necessary" deductible expense of an 
existing business in expansion (or now operation) standard of origi-
nal section 195 was intended to deny amortization to such nonordi-
nary and necessary business expenses. 389 The 1980 Committee Re-
ports provided the following examples of such nonamortizable 
expenses: 
[A]mounts paid or incurred in connection with the sale of stock, 
securities, or partnership interests are not within the definition of 
startup expenditures, e.g., securities registration expenses, under-
writers' commissions, etc., are not startup expenditures. In addi-
tion, the amortization election for startup expenditures does not 
apply to amounts paid or incurred as part of the acquisition cost of 
a trade or business. Also, startup expenditures do not include 
amounts paid or incurred for the acquisition of property to be held 
for sale or property which may be depreciated or amortized based 
on its useful life, including expenses incident to a lease and lease-
hold improvements. 870 
Although syndication costs cannot fit into the capital expendi-
ture mold as easily as the acquisition cost of a trade or business, of 
depreciable or amortizable property, or of leasehold improvements, 
all three categories are not currently deductible under a distortion 
of income analysis. To provide a deduction for syndication or regis-
tration costs, where the monies raised in the undertaking are ex-
cluded from income371 by the business raising the funds, would dis-
•
87 S. Rep. No. 1036, supra note 9, at 11-12. 
,... Id. at 11. 
,... Id. at 12. 
870 Id. 
371 See I.R.C. §§ 721, 1032. 
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tort the taxpayer's income.372 Additionally, current deduction of 
the other listed capital expenditures would produce a distortion of 
income since benefits are produced over a number of years and 
none of the exceptions discussed in the model apply.373 
2. Source of the Problem 
The cause of the potential "shot in the foot" was the absence of 
any deep structure or distortion of income analysis by the drafters, 
courts, or commentators, prior to 1980, as to why start-up costs of 
a new business should or should not be deductible currently. 374 
Rather, the drafters of the Committee Reports and the statute ac-
cepted the new business preparatory doctrine and the existing bus-
iness separate, saleable asset test as their conceptual framework. 3711 
The 1980 Committee Reports explained that "business investiga-
tory expenses of a general nature normally are viewed as being ei-
ther nondeductible personal expenses, or as not being ordinary and 
necessary trade or business expenses, viz., because no business ex-
ists, within the meaning of section 162 of the Code."378 The draft-
ers believed that the latter definitional rationale applied to start-
up or pre-opening expenses as well, since they are incurred prior to 
the actual operation of the business,377 although some pre-opening 
expenses would not be deductible even if incurred after business 
operations commence because they "either may be of a purely cap-
171 See Missouri Pac. Corp. v. United States, 5 Cl. Ct. 296, 309 (1984) (since year-one 
stock issuance transaction gave rise to no taxable income to recipient corporation, year-two 
adjustment gives rise to no deduction under the doctrine adopted in Arrowsmith v. Commis-
sioner, 344 U.S. 6 (1952)); Gunn, supra note 5, at 447 n.20; Lee & Murphy, supra note 5, at 
524-25. 
171 See supra notes 37-38 & 53-78 and accompanying texts. 
174 See cases and sources cited supra notes 2, 168 & 171. 
.,. S. Rep. No. 1036, supra note 9, at 12. Quoting the Senate Report's definition of inves-
tigatory costs, the NCNB II court concluded that: "Congress is thus under the impression 
that expenditures for market studies and feasibility studies, as at issue here, are fully de-
ductible if incurred by an existing business undergoing expansion." 684 F.2d at 291. In 
Johnsen, the Tax Court similarly quoted the House Report's definition of start-up costs as 
manifesting that "Congress has recognized that section 162 precludes deduction of preopen-
ing expenses." Johnsen v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 103, 116-17 (1984), rev'd on other grounds, 
794 F.2d 1157 (6th Cir. 1986); see also Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. United States, 7 
Cl. Ct. 220 (1985). Thus, courts have relied upon the drafters' mechanical reading of§ 162 
to apply definitional rules that distort the taxpayer's income. See supra notes 305-17 and 
accompanying text. 
••• S. Rep. No. 1036, supra note 9, at 10. 
177 Id. at 11. 
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ital nature, or may be capitalizable simply because they relate to a 
business with an indeterminate life. "378 The drafters correctly read 
then-current law (Briarcliff Candy and its bank credit card prog-
eny) as allowing, under the definitional "separate property interest 
test," current deduction of the "ordinary and necessary" costs of 
an existing business expanding in the same field, 379 at least as to 
new ways of conducting an existing business. To preclude amorti-
zation of start-up costs that would be nondeductible and nonamor-
tizable, even if they were incurred subsequent to commence-
ment,380 the drafters of section 195 provided that amortizable 
start-up costs did not include any amount that would not be cur-
rently deductible "if paid or incurred in connection with the ex-
pansion of an existing trade or business (in the same field ... )."381 
By tying amortization of new business start-up costs to whether 
identical expenditures would be deductible by an existing business 
in expanding, however, the drafters left the door open for subse-
quent business expansion cases to rule that expenditures identical 
to the start-up costs, intended to be covered by section 195, were 
not currently deductible under section 162, and hence, identical 
targeted start-up costs would not be amortizable under section 195. 
The NCNB I panel did just that in treating recurring market sur-
vey costs incurred in expanding to new branches as constituting 
separate, but amortizable assets.382 Similarly, the Central Texas 
Savings & Loan Association v. United States888 treatment of 
.,. ld. 
170 ld. at 12. 
""" Id. The Committee Reports explained: 
ld. 
Thus, amounts paid or incurred in connection with the sale of stock, securities, or 
partnership interests are not within the definition of startup expenditures . . . . In 
addition, the amortization election for startup expenditures does not apply to 
amounts paid or incurred as part of the acquisition cost of a trade or business. Also, 
startup expenditures do not include amounts paid or incurred for the acquisition of 
property to be held for sale or property which may be depreciated or amortized based 
on its useful life, including expenses incident to a lease and leasehold improvements. 
""' I.R.C. § 195(b)(2) (1980) (predecessor to I.R.C. § 195(c)(1)(B) (1984)). 
""' 651 F.2d at 956-57, 962. The court held that the test is not whether the business is old 
or new, but instead is whether the nature of the matching income represents current or 
future income; expansion costs are usually related to anticipated future income, and hence 
must be capitalized where a current deduction would distort income. See generally supra 
notes 245-69 and accompanying text. 
""" 731 F.2d 1181, 1185 (5th Cir. 1984). 
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branch expansion costs, including investigatory costs, as constitut-
ing part of the acquisition cost of the branch itself under the "ori-
gin-of-the-claim" doctrine denied a current deduction for such 
costs, although traditionally no case-law amortization of such cost 
would be available since the branch would have no determinable 
life. 
The Claims Court attempted in Cleveland Electric Illuminating 
Co. v. United States384 to preserve a playing field for section 195 
by permitting a current deduction for employee training costs as to 
a new branch of the same business while requiring capitalization of 
more substantial employee training costs as to a purportedly new 
business. Denied the support of the preparatory doctrine by 
Blitzer,386 and itself functionally rejecting the separate, saleable as-
set avenue,388 however, the Claims Court could not fashion a con-
vincing rationale for its disparate treatment of substantially identi-
cal costs. 387 
In summary, believing that expenditures identical to the 
targeted investigatory and start-up costs .of a new business were 
currently deductible if made by an existing business expanding in 
the same field, 388 the drafters of section 195 chose the standard of 
deductibility in expansion in the same field as the barrier to pre-
clude the amortization of the cost of syndication, purchase of a 
business, or assets when either held for sale or depreciable. Shortly 
after the enactment of section 195, however, courts applying a dis-
tortion of income analysis or the origin-of-the-claim doctrine to 
business expansion costs properly undercut the separate, saleable 
asset doctrine.389 Consequently, in some jurisdictions (e.g., the 
Fifth Circuit and perhaps the Eleventh Circuit) expenditures iden-
tical to the targeted investigatory start-up costs could not be cur-
rently deducted in expansion, and hence, start-up costs of new 
businesses arguably could not be amortized under section 195. This 
would have eliminated the disparity between new and existing 
businesses, albeit not in the direction intended by Congress . 
... 7 Cl. Ct. 220, 228-29, 234-35 (1985). 
••• See supra notes 193-213 and accompanying text . 
.. , 7 Cl. Ct. at 225. 
887 See supra notes 298-300 and accompanying text. 
888 See supra note 375. 
••• See supra notes 287-304 and accompanying text. 
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3. 1984 Amendments 
By 1984, Blitzer and Hoopengarner forced Congress to repair 
section 195 by attempting to make it preemptive. The NCNB opin-
ions also had exposed the defects in the statutory reference point 
of deductibility of a comparable expenditure in expansion by an 
existing business in the same field. Without explanation in either 
the Senate Finance or Conference Committee Reports, the Tax Re-
form Act of 1984 amendments to section 195 changed "expansion" 
to "operation"390 in the section 195 requirement that identical ex-
penses "if paid or incurred in connection with the operation of an 
existing trade or business ... , would be allowable as a deduction 
for the taxable year in which paid or incurred. "391 
Obviously, the change from "expansion" to "operation" was in 
response to the NCNB opinions. Unfortunately, Central Texas 
Savings & Loan was decided after the Senate Committee on Fi-
nance approved its version of the legislation but before preparation 
of the Conference Bill and Report,392 and thus, the impact of its 
"origin-of-the-claim" analysis was not taken into account by the 
1984 amendments.393 The panel opinion in NCNB I viewed an "or-
dinary" expenditure as one that constituted part of the cost of pro-
ducing the income for the current year and, conversely, a capital 
expenditure as one that properly must be matched against some 
future period's revenues that it would help produce. Therefore, the 
panel remanded the decision to the district court to make a finding 
concerning the amount of use of the market surveys in the tax-
payer's current revenue-producing operations and the amount of 
use of the surveys in the planning for, or implementation of, new 
facilities for future use in the taxpayer's revenue-producing 
••• Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 94(a), 98 Stat. 494, 615 (codified at 
I.R.C. § 195(c)(1)(B)). 
••• I.R.C. § 195(c)(1)(B) (1984) (identical to I.R.C. § 195(b)(2) (1980) except "operation" 
substituted for "expansion"). 
••• Central Texas Savings & Loan was decided on May 11, 1984. See 731 F.2d at 1181. 
The Senate Committee on Finance approved its Report recommending amendments to 
§ 195 on Mar. 21, 1984. See S. Print No. 169, supra note 348 (suggested amendments were 
§ 73 of the Committee's proposed Deficit Reduction Tax Act). The Conference Report on 
the Tax Reform Act of 1984, H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., was ordered to 
be printed on June 23, 1984. 
••• In addition, the Claims Court's Cleveland Electric Illuminating and Sixth Circuit's 
Johnsen decisions were not issued until 1985 and 1986, respectively. See 7 Cl. Ct. at 200; 
794 F.2d at 1157. 
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operations. 39" 
Possibly, the drafters intended the 1984 change from "expan-
sion" to "operation" to limit section 195 amortization to expendi-
tures that are totally used up in current operations, while at the 
same time to bolster the section 195 preemption of deductions for 
start-up costs. Thus, Congress reasoned that such start-up costs 
"generally result in the creation of an asset which has a useful life 
which extends substantially beyond the year in which incurred."3911 
Such expenditures usually would not be deductible in operation of 
an existing business in the year paid, under a distortion of income 
analysis.396 Consequently, the amendment does not remedy the 
deep structure conflict between the conceptionalization of start-up 
costs as creating a long-lived asset and a comparability require-
ment of current deductibility in operation largely to preclude 
amortization of long-lived assets. 
4. Suggested Solution 
The ideal solution would be application of the same statutory 
rules to comparable expenditures by both existing and new busi-
nesses, i.e., a current deduction as to recurring and short- or varia-
ble-term benefits, a longer amortization for longer-term benefits 
(say, sixty months), and a still longer amortization period for in-
definite-life expenditures such as permit costs (say, eighteen to 
twenty years).397 If, however, as is more likely, Congress at most 
merely tinkers with section 195 again, it should eliminate the refer-
ence to current deductibility if incurred in operation by an existing 
business. The provision instead should articulate the criteria for 
determining which shorter- and longer-term expenditures should 
be amortized over sixty months by a new business and which 
should not be amortizable, addressing both the degree of recur-
rence and the length of useful life necessary. One of the originally 
proposed requirements for eligible start-up expenditures was 
whether the expenditure would have been amortizible over the life 
of the trade or business investigated or acquired if such trade or 
... NCNB I, 651 F.2d at 962-63. 
••• S. Print No. 169, supra note 348, at 282. 
'" See supra note 354 and accompanying text. 
••• See supra full paragraph in text following note 319; see also supra full paragraph in 
text following note 172. 
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business had a determinable life. 398 Adoption of this standard in 
any minor amendment would satisfy Central Texas Savings & 
Loan and its origin-of-the-claim test. However, it would not satisfy 
the NCNB I panel's approach of treating a business expansion or 
start-up cost as creating a separate, amortizable asset. Conse-
quently, an alternative requirement under such an amendment 
might be whether the expenditure, if not associated with the basis 
of the business, would be amortizable as a separate, intangible 
asset. 
If Congress fails to reformulate section 195 along the above lines, 
courts will have three options: (1) conceptually backstopping sec-
tion 195 by adopting the definitional preparatory and separate, 
saleable asset doctrines;399 (2) adopting the functional distortion of 
income doctrine as to start-up costs incurred in operation or ex-
pansion, thus rendering section 195 largely "meaningless";400 or, (3) 
applying a functional test elsewhere, but strong-arming section 195 
into a workable tool.401 The keystone to current section !95's effi-
cacy is the standard of deductible "if paid or incurred in connec-
tion with the operation of an existing trade or business."402 Those 
seeking to maintain current section 195 must adopt either the first 
or third alternative. The statute would be largely "meaningless" if 
most substantial, less frequently recurring start-up-type costs 
would not be currently deductible in operation, or expansion, of an 
existing business under the functional distortion of income analysis 
of the second choice. However, such a capitalized start-up cost 
would be amortizable as a free-standing asset under the model. 
The mechanism for undercutting the statute-the continuing shot-
in-the-foot statutory reference point of current deductibility-can 
now be seen. Whether courts should yield instead to the adminis-
••• See supra text accompanying note 331. 
... This is the approach taken by the Fourth Circuit in NCNB II, 684 F.2d 285 (4th Cir. 
1982) (en bane) and the Tax Court in Johnsen v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 103 (1984), rev'd on 
other grounds, 794 F.2d 1157 (6th Cir. 1986). 
•oo This is the effect of NCNB I, 651 F.2d 942 (4th Cir. 1981), vacated and remanded en 
bane, 684 F.2d 285 (4th Cir. 1982), notwithstanding Judge Murnaghan's protestations to the 
contrary. See 684 F.2d at 294-95 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting). 
••• See Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 220, 228-29, 234-35 
(1985); see also Johnsen, 794 F.2d at 1162-63 (adopting capitalization theory for start-up 
costs, but seeking to preserve § 195); accord Central Tex. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. United 
States, 731 F.2d 1181, 1185-86 (5th Cir. 1984). 
••• l.R.C. § 195(c)(1)(B). 
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trative practicabilities of the third or first alternatives turns on the 
other defects in section 195, also arising from loosely tacked-on tax 
reform. Thus, the question to be asked as these further defects are 
explored is whether section 195 is so seriously flawed that, absent 
further amendment, courts should fashion a more equitable frame-
work, along the lines of the model, outside of-and largely ignor-
ing-the statutory provision. 
C. Exclusivity of Section 195: When Does an Active Business 
Begin and Confusion End? 
1. Introduction 
The commencement point of a trade or business, for purposes of 
section 195 as enacted, had two intended consequences. First, if an 
activity never reached that point, start-up costs incurred in the ac-
tivity could not be amortized under section 195. Second, the sixty-
month or longer amortization could not commence until this point. 
Additionally, perhaps as an unintended consequence, expenditures 
incurred after this point presumably could not be amortized under 
section 195.403 Current section 195(b)(1) and (d)(1) continue this 
requirement, adding, however, that amortization begins with the 
month in which the active trade or business begins. Thus, both 
original and amended section 195 narrowly limit the sixty-month 
amortization to start-up expenditures that are paid or incurred in 
connection with an (active) trade or business that the taxpayer ac-
tually begins. 404 The result of this provision is that "no deduction 
is allowed . . . with respect to items incurred incident to a trade or 
business which actually is not commenced or acquired by the 
taxpayer. "4011 
While this prerequisite clearly rules out amortization of investi-
gatory or pre-operating expenses of an enterprise that never actu-
ally commences business operations, it also might rule out amorti-
zation of unsuccessful investigations preceding an investigation of 
a business ultimately commenced or acquired by the taxpayer. 
Traditionally, the cost of unsuccessful general investigations is not 
••• See Lathen & Lathen, The "Gap Period" Problem in Section 195, 62 Taxes 416, 419-
22 (1984). 
404 See S. Rep. No. 1036, supra note 9, at 13-14. 
••• Id. at 13. 
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added to the cost of a subsequent successful acquisition.406 Conse-
quently, the costs of the unsuccessful investigation in the same 
field probably cannot be added to the cost, amortizable under sec-
tion 195, incurred as to an active business entered into in that 
field. 407 
Congress intended that situations not covered by section 195 
would be covered by section 165, if at al1.408 However, only those 
unsuccessful investigatory expenses going beyond a general search 
to focus on the acquisition or creation of a specific business or in-
vestment that is not consummated are deductible under section 
165, as a loss incurred in a transaction entered into for profit.409 
These rules are harsh ones; they were likely intended as barriers to 
fictitious claims.410 This rationale may also be one of the primary 
reasons for the prior case law generally taking a harsh approach to 
•oe See Rev. Rul. 77-254, 1977-2 C.B. 63, 64 (general investigatory costs incurred prior to 
focusing on specific acquisition were personal, thus not deductible under § 165); Rev. Rul. 
73-421, 1973-2 C.B. 34 (travel expenses in search of a business site were not incurred in 
carrying on a trade or business). Contrary arguments have been made that unsuccessful 
acquisition costs should be added to the cost of assets actually acquired. See Wabich, Ex-
penses Relating to Abandoned Acquisitions and Business Expansion: Capital vs. Ordinary, 
64 Taxes 377, 379-80 (1986) . 
.., See Shapiro & Shaw, supra note 341, at 11-23 (raising issue whether general investiga-
tory costs may be added to basis of subsequent related acquisitions); see also Solomon & 
Weintraub, Business Start-Up Expenses and Section 195: Some Unresolved Problems, 60 
Taxes 27, 31 (1982), reprinted in 7 Rev. Tax'n Individuals 123, 131 (1983). 
•os S. Rep. No. 1036, supra note 9, at 14, stated that start-up costs of a business with an 
ascertainable useful life of less than 60 months may not be amortized under§ 195. However, 
the start-up costs will remain subject to pre-§ 195 rules, which will apply to any remaining 
unamortized amount upon termination of a business prior to the end of the 60-month or 
longer amortization period. "Therefore, in an appropriate instance, a taxpayer may deduct 
any unamortized amount as a loss (Code sec. 165) or an unamortized amount might be 
carried over to the taxpayer's successor in interest .... " Id.; see also S. Print No. 169, 
supra note 348, at 283. 
•
09 Section 165 limits an individual's losses, other than trade or business or casualty, etc., 
losses, to "losses incurred in any transaction entered into for profit, though not connected 
with a trade or business." I.R.C. § 165(c)(2). After considerable controversy, the Tax Court 
and the Service agreed that the investigatory costs of a failed acquisition are deductible 
under this provision once the taxpayer has gone beyond a general search and focused on the 
acquisition of a specific business or investment, but then failed to consummate the at-
tempted acquisition. Seed v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 880 (1969), acq., 1970-2 C.B. xxi; Rev. 
Rul. 77-254, 1977-2 C.B. 63. See generally, Seago, supra note 2, at 413-14; Wilberding, supra 
note 175, at 232-43; Comment, Transaction Test for Federal Income Tax Loss Deductions, 
27 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 158 (1970). 
••• See Sharp, Tax Relief for New Businesses: Equitable Treatment of Start-Up Costs, 57 
Taxes 695, 699 (1979). 
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investigatory expenses.411 However, as commentators have pointed 
out, "the appropriate remedy for abuse is a skeptical eye, not a 
rigid rule of law. "412 
2. Source of the Problem 
a. Commencement Point of Amortization 
H.R. 5729, as originally introduced, pegged commencement of 
amortization to "the month the trade or business starts function-
ing as a going concern."413 This formulation clearly was modeled 
on the Richmond Television, section 162 test, under which a tax-
payer was not yet carrying on a trade or business "until such time 
as the business has begun to function as a going concern and per-
formed those activities for which it was organized."414 The Tax 
Court also has followed this test. 416 
However, by 1980 the answer to when a trade or business com-
mences for purposes of section 162 was no longer unanimous. In 
that year a district court in the Fourth Circuit ruled that recurring 
payments made by the taxpayer for wages, employee training, util-
ities, promotion and consumable supplies, and advertising were 
currently deductible under section 162 for the period from the first 
of its tax year to the date in the same year that the taxpayer ob-
tained a permit to conduct its business.416 The district court func-
tionally reasoned that the one-year rule417 (providing in part that 
an expenditure producing a benefit that is exhausted completely 
within the tax year is currently deductible) applied to a new busi-
ness during the first tax year in which it began operations, there-
411 Note, supra note 179, at 88. 
411 1 B. Bittker, supra note 5, 'II 20.4.4, at 20-77 to 20-78; accord Shapiro & Shaw, supra 
note 341, at 11-21 & n.20. 
411 H.R. 5729, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1 (proposed § 193(a)), reprinted in 1980 Hearings, 
supra note 2, at 181. 
••• Richmond Television Corp. v. United States, 345 F.2d 901, 907 (4th Cir.), vacated and 
remanded on other grounds, 382 U.S. 68 (1965); see supra note 214 and accompanying text. 
410 See, e.g., Bennett Paper Corp. v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 458, 463 (1982), affd, 699 
F.2d 450 (8th Cir. 1983); Todd v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 246, 249 (1981), affd, 682 F.2d 207 
(9th Cir. 1982); Goodwin v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 424, 433 (1980), affd mem., 691 F.2d 490 
(3d Cir. 1982); see also Aboussie v. United States, 779 F.2d 424, 428 (8th Cir. 1985) (court 
held that "carrying on a business" starts when facts show that taxpayer almost certainly will 
engage in a profit-seeking activity). 
••• United States v. Manor Care, Inc., 490 F. Supp. 355 (D. Md. 1980); see supra note 219. 
417 See supra note 247. 
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fore producing no distortion of income. At the same time, the liti-
gation leading to the Blitzer decision had commenced.418 Blitzer 
applied a functional profit-motivated noninvestment analysis to 
the section 162 carrying on a trade or business proviso. This analy-
sis in effect pegged practical commencement of a business to activ-
ities committing the taxpaying to an identifiable business activity, 
and it rejected a requirement of carrying on revenue-producing op-
erations as "an inflexible temporal prerequisite for the application 
of I.R.C. § 162(a)."41e 
Moreover, the Service's audit activity in this area had increased 
by the eve of enactment of section 195, with heavy reliance on 
Richmond Teleuision;uo Viewing the "functioning as a going con-
cern" criterion as erroneous, witnesses argued at the 1980 Hearings 
on the proposed new section that such a test would leave "open for 
controversy identification of the point at which a trade or business 
begins to function as a going concern. Moreover, it [would] de-
part[] from the formulation already adopted in the Code in closely 
analogous situations,"'21 i.e., the regulations under section 248 and 
1372(e)(5).422 The witnesses representing industry at the 1980 
Hearings apparently feared that the Service would use section 195 
and its proposed "functioning as a going concern" standard to 
backstop the Service's audit and litigating posture that no deduc-
tion was allowable under section 162 until the business began to 
function as a going concern,'28 which in fact proved to be the 
case.42' 
Section 195, as enacted, provided that the "not less than 60 
months" amortization period commenced with the month in which 
the business began.420 Other than a reference to when an acquired 
••• Blitzer v. United States, 684 F.2d 874, 880 (Ct. Cl. 1982). For a discussion of Blitzer, 
see supra notes 193-213 and accompanying text. 
••• 684 F.2d at 880. 
••• See 1980 Hearings, supra note 2, at 45, 101-02 (statements of Charles M. Walker, 
Chairman, Section of Taxation, A.B.A., and of Samuel M. Chase, Jr., Chairman, Legislative 
Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Real Estate Securities, Nat'l Ass'n of Realtors, respectively). 
411 ld. at 45 (statement of Charles M. Walker). 
411 Treas. Reg. §§ 1.248-1(a)(3), 1.1372-4(b)(5)(ii)(b). 
••• See 1980 Hearings supra note 2, at 102, 113 (statements of Samuel M. Chase, Jr., 
Chairman, Legislative Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Real Estate Securities, Nat'l Ass'n of Real-
tors, and of Paul W. Clevenger, Vice President, Taxes, UAL, Inc., respectively). 
414 See, e.g., Johnsen v. Commissioner, 794 F.2d 1157, 1163 (6th Cir. 1986); Cleveland 
Elec. IJJuminating Co. v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 220, 228 (1985). 
••• I.R.C. § 195(a) (1980) (parenthetical language). 
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business began (when acquired),'626 the 1980 statute was silent as to 
when such event actually occurred. The 1980 Committee Reports, 
however, stated that: 
The month of acquisition is to be determined with regard to the 
economic substance of each situation. Generally it is anticipated 
that the definition of when a business begins is to be made in ref-
erence to the existing provisions for the amortization of organiza-
tional expenditures (Code sees. 248 and 709). Generally, if the ac-
tivities of the corporation have advanced to the extent necessary to 
establish the nature of its business operations, it will be deemed to 
have begun business. For example, the acquisition of operating as-
sets which are necessary to the type of business contemplated may 
constitute the beginning of business.427 
Ironically, earlier in Richmond Television and in some of its prog-
eny, taxpayers argued to no avail, based upon the section 248 regu-
lations (the section 195 legislative history's reference point), that a 
business commenced for purposes of section 162 as soon as its ac-
tivities advanced to the extent necessary to establish the nature of 
the business operations. 428 
418 I.R.C. § 195(d) (1980). The month of acquisition was to be determined with regard to 
the economic substance of each situation. S. Rep. No. 1036, supra note 9, at 14. 
417 S. Rep. No. 1036, supra note 9, at 14. 
••• In a previous article, the author noted that: 
The district court in Richmond Television Corp. v. United States, 66-2 U.S.T.C. 11 
9589 (E.D. Va. 1963), clearly relied upon these regulations [Treas. Reg. § 1.248-
1(a)(3)) in giving the jury instructions as to when a business commences. Unfortu-
nately, before the Fourth Circuit the taxpayer merely relied upon the section 248 
regulations for the somewhat attenuated argument that since start-up costs were not 
mentioned in such regulations as chargeable to capital account they were not required 
to be capitalized. Brief for Appellee at 15, Richmond Television Corp. v. United 
States, 345 F.2d 901 (4th Cir.), vacated and remanded per curiam on other grounds, 
382 U.S. 68 (1965). Ironically, while many commentators have suggested that the [sic] 
section 248 strongly supports the argument that trade or business status can attach 
prior to full grown operations, its first explicit presentation to a court after Richmond 
Television was an individual hobby loss case, rather than a preoperating expense 
case. Justin A. McNamara, 32 T.C.M. 11, 16 (1973). Instead of pointing out that the 
section 248 regulations speak only to when a business commences and not to whether 
the requisite profit motive is present, the Tax Court broadly announced: "Our atten-
tion has not been called to, nor have we found any case which holds or even implies 
that the test set forth in section 1.248-l(a)(3) has any applicability to determining 
whether an enterprise in other than corporate form was [sic] actually entered into a 
trade or business for purposes of section 162(a)." 
Lee, supra note 122, at 460 n.481. 
In Davis v. Commissioner, the taxpayer similarly relied to no avail upon the § 248 regula-
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Some commentators concluded that the above strands created a 
"gap" under which a business might "begin" for purposes of com-
mencement of amortization under section 195 (starting at the sec-
tion 248 regulations' standard of when the nature of the business is 
determined) at a point considerably earlier than under the Rich-
mond Television test of when income-producing activities com-
mence (before which time expenditures cannot be deducted under 
section 162(a)). The commentators claimed that start-up expenses 
incurred during this "gap" arguably could be neither currently de-
ducted under traditional section 162 definitional authorities nor 
amortized under section 195. Accordingly, they argued that to 
achieve the legislative goal of reducing disparity between new and 
existing businesses recurring "gap" expenses producing short-term 
benefits should be currently deductible under Blitzer;m 
The Service chose, probably wisely, to ignore the legislative his-
tory,430 as evidenced by Revenue Ruling 81-150.431 In subtle reli-
ance on Richmond Television, this Ruling held that a limited part-
nership, organized in 1980 to construct an offshore drilling rig and 
to engage in contract drilling after its completion in July 1981, did 
not begin a trade or business for purposes of section 195 until July 
1981 and that section 162 amortization also could not begin until 
that date. 432 
tions in a pre-opening context. 45 T.C.M. (CCH) 1070, 1074 n.7 (1983). Moreover, the Tax 
Court applied the Richmond Television actual business operations test to deny current de-
ductibility of pre-opening expenses of a subchapter S corporation. Scott v. Commissioner, 46 
T.C.M. (CCH) 1324 (1983). The Scott court did so despite the taxpayer's reliance on the 
§ 1372 regulations, which provide, for purposes of the passive investment income test, that 
"a corporation will be deemed to have commenced the active conduct of a trade or business 
in the taxable year in which it first engages in activities (other than activities merely inci-
dental to the organization of the corporation) designed or intended to enable it to engage in 
any business operations." Treas. Reg. § 1.1372-4(b)(5)(ii)(b)), quoted in Scott, 46 T.C.M. at 
1329. The more recently drafted "commencement of business" regulations attempt to push 
commencement to a later date. See supra note 211. 
••• E.g., Lathen & Lathen, supra note 403, at 419-22. 
••• See id. at 422 (reporting that one author of unpublished draft § 195 regulations stated 
that the draft provided that the beginning of business, for purposes of § 195, was when it 
began for purposes of § 162, presumably under the Richmond Television test). 
••• 1981-1 C.B. 119. 
••• Id. at 120. The Revenue Ruling held that under Richmond Television the partnership 
was not carrying on a trade or business until July 1981, when completion and operation of 
the drilling rig took place; therefore, the management fee could not be deducted under 
§ 162. As to § 195, the Ruling flatly stated that the amortization period began July 1981, 
without mentioning any authority. ld. The Service thus ignored the statement in the 1980 
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b. By-Passing Section 195 
More serious problems, at least from the perspective of the De-
partment of the Treasury's main objective of encouraging use of 
section 195 and decreasing controversies, were the foreseeable433 
Blitzer and the unforeseeable Hoopengarner developments. After 
the enactment of section 195, the Court of Claims concluded in 
Blitzer,'3' albeit in dictum, that for purposes of section 162 a part-
nership organized to construct and operate a low-income housing 
project commenced carrying on its business no later than the date 
by which it (1) acquired title to the land for the project, (2) exe-
cuted its building loan agreement, and (3) received substantial 
funds under the agreement, although construction of the partner-
ship's income-producing asset had not begun. Thus, under Blitzer 
any recurring noncapital expenditures incurred after such events 
(amounting to a commitment to the identifiable business and the 
acquisition of an asset to be used in the business, even though not 
an operating asset) could be currently deducted under section 
162(a). The decision by the Court of Claims in Blitzer thereby ren-
dered section 195 superfluous as to recurring pre-opening costs 
(but not as to investigatory costs), as the drafters of the statute 
should have anticipated. To similar effect, the Tax Court in 
Hoopengarner'3" subsequently permitted a current deduction of 
noncapital expenditures under section 212 to commence upon the 
acquisition of a property interest in a nonoperating asset, specifi-
cally a ground lease on which a building would be constructed to 
be used in an anticipated active rental business. Not surprisingly, a 
substantial number of affected taxpayers did not elect to amortize 
start-up expenditures under section 195, but argued instead, 
against Service opposition, that the costs were currently deductible 
Committee Reports that when a business begins should be defined in light of the definition 
provided by §§ 248 and 709, i.e., when the partnership's activities "have advanced to the 
extent necessary to establish the nature of its business operations." S. Rep. No. 1036, supra 
note 9, at 14. 
••• See 1980 Hearings, supra. note 2, at 102, 106 (statement of Samuel M. Chase, Jr., 
Chairman, Legislative Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Real Estate Securities, Nat'l Ass'n of 
Realtors). 
••• Blitzer v. United States, 684 F.2d 874, 880 (Ct. Cl. 1982). 
••• Hoopengarner v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 538 (1983), affd mem., -745 F.2d 66 (9th Cir. 
1984); see supra note 175. 
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under either section 162 or section 212.438 
3. 1984 Amendments 
In 1984 Congress amended section 195 to deal with the problem 
of taxpayers currently deducting pre-opening costs under section 
162 or 212. As a "clarification"437 of the original definition of start-
up costs, Congress added a third category-costs paid or incurred 
in connection with "any activity engaged in for profit and for the 
production of income before the day on which the active trade or 
business begins, in anticipation of such activity becoming an active 
trade or business."438 This amendment was expressly intended439 to 
cover the annual ground rent expenses permitted as a current de-
duction in Hoopengarner;"0 At the same time that Congress 
broadened the definition of start-up costs in 1984, it preempted 
any further current deductions under section 162 or 212 as to 
targeted start-up costs by denying any deduction for a start-up ex-
penditure other than as an amortization deduction under section 
195, with minor exceptions. •·n The 1984 amendments also pro-
vided, without any explanation in the legislative history, that "leg-
islative" regulations would determine when an active trade or busi-
••• S. Print No. 169, supra note 348, at 282 . 
... The Senate Print stated that: 
I d. 
Present law is unclear whether a specific item should be capitalized[,] expensed, or 
amortized as provided in section 195. For example, some taxpayers who do not elect 
to amortize start-up expenditures under section 195 have argued that start-up ex-
penditures are currently deductible as ordinary and necessary expenses under section 
162, and, in any event, are deductible under section 212 as expenses paid or incurred . 
in connection with property held for the production of income. The Internal Revenue 
Service disagrees with both these positions. 
•aa Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 94(a), 98 Stat. 494, 615 (codified at 
I.R.C. § 195(c)(1)(A)(iii)). 
••• S. Print No. 169, supra note 348, at 282-83. 
••• See supra note 175 . 
... I.R.C. § 195(a) (1984); S. Print No. 169, supra note 348, at 283. The Conference Com-
mittee properly carved out, from the scope of § 195 capitalization, amounts deductible 
under §§ 163(a), 164, or 174. I.R.C. § 195(c) (1984) (flush language); H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 
861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 896-97, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1445, 
1584-85. The Senate Finance Committee believed that "start-up expenditures generally re-
sult in the creation of an asset which has a useful life which extends substantially beyond 
the year in which incurred. Therefore, such expenditures should not be fully deductible 
when paid or incurred but rather should be deducted over a longer term." S. Print No. 169, 
supra note 348, at 282-83. 
1986] Start-Up Costs 99 
ness begins. 442 
The linchpin to the section 195 preemption of the current de-
duction of start-up costs is the determination of when an active 
trade or business begins. If it begins as soon as the business can be 
identified, both Hoopengarner and Blitzer can still come into play 
as to expenses incurred from that point until revenue-producing 
operations commence. Thus, as a practical matter, under this ap-
proach to determining the commencement of business section 195 
"capitalization" and "amortization" would be limited to investiga-
tory expenses.443 Clearly, Congress did not intend this,""" and the 
"legislative" regulations undoubtedly will peg the beginning of an 
active business to some point close to, or identical with, the begin-
ning of revenue-producing operations."411 Nevertheless, within the 
four corners of the 1980 and 1984 legislative histories, the only 
mention of when a business or active business begins appears in 
the 1980 reference to the model of "identification of the business" 
found in sections 248 and 709. To discern the intended scope of 
the legislative regulations for determining when an active business 
begins, namely, commencement of revenue-producing operations or 
functioning as a going concern, (1) the 1984 legislative intent of 
preempting Hoopengarner by section 195, (2) the reference to tax-
payer arguments (implicitly based on Blitzer) that start-up costs 
are currently deductible under section 162(a), which the Commit-
tees apparently also intended to preempt,""6 and (3) the rationales 
... I.R.C. § 195(c)(2)(A) (1984). 
••• Under the Blitzer approach, investigatory expenses are usually incurred before the 
taxpayer acquires assets identifying the business. See 684 F.2d at 880. Moreover, such ex-
penses more easily fall into an acquisition cost mold. See supra notes 216 & 218 and accom-
panying texts. Under a functional analysis, investigatory costs are more likely to be non-
recurring than start-up costs. 
••• The Senate Finance Committee explicitly stated that it intended that the Hoopen-
garner expenses be covered by § 195, i.e., "capitalized" and electively amortized. S. Print 
No. 169, supra note 348, at 283. The Joint Committee on Taxation Staff explicitly cited 
Blitzer, to which the Finance Committee Report only alluded. General Explanation, supra 
note 215, at 296; cf. S. Print No. 169, supra note 348, at 283. 
••• Thus, the circle will close, returning commencement of amortization closer to the origi-
nal proposal of "the month the trade or business starts functioning as a going concern." See 
supra note 330 and accompanying text. See generally Lathen & Lathen, supra note 403, at 
422-23. 
••• The Senate Finance Committee Report referred only to arguments under § 162 and 
not to Blitzer specifically, unlike its references to § 212 and Hoopengarner. See S. Print No. 
169, supra note 348, at 282. This omission may have been due to the Blitzer "preemption 
gap." See supra note 429 and accompanying text. In the alternative, it may point out the 
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of Blitzer and Hoopengarner must be read together. 
Assuming that the regulations provide that an active business 
begins no earlier than commencement of revenue-producing opera-
tions, Hoopengarner will have been legislatively overturned. The 
situation as to Blitzer will be far less clear. The Court of Claims, 
while speaking to the very types of expenditures described in the 
1980 legislative history of section 195 as start-up costs when in-
cu:tred prior to actual operation,'47 reasoned that normal recurring 
expenses (utility bills, rent, stationery, and compensation) do not 
provide benefits beyond the tax year in question and, hence, are 
currently deductible under section 162(a) once the business com-
mences."8 Under Blitzer, the new business begins for purposes of 
section 162 as soon as it is committed to and assets (identifying the 
business) are acquired. The key to the efficacy of the 1984 changes 
in this regard is whether such normal recurring expenses incurred 
after business commences under the Blitzer approach, but prior 
both to completion of construction or acquisition of income-pro-
ducing assets and to functioning as a going concern under the 
Richmond Television approach, creates an asset with a useful life 
extending substantially beyond the tax year in which incurred (i.e., 
the business itself of an increase in earning power). Only if the 
recurring pre-opening costs can be said to "create" an active busi-
ness are they covered by the mandatory "capitalization" of new 
section 195(a). New section 195 applies only to "start-up costs" 
and the "Congress believed that start-up expenditures generally 
result in the creation of an asset which has a useful life which ex-
tends substantially beyond the year in which incurred";••e other-
wise, such expenditures will be currently deductible under section 
162 under both Blitzer and a distortion of income approach to cap-
italization. Paradoxically, if start-up expenditures do constitute 
such an acquisition cost, they generally should not be currently de-
embarrassing fact that the drafters of original § 195 should have been on notice as to the 
potential holding and impact of Blitzer. See 1980 Hearings, supra note 2, at 102, 106 n.1 
(statements of Samuel M. Chase, Jr., Chairman, Legislative Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Real 
Estate Securities, Nat'l Ass'n of Realtors). In any event, the General Explanation explicitly 
referred to Blitzer. See supra note 444. 
••• See S. Rep. No. 1036, supra note 9, at 11; see supra note 315. 
448 Blitzer, 684 F.2d at 880; see Fowler, Continuing Saga of Start-Up Costs and Their 
Identification, 17 Tax Adviser 244, 248 (1986). 
••• General Explanation, supra note 215, at 296. 
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ductible in "operation" under section 162(a) because a current de-
duction would produce distortion of income!110 
Blitzer assumes that such expenses do not result in the acquisi-
tion of such a long-lived benefit.4111 To the contrary, the legislative 
history of the 1984 amendments to section 195 (in a shift from the 
rationale underlying the 1980 enactment of section 195, rather 
than in a "clarification"),'~~2 as well as decisions such as Richmond 
Television,'113 Central Texas Savings & Loan,'~~' Cleveland Elec-
tric Illuminating,'~~11 and Johnsen,' 116 assume that they do. Thus, 
the exclusivity of section 195 as to recurring expenditures produc-
ing short-term benefits incurred prior to commencement of reve-
nue-producing operations likely will be established only through 
additional litigation. A better solution would be to explicitly 
amend section 162. 
4. Suggested Solution 
The lesser problem is when a business commences for purposes 
of section 195. Symmetry undoubtedly mandates that a business 
begin for purposes of section 195 at the same point that a business 
is first being carried on for purposes of section 162. From a func-
tional point of view this stage will be as soon as the activity is 
identifiable as being profit motivated rather than an investment. 
However, the regulations under section 195 most likely will peg 
commencement of an active business to when the business begins 
••• See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text. 
••• 684 F.2d at 880 (recurring expenditures, e.g., utilities, rent, and office expenses, in-
curred prior to carrying on revenue-producing operations did not provide benefits extending 
beyond the current tax year). 
••• Compare supra notes 376-77 and accompanying text with supra note 395 and accom-
panying text. 
••• Richmond Television capitalized pre-opening staff training costs and added them to 
the basis of a nonamortizable operating permit. See supra note 112. In Francis v. Commis-
sioner, however, the Tax Court treated recurring pre-operating expenses (insurance, profes-
sional fees, office supplies, auto and travel costs, etc.) as acquisition costs of the business 
entered into. 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 704 (1977). Blitzer dismissed Francis on the grounds that it 
was devoid of "critical analysis." 684 F.2d at 880 . 
... Central Te:r.as Savings & Loan involved investigatory survey and permit costs. 731 
F.2d at 1182. Such costs were more easily fit into the acquisition cost analysis the opinion 
espoused than recurring pre-opening costs would be. See supra full paragraph in text follow-
ing note 318; see also supra note 443. 
••• 7 Cl. Ct. at 228 . 
... 794 F.2d at 1162. 
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to function as a going concern in order to backstop section 195's 
new anti-shelter preemption. The section 162 authorities, in time, 
may also be expected to yield to this standard. 
The actual root of the problem in preemption by section 195 is 
the continued disparity between new businesses and existing busi-
nesses; the former are limited to sixty-month amortization of ex-
penditures that the latter can deduct currently. Similar rules 
should apply to similar expenses incurred by both new and existing 
businesses. Therefore, the ideal solution is to cover both new busi-
ness start-up and exisitng business expansion costs under the same 
statutory provision, allowing a current deduction or five-year, eigh-
teen-year, or twenty-year amortization, depending upon articu-
lated functional factors. 4117 If such an equitable solution is not en-
acted, courts will best achieve equity by reading section 195 so as 
to take substantial long-term benefit pre-operating and business 
expansion costs out of its penumbra. This position can be based on 
the ground that such costs, as capital expenditures, will not be cur-
rently deductible in operation but instead will be amortizable as 
free-standing costs by estimating their useful life equitably under 
Cohan. However, this case-by-case approach will generate contin-
ued controversy and may lead most courts "to bow to the will of 
Congress"4118 in codifying past judicial error, at least as to start-up 
costs. 
D. Exclusion of Business Expansion Costs: Don't Bank on 
Pyrrhic Victories 
1. Source of the Problem 
The 1980 Hearings on H.R. 5729 aired two problems regarding 
the then-proposed new section and expansion costs of existing 
businesses: whether the new provision would overturn the prior 
bank credit card "method of business" precedents and whether an 
existing business expanding through new branches would be able 
to use the proposed section if the new branch start-up costs had to 
be capitalized. A witness suggested that the first problem should 
••• See supra full paragraph in text following note 172; see also supra full paragraph in 
text following note 319. 
••• Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 460 U.S. 370, 380 n.10 (1983); see supra note 
320. 
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be resolved by committee reports providing that the section was 
"not intended to create any presumptions about the state of the 
law concerning start-up expenditures in prior taxable years."4119 
The second problem, the witness continued, should be solved by 
.. the statute or committee reports clarifying that the section was 
"not intended to penalize existing businesses if they would other-
wise meet the qualifications to amortize expenditures under sec-
tion [195], and that the new section should be given reasonable 
interpretation as applicable to existing organizations. "460 
Instead, the 1980 Committee Reports stated that amortizable 
start-up expenditures did not include ordinary and necessary busi-
ness expenses incurred in connection with the expansion of an ex-
isting trade or business; rather, "[a]s under present law [prior to 
NCNB I and Central Texas Savings & Loan], such expenditures 
will continue to be currently deductible."461 The determination, 
however, of whether there has been an expansion of an existing 
business or an entering into a new trade or business "is to be based 
on the facts and circumstances of each case as under present 
law."462 In the context of the 1980 "present law" preparatory doc-
trine, the Tax Court regularly defined the taxpayer's existing busi-
ness narrowly, particularly in the context of real estate, where it 
believed that rental holdings in different geographic locations con-
stituted different businesses463 and that development (construction 
for sale or rental) of residential, commercial, and industrial real 
estate constituted different businesses. 484 The Fourth Circuit flatly 
••• 1980 Hearings, supra note 2, at 110 (statement of Gerald W. Padwe, Associate Na-
tional Director, Tax Services, Touche Ross & Co.). 
410 Id. at 115 (supplemental statement of Gerald W. Padwe). 
481 S. Rep. No. 1036, supra note 9, at 12. 
••• Id. 
••• Francis v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 704 (1977); see Odom v Commissioner, 44 
T.C.M. (CCH) 113 (1982) (also looked at substantiality of compared rental activities); 
Shehan v. Commissioner, 29 T.C.M. (CCH) 727 (1970) (similarity of activities not shown); 
cf. O'Donnell v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 781, 785-86 (1974), (substantiality of activities in the 
existing business constituting a material factor), arrd, 519 F.2d 1406 (7th Cir. 1975); 
Preseault v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 685, 687 (1975). Contra Malmstedt v. Com-
missioner, 578 F.2d 520, 527 & n.13 (4th Cir. 1978). The Tax Court's position as to geo-
graphic separation conflicts with the current law concerning conduct of the same or of dif-
ferent active business under § 355(b)(2). See Lee, Proposed Regs. Under 355 Overhaul 
Device Test and Single Business Divisions, 46 J. Tax'n 194, 198-99 (1977). 
414 York .v. Commissioner, 29 T.C. 520, 526-27 (1957) (residential and commercial devel-
opment not the same as industrial development), rev'd, 261 F.2d 421 (4th Cir. 1958); accord 
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disagreed on both points.4811 The Tax Court, however, on occasion 
took a broader approach similar to the new methods/new business 
line drawn by some of the bank credit card cases,"88 where neither 
real estate nor geographic expansion was involved. 467 It followed a 
particularly expansive approach as to the business of being an 
employee.488 
Subsequently, the Claims Court in Cleveland Electric Illuminat-
ing added to the confusion as to the "present law" line between 
expansion of an existing business and entering a new trade or busi-
ness.489 The court found that nuclear generation of electricity was 
·a new and different business than generation of electricity by con-
ventional fossil fuel plants.470 Yet, under the bank credit card 
cases, nuclear generation appears to be merely a new way of carry-
ing on the existing business of generating electricity.471 It was ex-
ceedingly poor drafting, even for congressional committee reports, 
to specifically incorporate an area in which there was an existing 
conflict between the Tax Court and other tribunals"72 (with other 
conflicts to develop) as to what the "present law" then was regard-
Malmstedt v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 199 (1976), rev'd, 578 F.2d 520 (4th Cir. 
1978). 
••• Malmstedt, 578 F.2d at 526-27; York, 261 F.2d at 422 . 
... See supra note 229 and accompanying text. 
••• See Brown v. Commissioner, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 397 (1979) (development of computer 
monitored learning program was part of existing business of tutoring learning disabled); 
Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1184 (1977) (costs of registering 
certain variable annuity contracts with the Securities and Exchange Commission by a com-
pany's subsidiary were currently deductible). 
••• See Primuth v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 374, 377-78 (1970). For its progeny, see, e.g., 
Black v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 108, 113 (1973) (employment agency fee was deductible 
although new job in same field obtained independently); Cremona v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 
219, 220-22 (1972) (employment agency fee was deductible although taxpayer remained em-
ployed at old job); Kenfield v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1197, 1199-1200 (1970) (employment 
agency fee was deductible, although taxpayer accepted a new job obtained through an 
agency, then stayed with his old job because he received a promotion resulting from the new 
job offer); Motto v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 558, 559 (1970) (employment agency fee was 
deductible, even when the new job obtained is in the same field). See generally Tucker, An 
Individual's Employment-Seeking Expenses: Analyzing the New Judicial Climate, 34 J. 
Tax'n 352 (1971); Note, Federal Income Tax Treatment of Business and Employment Inves-
tigatory Expenses, 56 Minn. L. Rev. 1157 (1972). 
••• 7 Cl. Ct. 220 (1985). 
470 Id. at 229. 
471 See supra note 229 and accompanying text. 
471 Compare supra note 464 and accompanying text with supra note 465 and accompany-
ing text. 
1986] Start-Up Costs 105 
ing expansion versus new business. This situation represents still 
another case of tacked-on reform producing the antithesis of sim-
plification, i.e., unpredictability. 
Possibly the drafters of the 1980 Committee Reports left open 
the question of "expansion" so that taxpayers in "marginal cases" 
would choose amortization under section 195. However, had the 
drafters drawn a bright line between start-up and expansion costs, 
some taxpayers would have chosen current deductions under sec-
tion 162 rather than amortization under section 195. The drafters 
may have believed that the uncertainty of hanging definitions 
would force more taxpayers to the certainty of section 195.473 Ex-
perience with deductions claimed under Blitzer and Hoopengarner 
suggest that this would not have been the case. 474 
Once again, a more fundamental issue than the statutory mecha-
nism for exempting expansion costs of existing businesses from 
section 195 amortization is the question of why Congress intended 
preferential treatment for an existing business (current deduction) 
as contrasted with a new business (only sixty-month amortization). 
Clearly the sixty-month or longer period for amortization under 
new section 195(b)(1) was copied from sections 248 and 709,4711 
which provide sixty-month amortization of organizational expendi-
tures by corporations and partnerships, respectively. A major pro-
ponent pronounced the sixty-month amortization as more desira-
ble than the immediate deduction for many businesses: 
This is because the first few years of a business operation often 
show low profits so that immediate deductibility might generate a 
net operating loss. A net operating loss can be complicated for a 
small businessman to handle. Thus, spreading the deductibility of 
startup expenses over 5 years may correspond more closely to the 
earnings growth of a new business. 478 
471 See supra note 355 and accompanying text. 
••• Congress estimated in 1980 that amortization under § 195 would reduce fiscal year 
budget receipts by $22 million in 1981, $73 million in 1982, $121 million in 1983, $180 mil-
lion in 1984, and $254 million in 1985. S. Rep. No. 1036, supra note 9, at 14. The 1984 
amendments, precluding a current § 162 (Blitzer) or § 212 (Hoopengarner) deduction, were 
expected to increase fiscal year budget receipts by $23 million in 1985, $36 million in 1986, 
$31 million in 1987, $26 million in 1988, and $19 million in 1989. S. Print No. 169, supra 
note 348, at 283. 
••• Compare the statements in the 1980 Hearings, supra note 2, with S. Rep. No. 1036, 
supra note 9, at 14. See generally Krane, supra note 10, at 310-11. 
••• 126 Cong. Rec. 24,813 (1980) (statement of Rep. Conable, introducer of H.R. 5729). 
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More likely, however, sixty-month amortization was chosen as a 
compromise to the aU-or-nothing stakes of pre-section 195 case 
law:n7 
Tax reform, particularly tax simplification, has no substantial 
natural lobby;ns at least prior to President Reagan's efforts in 
1985-86. Therefore, simplification projects must tread a narrow 
path to reach a "collegial" understanding among the tax profession 
interest groups themselves-Joint Committee, Treasury, and Ser-
vice staffs and tax section representatives from the professional as-
sociations of tax accountants and lawyers479-without stirring up 
·any opposed special interest groups along the way. During the de-
liberations over section 195, the banks obviously were concerned 
that their judicial victories regarding credit card business expan-
sion might be lost in the legislative arena.480 Perhaps this led Con-
gress to preclude section 195 from limiting existing businesses to 
sixty-month amortization of start-up-like costs. 
In any event, the compromise sixty-month amortization of new 
business start-up costs continued the disparity between a new bus-
iness and an ongoing business; consequently, the seeds of contro-
versy continue to germinate. A more serious consequence to section 
195's efficacy arising from the exemption of existing business 
(through the 1980 "deductible in expansion" standard) was the 
risk that business expansion costs would not "continue to be de-
ductible" when the issue shifted from expansion by new methods 
to expansion to new geographic locations. Indeed, the House Ways 
and Means Subcommittee on Select Revenue Measures was 
warned that costs of such geographic expansion might prove de-
ductible under neither section 195 nor 162.481 With Central Texas 
Savings & Loan this unheeded warning came true. Under the Fifth 
Circuit's analysis, "establishment of a new branch office creates a 
417 See Krane, supra note 10, at 310-11 & n. 25. 
471 See McDaniel, supra note 10, at 35-36, 72-75. 
470 See Hoffman, Role of the Bar in the Tax Legislative Process, 37 Tax L. Rev. 413, 499-
502 (1982). 
••• See 1980 Hearings, supra note 2, at 110 (statement of Gerald W. Padwe, Associate 
National Director, Tax Services, Touche Ross & Co.). Referring to the bank credit card 
victories, Padwe urged the Subcommittee members to adopt reports that "include language 
that enactment of new Code section 193 [ultimately § 195] is not intended to create any 
presumptions about the state of the law concerning start-up expenditures in prior taxable 
years." ld. 
411 Id. at 114-15 (supplemental statement of Gerald W. Padwe). 
1986] Start-Up Costs 107 
separate and distinct additional asset. "482 The Fifth Circuit also 
added the costs capitalized under the "origin-of-the-claim" doc-
trine to the nonamortizable basis of the indefinite-life permits,488 
just as the Claims Court in Cleveland Electric Illuminating added 
the cost of pre-opening staff training to similar permits.484 Thus, 
under their view expansion costs of new branches could not be de-
ducted currently under section 162 and could not be amortized 
under either current case law (as they could under the separate 
asset approach adopted by the NCNB I panel) or logically under 
section 195 (due to the Committee Report approach). Here too, of 
course, the incorporated case law as to expansion costs developed a 
conflict: Central Texas Savings & Loan, Cleveland Electric Illu-
minating, and perhaps Ellis Banking versus NCNB II.•n 
2. Suggested Solutions 
The Department of the Treasury may be expected to apply a 
strict view to expansion of a business under current section 195, 
defining the "same business" very narrowly and thus broadening 
the scope of the preemptive capitalizaton of the 1984 version of the 
statute. Treasury may determine, e.g., that a new branch is to be 
treated as a new business. In essence, this is the consequence of 
the Central Texas Savings & Loan approach. With the section 195 
preemption as to targeted start-up costs, this will encourage tax-
payers to elect section 195 more frequently as to expansion costs, 
the original goal of the Treasury. This approach also will have the 
benefit of providing some deductions to taxpayers expanding to 
••• 731 F.2d at 1185. 
••• The permit costs were recurring, but only as part of the acquisition process; they 
would end when expansion ended. Market surveys apparently were regularly made indepen-
dently of acquisitions, but even if made solely for acquisitions such surveys could be a bene-
fit only so long as they were not supplanted by changing market conditions. See NCNB I, 
651 F.2d at 946 n.5; cf. Iowa-Des Moines Nat'! Bank v. Commissioner, 592 F.2d 433, 436 
(8th Cir. 1979). In Iowa-Des Moines National Bank, although the value of the permits con-
tinued undiminished as long as the branch continued-a classic capital expendi-
ture-unfortunately no amortization was available due to the absence of a determinable life. 
ld.; see Gunn, supra note 5, at 490-91 & n.219; see also Nachman v. Commissioner, 191 F.2d 
934, 936 (5th Cir. 1951). Market survey costs and permit costs should, therefore, be treated 
differently under a distortion of income analysis. The two NCNB decisions and Central 
Texas Savings & Loan failed to do so . 
... 7 Cl. Ct. at 229. 
••• See supra notes 287-97 and accompanying text. 
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new branches in the Fifth Circuit. If Treasury applies a broad 
reading of the "same business" to encompass expansion to a 
branch in a different location, then potentially a taxpayer, at least 
in the Fifth Circuit, will not be entitled to elect section 195. Addi-
tionally, under the Fifth Circuit view, such taxpayer will be able 
neither to deduct these costs currently under section 162 nor to 
amortize them under section 167. This result should be avoided at 
all costs. 
The ideal solution is statutory "reform" treating identical start-
up and expansion costs identically, ranging from immediate deduc-
tion to various periods of amortizations depending upon the fre-
quency of the expenditure and its useful life. If this does not occur, 
then courts choosing the second activist option should apply the 
exception to section 195 for the expansion of the same business 
very broadly, carving out many cases from the statute's scope. 
Each class of expansion costs should therefore be set up as a sepa-
rate asset currently deductible or amortizable over its "estimated" 
useful life, equitably determined under Cohan if necessary. 
E. Active Business: "When I use a word, . . . it means just 
what I choose it to mean-neither more nor less. "488 
1. Source of the Problem 
The drafters of the original section 195 did not want the costs of 
starting-up or investigating an investment to be eligible for section 
195's sixty-month amortization.487 The statute was meant to "en-
courage formation of new businesses";488 therefore, section 195 re-
quires that amortizable start-up costs relate to the investigation or 
creation of an active business, or to a profit-motivated activity 
which, it is anticipated, will become an active business. In adopting 
the term "active business," however, the drafters of section 195 
recklessly plunged into one of the true Serbonian Bogs of the tax 
world.489 The term "trade or business" is widely used in the Code, 
... L. Carroll, Through the Looking Glass and What Alice Found There ch. vi (1871), 
reprinted in The Annotated Alice 269 (M. Gardner ed. 1960) (statement of Humpty 
Dumpty) . 
.., S. Rep. No. 1036, supra note 9, at 12 . 
... ld. at 11. 
••• See, e.g., Whitman, Draining the Serbonian Bog: A New Approach to Corporate Sepa-
rations Under the 1954 Code, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1194 (1968). 
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purportedly interchangeably, and while "active conduct of a trade 
or business" and closely related terms are used less commonly, 
conflicts abound in connection with the usage of both terms in va-
rious regulations and the cases, as has been noted by commenta-
tors.490 The drafters of the 1980 Committee Reports badly com-
pounded the confusion by referring to "an active trade or business 
(within the meaning of Code sec. 162)."491 Traditionally, section 
162 is thought to impose only a "trade or business" requirement, 
and a rather easy standard to meet at that, while other Code provi-
sions (such as sections 355 and 954(c)(3)(A)) using "active trade or 
business" or "active conduct of a trade or business" require some-
thing more than a mere trade or business, particularly in the con-
text of rental real estate.492 The 1984 amendments of section 195 
only intensified this confusion. 493 
2. Conduct Versus Active Conduct: Overview 
The term "trade or business" appears more frequently in the 
Code than "active trade or business" and related terms.494 Al-
though the lines between investment and trade or business have 
long been blurred (especially in the Tax Court), for largely histori-
cal reasons,'96 the more recent view is that the distinction between 
an investment and a trade or business lies in the intensity of the 
••• See, e.g., Lee, "Active Conduct" Distinguished from "Conduct" of a Rental Real Es-
tate Business, 25 Tax Law. 317 (1972). 
••• S. Rep. No. 1036, supra note 9, at 12 (emphasis added). 
••• Lee, supra note 490, at 325-26. 
••• See S. Print No. 169, supra note 348, at 283. 
••• Lee, supra note 490, at 317. 
••• Prior to 1942, only property used in a trade or business, unlike investment property, 
could give rise to deductions for depreciation and operating expenses. 2 B. Bittker, supra 
note 5, 11 51.3, at 51-31 n.10. Consequently, the predecessor to the Tax Court essentially 
espoused the position that renting of real estate was automatically a trade or business. See, 
e.g., Fackler v. Commissioner, 45 B.T.A. 708, 714 (1941), aff'd, 133 F.2d 509 (6th Cir. 1943). 
This position was maintained even after the enactment of the predecessors to §§ 167(a)(2) 
and 212. See Hazard v. Commissioner, 7 T.C. 372, 375-76 (1946); accord Elliot v. Commis-
sioner, 32 T.C. 283, 289 (1959); see also Lee, supra note 490, at 318-19; Comment, The Sin-
gle Rental as a Trade or Business Under the Internal Revenue Code, 23 U. Chi. L. Rev. 111, 
113-17 (1955). Other tribunals looked instead for regular and continuous management of 
rental activities. Fackler v. Commissioner, 133 F.2d 509 (6th Cir. 1943); Grier v. United 
States, 120 F. Supp 395 (D. Conn. 1954), aff'd mem., 218 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 1955); Bauer v. 
United States, 168 F. Supp. 539 (Ct. Cl. 1958). See generally Rothman, Capital Assets-Sale 
of a Business or Property Used in a Trade or Business, 447 Tax Mgmt. (BNA) A-18, A-22 
(1983). 
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taxpayer's activities. Thus, a taxpayer can transform almost any 
section 212 investment activity into a section 162 trade or business 
by intensifying his participation.496 Consequently, rental of a single 
piece of property, or even of an important project, can constitute 
an investment activity or a trade or business, or shift back and 
forth from one status to the other depending upon the intensity of 
the taxpayer's management or rental activities.497 Significantly, 
under this analysis net leasing property does not qualify as a trade 
or business. "98 
Active conduct of a trade or business, on the other hand, gener-
ally requires a taxpayer to engage in "entrepreneurial endeavors of 
such a nature and to such an extent as to qualitatively distinguish 
its operations from mere investments.""99 In the context of active 
conduct of a rental real estate trade or business, the taxpayer gen-
erally must perform significant operational management ser-
vices;~00 net leasing property alone obviously will not qualify under 
this standard.~01 A well-known provision in the pre-Subchapter S 
Revision Act regulations, which is followed in several other regula-
tions, sought to distinguish between passive and active rental busi-
nesses based upon whether the taxpayer rendered significant ser-
vices to the tenant, with maid servies qualifying, but not 
furnishing utilities, cleaning public areas, or collecting trash. ~02 
406 Hoopengarner v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 538, 543 n.8 (1983), afrd mem., 745 F.2d 166 
(9th Cir. 1984) . 
• .., Hoopengarner pinned these otherwise sound conclusions on several cases; unfortu-
nately these cases did not address the issue surrounding the applicability of § 162 versus § 
212. Thus, Hoopengarner, and not the "precedents" upon which it relied, constitutes the 
best authority. 
••• Union Nat'! Bank v. United States, 195 F. Supp. 382 (N.D.N.Y. 1961); Lee, supra note 
490, at 320-21. See generally Lee, Functional Divisions and Other Corporate Separations 
Under Section 355 After Rafferty, 27 Tax L. Rev. 453, 462-66 (1972). 
400 Rafferty v. Commissioner, 452 F.2d 767, 772 (1st Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 922 
(1972); see Rothenberg v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 369, 373 (1967); Treas. Reg. § 1.954-
2(d)(l)(ii)(a)(2); Rev. Rul. 79-394, 1979-2 C.B. 141; Lee, supra note 463, at 199. 
••• Cohen & Conzelmann, Corporate Separations-Active Business Requirement, 224-3rd 
Tax Mgmt. (BNA) A-4, A-8 (1981). 
001 Rafferty, 452 F.2d at 772-73; see Gada v. United States, 460 F. Supp. 849 (D. Conn. 
1978); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.355-3(c) (Ex. 5). See generally Cohen & Conzelmann, supra note 
500, at A-6; Lee, supra note 498, at 463. Net leasing coupled, however, with extensive acqui-
sition, financing, and construction activities may constitute active conduct of a rental busi-
ness. King v. Commissioner, 458 F.2d 245 (6th Cir. 1972) . 
... Treas. Reg. § 1.1372-4(b)(5)(vi). Similar distinctions are drawn in other regulations. 
See, e.g., Treas. Reg. §§ 1.167(j)-3(b), 1.1402(aH(c)(2); see also City Markets, Inc. v. Com-
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Under this rule, payments for use or occupancy of private resi-
dences, apartments, offices, and shopping malls constitute "pas-
sive" rental income, while the regulations treated similar payments 
for motel rooms as active income. 1103 Such degree of activity is not 
required under most active conduct of a trade or business 
provisions. 1104 
3. Initial Legislative History of Section 195 as Enacted 
The 1980 Committee Reports explained that the active business 
requirement was intended to preclude amortization of the investi-
gatory and start-up costs attributable to an investment. "For this 
purpose, an activity with respect to which expenses are deductible 
only as itemized deductions for individuals (Code sec. 212) is not 
considered to be a trade or business. "ClOG The Reports also warned 
that use in a trade or business under section 1231 would not deter-
mine whether the activity was a section 195 trade or business.1108 
Significantly, the comparable trade or business status provision of 
section 1221(2)1107 is one of the areas where some courts, purporting 
to use section 162 as their model, stretched the term "trade or bus-
iness," especially as to rental property, finding such status in a sin-
gle rental of residential property. 1108 
missioner, 433 F.2d 1240, 1242 (6th Cir. 1970); Bramlette Building Corp. v. Commissioner, 
424 F.2d 751 (5th Cir. 1970); Feingold v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 461 (1968) . 
... Treas. Reg. § 1.1372-4(b)(5)(iv). 
604 See Lee, supra note 490, at 326-28; Lee, supra note 498, at 464. 
••• S. Rep. No. 1036, supra note 9, at 12 . 
... Id. 
007 See I.R.C. § 1221(2) (relating to the definition of "capital asset"); 2 B. Bittker, supra 
note 5, 11 54.1.3, at 54-8. 
008 See, e.g., Crawford v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 678 (1951), acq., 1951-2 C.B. 2. Some 
earlier reported decisions made a distinction between improved and unimproved rental re-
alty, with only the former automatically considered a trade or business. Compare Hazard v. 
Commissioner, 7 T.C. 372 (1946) (improved realty), acq., 1946-2 C.B. 3 with Emery v. Com-
missioner, 17 T.C. 308 (1951) (sale of unimproved realty). But cf. Curphey v. Commissioner, 
73 T.C. 766 (1980) (relying on factual determination in lieu of dichotomy between improved 
and unimproved real property). Other decisions, however, also indicated that the rental of 
even improved real estate did not qualify where the taxpayer's activities were minimal. See, 
e.g., Grier v. United States, 120 F. Supp. 395 (D. Conn. 1954), affd., 182 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 
1955). The Service reversed its earlier position by stating it would apply a facts and circum-
stances test to all rental real estate. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8,350,008 (Aug. 23, 1983). Moreover, 
since the improved real estate in question was net leased, the taxpayer engaging in little or 
no activity as to the property, the loss on the sale was a capital loss and not a § 1231 loss, 
i.e., a loss as to real property used in the taxpayer's trade or business. Id. 
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Finally, the 1980 Committee Reports required, in the case of 
rental activities, "significant furnishing of services incident to the 
rentals to constitute an active business (within the meaning of 
Code sec. 162) rather than an investment."1109 The earlier House 
Report stopped at this point,1110 thus raising the question whether 
the more intense level of activity test of the Subchapter S regula-
tions was intended. The drafters of the 1980 legislative history, ap-
parently belatedly realizing the potential impact of their choice of 
words, added in the subsequent Senate Report that generally "the 
operation of an apartment complex, an office building, or a shop-
ping center would constitute an active trade or business,m thus 
manifesting that the more rigorous Subchapter S test was not the 
intention of the Reports. 
In summary, the start-up cost bill as introduced used the term 
"trade or business"1112 and the drafters probably added "active" 
just to deal with the historical blurring of the line between invest-
ment and trade or business rental property. Unfortunately the 
drafters again chose the format of a bare-bones statutory reference 
fleshed out by the Committee Reports, attempting to incorporate 
existing reference points, and again generated confusion based on 
pre-existing conflicts as to the meaning of the statutory referent. 
4. 1984 Amendments 
Prior to Hoopengarner, Congress' goal was a narrow construc-
tion of "active business" so that pre-operating investment costs 
could not be amortized under section 195, nor deducted currently 
under then section 212 precedents.1118 Hoopengarner changed the 
ground rules suddenly, providing the potential for a section 212 
deduction for start-up (but not investigatory) costs of a new in-
vestment activity. Equipment leasing tax shelters usually involve 
net leased property, as is also often the case with single tenant real 
estate and with commercial real estate,1114 so that all of these activi-
ties standing alone failed to constitute an active trade or business 
aott S. Rep. No. 1036, supra note 9, at 12. 
••• H.R. Rep. No. 1278, supra note 306, at 11 . 
., S. Rep. No. 1036, supra note 9, at 12 . 
.,. H.R. 5729, reprinted in 1980 Hearings, supra note 2, at 181. 
"'" See supra note 176. 
014 Staff of the Joint Comm. on Tax'n, Handbook on Tax Shelters 52-53 (1976). 
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under traditional authorities. Hoopengarner could be used in these 
situations to obtain current deductions for pre-opening costs under 
section 212, but not for investigatory costs, as soon as an asset to 
be used in the activity is acquired, and perhaps even earlier when 
contractual obligations identifying the activity are assumed. So 
long as such activities are never "anticipated" to rise to active bus-
iness status, they would not be caught by the new anti-Hoopen-
garner additional definition of start-up costs.5111 Therefore, such 
activities would not be capitalized under post-1984 section 195(a). 
Clearly, the drafters of the Committee Reports accompanying the 
1984 version of section 195 wanted a broader definition of "active 
business" to render the preemptive section 195516 applicable, deny-
ing the current deduction of pre-operating costs of such net leased 
property under section 212.517 
In 1984 Congress amended section 195, "clarifying" the deduc-
tion of start-up expenditures, so "that the rent expenses permitted 
as a deduction in Hoopengarner, and similar expenditures, will be 
subject to this provison. "518 The drafters added to the two existing 
1980 categories of start-up costs (investigation of an active busi-
ness and creation of an active business) a third category, i.e., "any 
activity engaged in for profit and for the production of income 
before the day on which the active trade or business begins, in an-
ticipation of such activity becoming an active trade or business."519 
Congress did not change the wording of the 1980 categories. To 
back up this definition, preempting any deduction of start-up costs 
under section 212 or section 162, Congress provided in new section 
195(a) that all start-up costs had to be "capitalized"520 by denying 
any deduction except for the sixty-month or more amortization de-
ductions under section 195.m Congress believed that "start-up ex-
"'" See infra notes 418-23 and accompanying text. 
••• See supra note 348 and accompanying text. 
••• S. Print No. 169, supra note 348, at 283 . 
••• ld. 
••• Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 94(a), 98 Stat. 494, 615 (codified at 
I.R.C. § 195(c)(1)(A)(iii)). 
••• See I.R.C. § 195(a) (1984). The drafters of the legislative history stated that "the com-
mittee believes that it is appropriate to require such expenses to be capitalized unless the 
taxpayer elects to amortize the start-up expenditures over a period of not less than 60 
months." S. Print No. 169, supra note 348, at 283. Actually, capitalization is not usually an 
alternative to amortization, but rather a precondition. 
"
11 Exceptions are provided for deductions under §§ 163, 164, and 174. See supra note 
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penditures generally result in the creation of an asset which has a 
useful life which extends substantially beyond the year in which 
incurred."1122 Thus, the Hoopengarner-type pre-opening ground 
rent deductions will constitute start-up costs, and therefore cannot 
be deducted under section 212, but only may be amortized under 
section 195. 
Regarding net leased property, if the net leasing activity never 
rises to an active business status, the pre-opening stage expendi-
tures of the activity do not constitute capitalizable start-up costs 
under section 195, and can be deducted currently under the 
Hoopengarner reading of section 212. Congress made no change in 
section 195 itself regarding net lease property, other than the gen-
eral anti-Hoopengarner amendment in new section 
195(c)(1)(A)(iii). Rather, following the now familiar, and disas-
trous, 1980 model, the congressional staff attempted to change the 
meaning of "active business" via the Committee Reports to the 
1984 amendments: 
Active trade or business means that the taxpayer is actively con-
ducting a trade or business. This definition of active trade or busi-
ness may include a trade or business that is in many respects pas-
sive. For example, a business where property is regularly [leased?] 
based on a net lease basis is an active trade or business for this 
purpose. 623 
Thus, the 1984 legislative history shifted, in the context of rental 
activities, from a "significant furnishing of services" standard to 
regularly leasing. The latter, but surely not the former, test would 
catch net leased property, including equipment leasing tax shelters 
and leasing of commercial real estate. 
Is the 1984 formulation of "active business" as to net leased 
property consistent with the 1980 test for rental activities? Judged 
on the basis of established precedent,1124 the answer must be no. 
Active conduct of a rental business requires significant services 
with respect to the management or operation of the property, or 
441. 
••• S. Print No. 169, supra note 348, at 282; accord Johnsen v. Commissioner, 794 F.2d 
1157 (6th Cir. 1986). 
••• S. Print No. 169, supra note 348, at 283. 
••• See supra notes 494-504 and accompanying text. 
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both.525 Net leasing on a regular basis alone will satisfy neither ac-
tive conduct aspect. Moreover, such a "regular basis" test comes 
perilously close to the sections 1221(2) to 1231 precedents,526 ex-
plicitly disavowed by the 1980 Committee Reports.527 Additionally, 
the Federal Circuit recently ruled that regular, extensive, and con-
tinuous activities do not in and of themselves establish trade or 
business status. 528 
To the extent that the 1980 and 1984 Committee Reports con-
flict as to the application of the "active business" concept to rental 
activities, the 1984 version is technically ineffective in changing 
the meaning of the term enacted in 1980. Should the 1984 version 
prevail? During the 1984 rearrangement of section 195, the 1980 
definition of start-up costs, i.e., costs incurred in investigation or 
creation of an active business, remained unchanged529 except for 
the addition of the anti-Hoopengarner clause covering a section 
212 activity that it is anticipated will become an active business. 
Assuming that "active business" means the same for (1) investigat-
ing and creating an active business and (2) holding for profit and 
the production of income in anticipation of becoming an active 
business, the 1984 Committee Report in effect technically ex-
plained the meaning of the term as used in the 1980 Act. Indeed, 
the 1984 legislative history explained that the Senate Finance 
Committee "intends that the definition of start-up expenditures be 
generally the same as under present law but clarifies the definition 
to cover certain pre-opening costs. "530 
Judicial application of and reliance on statutory construction in 
congressional committee reports, as well as more informal legisla-
tive history, has intensified in recent years.531 In the process, 
courts have often discarded old maxims of statutory construc-
tion.532 One of these traditional rules is that evidence of later con-
gressional understanding of a previously enacted statute has no in-
••• See supra notes 496-504 and accompanying text. 
••• See, e.g., Hazard v. Commissioner, 7 T.C. 372 (1946), acq., 1946-2 C.B. 3. 
017 S. Print No. 169, supra note 348, at 283. 
••• Moller v. United States, 721 F.2d 810, 814 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
••• Compare I.R.C. §§ 195(c)(1)(A)(i), (ii) (1985) with I.R.C. § 195(b)(l)(A), (B) (1981). 
••• S. Print No. 169, supra note 348, at 283. 
••• Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme 
Court Term, 68 Iowa L. Rev. 195 (1983) . 
••• ld. 
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terpretive effect as to the intent of the earlier Congress.1133 More 
recently the prevalent approach with regard to tax law is that the 
view of a later Congress will not establish definitively the meaning 
of an earlier enactment, but it is entitled to consideration "as a 
secondarily authoritative expression of expert opinion."1134 How-
ever, the maxim is still used that views of a subsequent Congress 
cannot override the unmistakable intent of the enacting one.11311 
The discussion in the 1980 Committee Reports of the "signifi-
cant furnishing of services" test interpreted the active business re-
quirement for start-up and investigatory expenses in the 1980 Act. 
The 1984 amendments did not change the existing definition of 
active business for start-up or investigatory expenses, but only 
added a category of expenses incurred in an activity which is antic-
ipated to become, although it is not yet, an active business. Thus, 
the 1984 Committee Report's pronouncements on the meaning of 
active trade or business technically interpreted the definition con-
tained in the 1980 Act, since the definition itself remained un-
changed by the 1984 Act. Indeed, the 1984 Report stated that the 
Senate Finance Committee "intends that the definition of start-up· 
expenditures be generally the same as under present law but clari-
fies the definition to cover certain pre-opening costs."1136 However, 
since the 1980 and 1984 definitions of "active trade or business" in 
fact conflict, technically the 1984 Report is ineffective to change 
the meaning of the term as enacted in 1980. Although the 1980 
definition should therefore technically prevail, the reality is that in 
both 1980 and 1984 Congress chose to "enact" definitions through 
committee reports rather than through a more detailed statute. In 
essence, the 1984 Committee Report definition is merely a "techni-
••• See, e.g., Waterman Steamship Corp. v. United States, 381 U.S. 252, 268-69 (1965) 
(House and Senate Reports accompanying a vetoed attempt to amend the Merchant Ship 
Sales Act of 1946 had little significance); United States v. Wise,- 370 U.S. 405, 411 (1962) 
(subsequent interpretation of the Sherman Act by several Congressmen, unsuccessful in 
their attempt to amend the statute, had no persuasive significance). 
••• Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 220, 228 (1985); accord 
Johnsen, 794 F.2d at 1163 (subsequent congressional views carried some weight and could 
not be ignored where clearly relevant); cf. Bobsee Corp. v. United States, 411 F.2d 231, 237 
n.18 (5th Cir. 1969) (subsequent committee reports were not part of legislative history, but 
should not be disregarded altogether because they constituted secondary expert opinion). 
••• International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 354 n.39 (1977) (views 
of a subsequent Congress were entitled to little, if any, weight). 
••• S. Print No. 169, supra note 348, at 283. 
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cal corrections act" amending the 1980 legislation by committee 
report. The proper question, therefore, is whether this "amend-
ment" of the definition of "active trade or business" by the 1984 
Committee Report is prospective only. It is clear, in any event, 
that the 1984 Report is to be treated in fact as a command and not 
as an interpretation of the earlier definition. 
Regardless of whether the 1984 Committee Report's extension of 
section 195 to net leased property is upheld by the courts (and it 
probably will be, the standards of construing statutes notwith-
standing, if the obvious trend in recent business expansion cases, 
i.e., leaving it to Congress,037 is any portent), this problem well il-
lustrates the dangers in following the "simplification" approach of 
bare-bones statutory language, fleshed out by regulations for which 
the committee reports are to serve as a blueprint. Congress could 
have defined "active trade or business" for purposes of section 195 
as it desired in 1980 and 1984. The Committee Report approaches 
of looking to section 162 for the content of "active trade or busi-
ness" and then abandoning a "substantial services" test for a "reg-
ular conduct" test, however, pose the danger of widespread ramifi-
cations throughout the Code, since section 195 purports to use a 
standard term and meaning. 
The final question is whether the orignal function of the section 
195 active trade or business test-to preclude amortization of ex-
penditures attributable to an investment-can still be accom-
plished with the new formulation of "active trade or business," 
(e.g., regularly leasing on a net lease basis). The essential distinc-
tion between an investment and a business is that an investment 
involves mere collection of income and/or possibly holding for 
long-term appreciation, while a trade or business requires signifi-
cant activity beyond collection of income, however regular. 038 Just 
as with the ordinary deduction in the expansion/operation exclu-
sion of capital expenditure costs morass, the drafters of the 1984 
Senate Finance Committee Report lost sight of the forest-the ex-
clusion of investment costs. 
••• See supra notes 310-11 and accompanying text . 
... See Moller v. United States, 721 F.2d 810, 814-15 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Rothman, supra 
note 495, at A-22. Trade or business status may differ, however, as to securities (involved in 
Moller) and real estate. See Lee, supra note 490, at 323-24. 
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5. Suggested Solution 
Ideally, a revised statute ending the disparity in treatment of 
investigatory and start-up costs between old and new trades or 
businesses would also end the disparity, if any, between start-up 
and investigatory costs of old and new investment activities. If 
Congress intends to continue to limit section 195 amortization to 
trade or business activities, however, then the statute itself should 
focus on the functional distinctions between investment activities 
and trade or business activities. The pertinent factors should in-
clude the level of intensity of the taxpayer's activity, the effect of 
the use of agents, the status of a single rental activity, and the type 
of rental activities. Moreover, any congressional revision should 
also expressly consider the applicability of the revised provision to 
areas analogous to start-up costs where distinctions traditionally 
have been drawn between identical expenditures incurred prior to 
obtaining trade or business status as an employee and those in-
curred after obtaining such status, e.g., costs of seeking a job in a 
new field versus seeking a new job in the same field and costs of 
education, beyond the minimum requirements, incurred before and 
after trade or business status is attained.1139 
If Congress does not make such changes, the effect of the 1984 
definition of active trade or business will remain unsettled. Most 
likely, courts will accept regulations based on the new definition, 
at least prospectively. The more difficult task will be drafting the 
Treasury Regulations, which should adopt functional criteria, as 
well as fashion a test covering a taxpayer regularly leasing property 
on a net lease basis but excluding other passive investments. 
V. CoNcLusiON 
The case-law treatment of start-up and business expansion costs 
illustrates well the dangers of applying definitional approaches in 
the attempt to distinguish ordinary expenses from capital expendi-
tures and to determine the degree of reasonable accuracy required 
for estimating the useful life of an intangible for purposes of amor-
tization. A functional clear reflection of income approach would 
have viewed current deduction, capitalization, amortization, and 
estimation of useful life as interrelated. The denial of both a cur-
... See supra note 274 and accompanying text. 
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rent deduction and any amortization of capitalized start-up costs 
by these definitional rules created distortion of income or inequity. 
To avoid inequity some courts, rather than functionally challeng-
ing these definitional rules, created their own definitional separate, 
saleable property test. These courts, and some commentators, 
thought that the "rough justice" of currently deducting an expen-
diture, regardless of whether its benefits were short- or long-lived, 
produced less distortion of income than no deduction at all. The 
cases, however, splintered as to when a business began . and 
whether an expansion involved the same business. Some decisions 
also disregarded the corporate entity to allow current deduction 
and amortization. Section 195 senselessly perpetuates every one of 
these conflicts. 
Some decisions, however, applied a functional approach to start-
up and business expansion expenditures. To avoid the distortion of 
income that arose from the ali-or-nothing approach of both the 
separate, saleable asset test· and the preparatory doctrine, Judge 
Murnaghan in NCNB I turned to an accounting concept. He 
treated the expenditure benefiting future years as itself creating a 
separate, amortizable asset. If the expenditure was short-term or 
fell into other instances in which a current deduction of an expen-
diture benefiting future years would not distort income, Judge 
Murnaghan would have permitted a current deduction of start-up 
and business expansion costs. 640 
The difficulty in this functional approach lies not in its concep-
tual foundation but rather in practical administration. Treasury 
has provided no standard for classes of useful lives of intangibles. 
Consequently, under a capitalization and amortization approach to 
start-up and business expansion costs, the taxpayer-and the 
courts-must determine useful life in each case on its own facts. It 
is unlikely that courts can apply the Cohan doctrine to create class 
lives or even accelerated rates as a reasonable allowance for amor-
tization. Thus, controversies will continue. In order for capitaliza-
tion and amortization to work in tandem to avoid distortion of in-
come, a liberal approach to estimating useful life of intangibles 
must be taken. Basically, the view of the Cohan rule-that a court 
must approximate if there is some deduction-should be applied 
to an intangible when it is shown that the intangible is a wasting 
040 NCNB I, 651 F.2d at 956-57, 961-62. 
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asset or that the present investment at some point can no longer 
reasonably be matched with income. Unfortunately, the reality is 
that many opinions, in particular Tax Court decisions, require a 
reasonable basis for a Cohan approximation, including estimation 
of useful life. Thus, controversy will likely result as to the proper 
determination of useful life. Furthermore, the basic conflict be-
tween those tribunals following the definitional approaches and 
those adopting the functional approach will continue. Indeed, in 
NCNB II the Fourth Circuit reversed Judge Murnaghan's func-
tional approach by applying the definitional separate, saleable test. 
Therefore, most courts following the lead of NCNB II may be 
expected to "bow to the will of Congress" gladly and cede start-up 
costs to section 195. Unfortunately, section 195 is as deeply flawed 
as the prior definitional approaches that constitute its conceptual 
foundation. The lack of deep structure analysis in the statute has 
resulted in self -contradiction, in light of which the drafters have 
sought to impose an "ordinary" prerequisite for deducting expend-
itures they regard as creating benefits lasting substantially beyond 
the tax year. Section 195 continues the disparity between new and 
existing businesses, with the former required to amortize expendi-
tures that are currently deductible by the latter. Thus, perversely, 
tax policy grants a slower, and hence less valuable, deduction to 
the entrepreneur who is least likely to have access to capital or 
debt markets because he is in a new business, while giving an im-
mediate, and hence more valuable, deduction to an existing busi-
ness-"an excellent illustration of a cart-before-horse policy."1141 
Section 195 is further flawed by its method of drafting: a bare-
bones statute with regulations to supply the details. Even if this 
concept has merit, the realities are that Congress, through the 
Joint Committee staff, has attempted to direct the course of the 
regulations through detailed legislative history. Perhaps due to the 
absence of the discipline required in drafting a detailed technical 
statute, these Committee Reports were replete with errors, confu-
sion, and contradicton. Hence, it can be said that the will of Con-
gress was reasonably clear, but-sadly-technically deficient. 
Treasury, however, probably will draft regulations that ulti-
mately will work. Courts probably will approve them, by and large . 
.. , 1980 Hearings, supra note 2, at 107 (statement of Gerald W. Padwe, Associate Na-
tional Director, Tax Services, Touche Ross & Co.). 
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Section 195 probably will preempt section 162, as well as section 
212, in the start-up area. In the interim, until the regulations are 
finalized, and depending upon the choices made in those regula-
tions, total confusion will reign. In the end, section 195 has failed 
utterly at simplification and does not achieve parity. One can only 
agree with Judge Murnaghan that the failure of the prevalent case 
law and repeated remedial statutes-ultimately traceable in both 
instances to the same lack of deep structure analysis-to treat 
start-up and business expansion costs equitably and similarly "fur-
ther contributes to the deserved [pre-1986] description of our in-
come tax system as a disgrace. "1142 
041 NCNB II, 684 F.2d at 296 (Murnaghan, J. dissenting). 
